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Abstract: Talk of linguistic universals has given cognitive scientists the impression that languages are all built to a common pattern. In
fact, there are vanishingly few universals of language in the direct sense that all languages exhibit them. Instead, diversity can be found
at almost every level of linguistic organization. This fundamentally changes the object of enquiry from a cognitive science perspective.
This target article summarizes decades of cross-linguistic work by typologists and descriptive linguists, showing just how few and
unprofound the universal characteristics of language are, once we honestly confront the diversity offered to us by the world’s 6,000
to 8,000 languages. After surveying the various uses of “universal,” we illustrate the ways languages vary radically in sound,
meaning, and syntactic organization, and then we examine in more detail the core grammatical machinery of recursion,
constituency, and grammatical relations. Although there are significant recurrent patterns in organization, these are better explained
as stable engineering solutions satisfying multiple design constraints, reflecting both cultural-historical factors and the constraints of
human cognition.
Linguistic diversity then becomes the crucial datum for cognitive science: we are the only species with a communication system that
is fundamentally variable at all levels. Recognizing the true extent of structural diversity in human language opens up exciting new
research directions for cognitive scientists, offering thousands of different natural experiments given by different languages, with
new opportunities for dialogue with biological paradigms concerned with change and diversity, and confronting us with the
extraordinary plasticity of the highest human skills.
Keywords: Chomsky; coevolution; constituency; culture; dependency; evolutionary theory; Greenberg; linguistic diversity; linguistic
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1. Introduction
According to Chomsky, a visiting Martian scientist would surely
conclude that aside from their mutually unintelligible vocabularies,
Earthlings speak a single language.
— Steven Pinker (1994, p. 232)
Languages are much more diverse in structure than cogni-
tive scientists generally appreciate. A widespread assump-
tion among cognitive scientists, growing out of the
generative tradition in linguistics, is that all languages
are English-like but with different sound systems and
vocabularies. The true picture is very different: languages
differ so fundamentally from one another at every level of
description (sound, grammar, lexicon, meaning) that it is
very hard to find any single structural property they
share. The claims of Universal Grammar, we argue here,
are either empirically false, unfalsifiable, or misleading
in that they refer to tendencies rather than strict
universals. Structural differences should instead be
accepted for what they are, and integrated into a new
approach to language and cognition that places diversity
at centre stage.
The misconception that the differences between
languages are merely superficial, and that they can be
resolved by postulating a more abstract formal level at
which individual language differences disappear, is
serious: it now pervades a great deal of work done in
psycholinguistics, in theories of language evolution,
language acquisition, neurocognition, parsing and speech
recognition, and just about every branch of the cognitive
sciences. Even scholars like Christiansen and Chater
(2008), concerned to demonstrate the evolutionary impossi-
bility of pre-evolved constraints, employ the term Universal
Grammar as if it were an empirically verified construct. A
great deal of theoretical work within the cognitive sciences
thus risks being vitiated, at least if it purports to be investi-
gating a fixed human language processing capacity, rather
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than just the particular form this takes in some well-known
languages like English and Japanese.
How did this widespread misconception of language uni-
formity come about? In part, this can be attributed simply
to ethnocentrism – most cognitive scientists, linguists
included, speak only the familiar European languages, all
close cousins in structure. But in part it can be attributed
to misleading advertizing copy issued by linguists them-
selves. Unfortunate sociological splits in the field have left
generative and typological linguists with completely differ-
ent views of what is proven science, without shared rules
of argumentation that would allow them to resolve the
issue – and in dialogue with cognitive scientists it has
been the generativists who have been taken as representing
the dominant view. As a result, Chomsky’s notion of Univer-
sal Grammar (UG) has been mistaken, not for what it is –
namely, the programmatic label for whatever it turns out
to be that all children bring to learning a language – but
for a set of substantial research findings about what all
languages have in common. For the substantial findings
about universals across languages one must turn to the
field of linguistic typology, which has laid bare a bewildering
range of diverse languages, where the generalizations are
really quite hard to extract. Chomsky’s views, filtered
through various commentators, have been hugely influen-
tial in the cognitive sciences, because they combine philoso-
phically sophisticated ideas and mathematical approaches
to structure with claims about the innate endowment for
language that are immediately relevant to learning theorists,
cognitive psychologists, and brain scientists. Even though
psychologists learned from the linguistic wars of the 1970s
(Newmeyer 1986) to steer clear from too close an associ-
ation with any specific linguistic theory, the underlying
idea that all languages share the same structure at some
abstract level has remained pervasive, tying in nicely to
the modularity arguments of recent decades (Fodor 1983).
It will take a historian of science to unravel the causes
of this ongoing presumption of underlying language uni-
formity. But a major reason is simply that there is a lack
of communication between theorists in the cognitive
sciences and those linguists most in the know about lin-
guistic diversity. This is partly because of the reluctance
by most descriptive and typological linguists to look up
from their fascinating particularistic worlds and engage
with the larger theoretical issues in the cognitive
sciences. Outsiders have instead taken the articulate
envoys from the universalizing generativist camp to
represent the consensus view within linguistics. But
there are other reasons as well: the relevant literature
is forbiddingly opaque to outsiders, bristling with
arcane phonetic symbols and esoteric terminologies.
Our first goal (sect. 2) in this article, then, is to survey
some of the linguistic diversity that has been largely
ignored in the cognitive sciences, which shows how differ-
ently languages can be structured at every level: phonetic,
phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic. We
critically evaluate (sect. 3) the kind of descriptive general-
izations (again, misleadingly called “universals”) that have
emerged from careful cross-linguistic comparisons, and
we survey the treacherously different senses of “universal”
that have allowed the term to survive a massive accumu-
lation of counterevidence.
We then turn to three syntactic features that have
recently figured large in debates about the origin of
language: grammatical relations (sect. 4), constituency
(sect. 5), and recursion (sect. 6). How universal are these
features? We conclude that there are plenty of languages
that do not exhibit them in their syntax. What does it
mean for an alleged universal to not apply in a given
case? We will consider the idea of “parameters” and the
idea of UG as a “toolkit” (Jackendoff 2002).
We then turn (sect. 7) to the question of how all this
diversity is to be accounted for. We suggest, first, that lin-
guistic diversity patterns just like biological diversity and
should be understood in the same sorts of ways, with func-
tional pressures and systems constraints engineering con-
stant small changes. Finally (sect. 8), we advance seven
theses about the nature of language as a recently evolved
bio-cultural hybrid. We suggest that refocusing on a
unique property of our communication system, namely
its diversity, is essential to understanding its role in
human cognition.
2. Language diversity
A review of leading publications suggests that cognitive
scientists are not aware of the real range of linguistic diver-
sity. In Box 1, for example, is a list of features, taken from a
BBS publication on the evolution of language, that all
languages are supposed to have – “uncontroversial facts
about substantive universals” (Pinker & Bloom 1990; a
similar list is found in Pinker 1994). But none of these
“uncontroversial facts” are true of all languages, as noted
in the box.
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Box 1. “Every language has X, doesn’t it?”: Proposed substantive universals (from Pinker & Bloom
1990) supposedly common to all languages
1. “Major lexical categories (noun, verb, adjective, preposition)” (! sect. 2.2.4)
2. “Major phrasal categories (noun phrase, verb phrase, etc.)” (! sect. 5)
3. “Phrase structure rules (e.g., “X-bar theory” or “immediate dominance rules”)” (! sect. 5)
4. “Rules of linear order” to distinguish, for example, subject from object, or “case affixes” which “can take over
these functions” (! sect. 5)
5. “Verb affixes” signaling “aspect” and “tense” (including pluperfects) (! sect. 2.2.3)
6. “Auxiliaries”
7. “Anaphoric elements” including pronouns and reflexives
8. “Wh-movement”
There are clear counterexamples to each of these claims. Problems with the first three are discussed in section
2.2.4 and section 5; here are counterexamples to the others:
(4) Some languages (e.g., Riau Indonesian) exhibit neither fixed word-order nor case-marking (Gil 2001).
(5) Many languages (e.g., Chinese, Malay) do not mark tense (Comrie 1985, pp. 50–55; Norman 1988, p. 163),
and many (e.g., spoken German) lack aspect (Comrie 1976, p. 8).
(6) Many languages lack auxiliaries (e.g., Kayardild, Bininj Gun-wok).
(7) Many languages (e.g. Mwotlap; Franc¸ois 2005, p. 119) lack dedicated reflexive or reciprocal constructions
altogether, so that “they hit them dead” can mean “they killed them,” “they killed themselves,” or “they killed
each other” (Levinson 2000, p. 334 ff.). Some Southeast Asian languages lack clear personal pronouns, using
titles (of the kind “honorable sir”) instead, and many languages lack third-person pronouns (Cysouw 2001).
Sign languages like ASL (American Sign Language) also lack pronouns, using pointing instead.
(8) Not all languages (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Lakhota) move their wh-forms, saying, in effect, “You came to see
who?” instead of “Who did you come to see _” (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997, pp. 424–25).
Some further universalizing claims with counterevidence:
(9) Verbs for “give” always have three arguments (Gleitman 1990); Saliba is a counterexample (Margetts 2007).
(10) No recursion of case (Pinker & Bloom 1990). Kayardild has up to four layers (Evans 1995a; 1995c).
(11) No languages have nominal tense (Pinker & Bloom 1990) – Nordlinger and Sadler (2004) give numerous
counterexamples, such as Guarani “my house-FUTURE-FUTURE” “it will be my future house.”
(12) All languages have numerals (Greenberg 1978b – Konstanz #527). See Everett (2005; Gordon 2004) for
counterexample.
(13) All languages have syntactic constituents, specifically NPs, whose semantic function is to express general-
ized quantifiers over the domain of discourse (Barwise & Cooper 1981 – Konstanz #1203); see Partee (1995)
and sect. 5.
See also collection of “rara” at: http://typo.uni-konstanz.de/rara/intro/index.php
The crucial fact for understanding the place of language
in human cognition is its diversity. For example, languages
may have less than a dozen distinctive sounds, or they may
have 12 dozen, and sign languages do not use sounds at all.
Languages may or may not have derivational morphology
(to make words from other words, e.g., run . runner),
or inflectional morphology for an obligatory set of syntac-
tically consequential choices (e.g., plural the girls are vs.
singular the girl is). They may or may not have constituent
structure (building blocks of words that form phrases),
may or may not have fixed orders of elements, and their
semantic systems may carve the world at quite different
joints. We detail all these dimensions of variation later,
but the point here is this: We are the only known species
whose communication system varies fundamentally in
both form and content. Speculations about the evolution
of language that do not take this properly into account
thus overlook the criterial feature distinctive of the
species. The diversity of language points to the general
importance of cultural and technological adaptation in
our species: language is a bio-cultural hybrid, a product
of intensive gene:culture coevolution over perhaps the
last 200,000 to 400,000 years (Boyd & Richerson 1985;
Enfield & Levinson 2006; Laland et al. 2000; Levinson
& Jaisson 2006).
Why should the cognitive sciences care about language
diversity, apart from their stake in evolutionary questions?
First, a proper appreciation of the diversity completely
alters the psycholinguistic picture: What kind of language
processing machine can handle all this variation? Not the
conventional one, built to handle the parsing of European
sound systems and the limited morphological and syntactic
structures of familiar languages. Imagine a language where
instead of saying, “This woman caught that huge butter-
fly,” one says, something like: “Thatobject thissubject
hugeobject caught womansubject butterflyobject”; such
languages exist (sect. 4). The parsing system for English
cannot be remotely like the one for such a language:
What then is constant about the neural implementation
of language processing across speakers of two such differ-
ent languages? Second, how do children learn languages
of such different structure, indeed languages that vary in
every possible dimension? Can there really be a fixed
“language acquisition device”? These are the classic ques-
tions about how language capacities are implemented
in the mind and in the brain, and the ballgame is
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fundamentally changed when the full range of language
diversity is appreciated.
The cognitive sciences have been partially immunized
against the proper consideration of language diversity by
two tenets of Chomskyan origin. The first is that the differ-
ences are somehow superficial, and that expert linguistic
eyes can spot the underlying common constructional
bedrock. This, at first a working hypothesis, became a
dogma, and it is wrong, in the straightforward sense that
the experts either cannot formulate it clearly, or do not
agree that it is true. The second was an interesting intellec-
tual program that proceeded on the hypothesis that
linguistic variation is “parametric”; that is, that there are
a restricted number of binary switches, which in different
states project out the full set of possible combinations,
explaining observed linguistic diversity (Chomsky 1981;
see also Baker 2001). This hypothesis is now known to
be false as well: its predictions about language acquisition,
language change, and the implicational relations between
linguistic variables simply fail (Newmeyer 2004; 2005).
The conclusion is that the variation has to be taken at
face value – there are fundamental differences in how
languages work, with long historico-cultural roots that
explain the many divergences.
Once linguistic diversity is accepted for what it is, it can
be seen to offer a fundamental opportunity for cognitive
science. It provides a natural laboratory of variation in a
fundamental skill – 7,000 natural experiments in evolving
communicative systems, and as many populations of
experts with exotic expertise. We can ask questions like:
How much longer does it take a child to master 144
distinctive sounds versus 11? How do listeners actually
parse a free word order language? How do speakers plan
the encoding of visual stimuli if the semantic resources
of the language make quite different distinctions? How
do listeners break up the giant inflected words of a poly-
synthetic language? In Bininj Gun-wok (Evans 2003a),
for instance, the single word abanyawoihwarrgahmarne-
ganjginjeng can represent what, in English, would consti-
tute an entire sentence: “I cooked the wrong meat for
them again.” These resources offered by diversity have
scarcely been exploited in systematic ways by the scientific
community: We have a comparative psychology across
species, but not a proper comparative psychology inside
our own species in the central questions that drive cogni-
tive science.
2.1. The current representation of languages
in the world
Somewhere between 5,000 and 8,000 distinct languages
are spoken today. How come we cannot be more
precise? In part because there are definitional problems:
When does a dialect difference become a language differ-
ence (the “languages” Czech and Slovak are far closer in
structure and mutual intelligibility than so-called dialects
of Chinese like Mandarin and Cantonese)? But mostly it
is because academic linguists, especially those concerned
with primary language description, form a tiny commu-
nity, far outnumbered by the languages they should be
studying, each of which takes the best part of a lifetime
to master. Less than 10% of these languages have decent
descriptions (full grammars and dictionaries). Conse-
quently, nearly all generalizations about what is possible
in human languages are based on a maximal 500 languages
sample (in practice, usually much smaller – Greenberg’s
famous universals of language were based on 30), and
almost every new language description still guarantees
substantial surprises.
Ethnologue, the most dependable worldwide source
(http://www.ethnologue.com/), reckons that 82% of the
world’s 6,912 languages are spoken by populations under
100,000, 39% by populations under 10,000. These small
speaker numbers indicate that much of this diversity is
endangered. Ethnologue lists 8% as nearly extinct, and a
language dies every two weeks. This loss of diversity, as
with biological species, drastically narrows our scientific
understanding of what makes a possible human language.
Equally important as the brute numbers are the facts of
relatedness. The number of language families is crucial to
the search for universals, because typologists want to test
hypotheses against a sample of independent languages.
The more closely two languages are related, the less inde-
pendent they are as samplings of the design space. The
question of how many distinct phylogenetic groupings
are found across the world’s languages is highly controver-
sial, although Nichols’ (1992) estimate of 300 “stocks” is
reasonable, and each stock itself can have levels of diver-
gence that make deep-time relationship hard to detect
(English and Bengali within Indo-European; Hausa and
Hebrew within Afroa-Asiatic). In addition, there are
more than 100 isolates, languages with no proven affilia-
tion whatsoever. A major problem for the field is that we
currently have no way of demonstrating higher-level phy-
logenetic groupings that would give us a more principled
way of selecting a maximally independent sample for a
set smaller than these 300 to 400 groups. This may
become more tractable with the application of modern
cladistic techniques (Dunn et al. 2005; Gray & Atkinson
2003; McMahon & McMahon 2006), but such methods
have yet to be fully adopted by the linguistic community.
Suppose then that we think of current linguistic diver-
sity as represented by 7,000 languages falling into 300 or
400 groups. Five hundred years ago, before the expansion
of Western colonization, there were probably twice as
many. Because most surviving languages are spoken by
small ethnic groups, language death continues apace. If
we project back through time, there have probably been
at least half a million human languages (Pagel 2000), so
what we now have is a non-random sample of less than
2% of the full range of human linguistic diversity. It
would be nice to at least be in the position to exploit
that sample, but in fact, as mentioned, we have good infor-
mation for only 10% of that. The fact is that at this stage of
linguistic inquiry, almost every new language that comes
under the microscope reveals unanticipated new features.
2.2. Some dimensions of diversity
In this section we illustrate some of the surprising dimen-
sions of diversity in the world’s languages. We show how
languages may or may not be in the articulatory-auditory
channel, and if they are how their inventories of contras-
tive sounds vary dramatically, how they may or may not
have morphologies (processes of word derivation or inflec-
tion), how varied they can be in syntactic structure or their
inventory of word classes, and how varied are the semantic
distinctions which they encode. We can do no more here
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than lightly sample the range of diversity, drawing atten-
tion to a few representative cases.
2.2.1. Sound inventories. We start by noting that some
natural human languages do not have sound systems at
all. These are the sign languages of the deaf. Just like
spoken languages, many of these have developed indepen-
dently around the world, wherever a sufficient intercom-
municating population of deaf people has arisen, usually
as a result of a heritable condition. (Ethnologue, an
online inventory of languages, lists 121 documented sign
languages, but there are certainly many more.) These
groups can constitute both significant proportions of
local populations and substantial populations in absolute
terms: in India there are around 1.5 million signers.
They present interesting, well-circumscribed models
of gene-culture coevolution (Aoki & Feldman 1994;
Durham 1991): Without the strain of hereditary deafness,
the cultural adaptation would not exist, whereas the
cultural adaptation allows signers to lead normal lives,
productive and reproductive, thus maintaining the
genetic basis for the adaptation.
The whole evolutionary background to sign languages
remains fascinating but obscure – were humans
endowed, as Hauser (1997, p. 245) suggests, with a capa-
bility unique in the animal world to switch their entire
communication system between just two modalities, or
(as the existence of touch languages of the blind-deaf
suggest) is the language capacity modality-neutral?
There have been two hundred years of speculation that
sign languages may be the evolutionary precursors to
human speech, a view recently revived by the discovery
of mirror-neurons (Arbib 2005). An alternative view is
that language evolved from a modality-hybrid communi-
cation system in which hand and mouth both participated,
as they do today in both spoken and signed languages
(cf. Sandler 2009). Whichever evolutionary scenario you
favor, the critical point here is that sign languages are an
existence proof of the modality-plastic nature of our
language capacity. At a stroke, therefore, they invalidate
such generalizations as “all natural languages have oral
vowels,” although at some deeper level there may well
be analogies to be drawn: signs have a basic temporal
organization of “move and hold” which parallels the rhyth-
mic alternation of vowels and consonants.
Returning to spoken languages, the vocal tract itself
is the clearest evidence for the biological basis for
language – the lowering of the larynx and the right-angle
in the windpipe have been optimized for speaking at the
expense of running and with some concomitant danger
of choking (Lenneberg 1967). Similar specializations
exist in the auditory system, with acuity tuned just to the
speech range, and, more controversially, specialized
neural pathways for speech analysis. These adaptations
of the peripheral input/output systems for spoken
language have, for some unaccountable reason, been mini-
mized in much of the discussion of language origins, in
favor of an emphasis on syntax (see, for example, Hauser
et al. 2002).
The vocal tract and the auditory system put strong
constraints on what an articulatorily possible and percep-
tually distinguishable speech sound is. Nevertheless, the
extreme range of phonemic (distinctive sound) inven-
tories, from 11 to 144, is already a telling fact about
linguistic diversity (Maddieson 1984). Jakobson’s distinc-
tive features – binary values on a limited set of (largely)
acoustic parameters – were meant to capture the full set
of possible speech sounds. They were the inspiration
for the Chomskyan model of substantive universals, a con-
strained set of alternates from which any particular
language will select just a few. But as we get better infor-
mation from more languages, sounds that we had thought
were impossible to produce or impractical to distinguish
keep turning up. Take the case of double-articulations,
where a consonantal closure is made in more than one
place. On the basis of evidence then available, Maddieson
(1983) concluded that contrastive labial-alveolar conso-
nants (making a sound like “b” at the same time as a
sound like “d”) were not a possible segment in natural
language on auditory grounds. But it was then discovered
that the Papuan language Ye´lıˆ Dnye makes a direct con-
trast between a coarticulated “tp,” and a “t
˙
p” where the t
˙is further back towards the palate (Ladefoged & Maddie-
son 1996, pp. 344–45; Maddieson & Levinson, in
preparation).
As more such rarities accrue, experts on sound systems
are abandoning the Jakobsonian idea of a fixed set of par-
ameters from which languages draw their phonological
inventories, in favor of a model where languages can
recruit their own sound systems from fine phonetic
details that vary in almost unlimited ways (see also
Mielke 2007; Pierrehumbert et al. 2000):
Do phoneticians generally agree with phonologists that we will
eventually arrive at a fixed inventory of possible human speech
sounds? The answer is no. (Port & Leary 2005, p. 927)
And,
Languages can differ systematically in arbitrarily fine phonetic
detail. This means we do not want to think about universal
phonetic categories, but rather about universal phonetic
resources, which are organized and harnessed by the cognitive
system . . . . The vowel space – a continuous physical space
rendered useful by the connection it establishes between
articulation and perception – is also a physical resource. Cul-
tures differ in the way they divide up and use this physical
resource. (Pierrehumbert 2000, p. 12)
2.2.2. Syllables and the “CV” universal. The default
expectation of languages is that they organize their
sounds into an alternating string of more versus less sonor-
ant segments, creating a basic rhythmic alternation of
sonorous vowels (V) and less sonorous consonants (C).
But beyond this, a further constraint was long believed
to be universal: that there was a universal preference for
CV syllables (like law /l :/ or gnaw /n :/) over VC sylla-
bles (like awl / :l/ or awn / :n/). The many ways in which
languages organize their syllable structures allows the
setting up of implicational (if/then) statements which
effectively find order in the exuberant variation: No
language will allow VC if it does not also allow CV, or
allow V if it does not also allow CV:
CV . V . VC
This long-proclaimed conditional universal (Jakobson &
Halle 1956; cf. Clements & Keyser 1983; Jakobson 1962)
has as corollary the maximal onset principle (Blevins
1995, p. 230): a /. . ..VCV. . ../ string will universally be
syllabified as /. . .V-CV. . ./. An obvious advantage such a
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universal principle would give the child is that it can go
right in and parse strings into syllables from first exposure.
But in 1999, Breen and Pensalfini published a clear
demonstration that Arrernte organizes its syllables
around a VC(C) structure and does not permit consonantal
onsets (Breen & Pensalfini 1999). With the addition of this
one language to our sample, the CV syllable gets down-
graded from absolute universal to a strong tendency, and
the status of the CV assumption in any model of UG
must be revised. If CV syllables really were inviolable
rules of UG, Arrernte would then be unlearnable, yet chil-
dren learn Arrernte without difficulty. At best, then, the
child may start with the initial hypothesis of CVs, and
learn to modify it when faced with Arrernte or other
such languages. But in that case we are talking about
initial heuristics, not about constraints on possible
human languages. The example also shows, as is familiar
from the history of mathematical induction (as with the
Gauss-Riemann hypothesis regarding prime number den-
sities), that an initially plausible pattern turns out not to be
universal after all, once the range of induction is suffi-
ciently extended.
2.2.3. Morphology. Morphological differences are among
the most obvious divergences between languages, and lin-
guistic science has been aware of them since the Spanish
encountered Aztec and other polysynthetic languages in
sixteenth-century Mexico, while half a world away the Por-
tuguese were engaging with isolating languages in Vietnam
and China. Isolating languages, of course, lack all the
inflectional affixes of person, number, tense, and aspect,
as well as systematic word derivation processes. They
even lack the rather rudimentary morphology of English
words like boy-s or kiss-ed, using just the root and
getting plural and past-tense meanings either from
context or from other independent words. Polysynthetic
languages go overboard in the other direction, packing
whole English sentences into a single word, as in Cayuga
E˛skakheh na’ta´ye˛thwahs “I will plant potatoes for them
again” (Evans & Sasse 2002). Clearly, children learning
such languages face massive challenges in picking out
what the “words” are that they must learn. They must
also learn a huge set of rules for morphological compo-
sition, since the number of forms that can be built from
a small set of lexical stems may run into the millions (Han-
kamer 1989).
But if these very long words function as sentences,
perhaps there’s no essential difference: perhaps, for
example, the Cayuga morpheme -h na- for “potatoes” in
the word above is just a word-internal direct object as
Baker (1993; 1996) has claimed. However, the parallels
turn out to be at best approximate. For example, the pro-
nominal affixes and incorporated nouns do not need to be
referential. The prefix ban- in Bininj Gun-wok ka-ban-
dung [she-them-scolds] is only superficially like its
English free-pronoun counterpart, since kabandung can
mean both “she scolds them” and “she scolds people in
general” (Evans 2002). It seems more likely, then, that
much of the obvious typological difference between poly-
synthetic languages and more moderately synthetic
languages like English or Russian needs to be taken at
face value: the vast difference in morphological complexity
is mirrored by differences in grammatical organization
right through to the deepest levels of how meaning is
organized.
2.2.4. Syntax and word-classes. Purported syntactic uni-
versals lie at the heart of most claims regarding UG, and
we hold off discussing these in detail until sections 4
through 6. As a warm-up, though, we look at one funda-
mental issue: word-classes, otherwise known as parts of
speech. These are fundamental to grammar, because the
application of grammatical rules is made general by formu-
lating them over word-classes. If we say that in English
adjectives precede but cannot follow the nouns they
modify (the rich man but not the man rich), we get a gen-
eralization that holds over an indefinitely large set of
phrases, because both adjectives and nouns are “open
classes” that in principle are always extendable by new
members. But to stop it generating the nerd zappy we
need to know that nerd is a noun, not an adjective, and
that zappy is an adjective, not a noun. To do this we
need to find a clearly delimited set of distinct behaviors,
in their morphology and their syntax, that allows us to dis-
tinguish noun and adjective classes, and to determine
which words belong to which class.
Now it has often been assumed that, across all
languages, the major classes – those that are essentially
unlimited in their membership – will always be the same
“big four”: nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. But we
now know that this is untenable when we consider the
cross-linguistic evidence. Many languages lack an open
adverb class (Hengeveld 1992), making do with other
forms of modification. There are also languages like Lao
with no adjective class, encoding property concepts as a
sub-sub-type of verbs (Enfield 2004).
If a language jettisons adjectives and adverbs, the last
stockade of word-class difference is that between nouns
and verbs. Could a language abolish this and just have a
single word-class of predicates (like predicate calculus)?
Here controversy still rages among linguists as the bar
for evidence of single-class languages keeps getting
raised, with some purported cases (e.g., Mundari) falling
by the wayside (Evans & Osada 2005). For many languages
of the Philippines and the Pacific Northwest Coast, the
argument has run back and forth for nearly a century,
with the relevant evidence becoming ever more subtle,
but still no definitive consensus has been reached.
A feeling for what a language without a noun-verb dis-
tinction is like comes from Straits Salish. Here, on the
analysis by Jelinek (1995), all major-class lexical items
simply function as predicates, of the type “run,”
“be_big,” or “be_a_man.” They then slot into various
clausal roles, such as argument (“the one such that he
runs”), predicate (“run[s]”), and modifier (“the running
[one]”), according to the syntactic slots they are placed
in. The single open syntactic class of predicate includes
words for events, entities, and qualities. When used
directly as predicates, all appear in clause-initial position,
followed by subject and/or object clitics. When used as
arguments, all lexical stems are effectively converted into
relative clauses through the use of a determiner, which
must be employed whether the predicate-word refers to an
event (“the [ones who] sing”), an entity (“the [one which
is a] fish”), or even a proper name (“the [one which] is
Eloise”). The square-bracketed material shows what we
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need to add to the English translation to convert the
reading in the way the Straits Salish structure lays out.
There are thus languages without adverbs, languages
without adjectives, and perhaps even languages without
a basic noun-verb distinction. In the other direction, we
now know that there are other types of major word-class –
e.g., ideophones, positionals, and coverbs – that are unfa-
miliar to Indo-European languages.
Ideophones typically encode cross-modal perceptual
properties – they holophrastically depict the sight, sound,
smell, or feeling of situations in which the event and its par-
ticipants are all rolled together into an undissected gestalt.
They are usually only loosely integrated syntactically,
being added into narratives as independent units to spice
up the color. Examples from Mundari (Osada 1992) are
ribuy-tibuy, “sound, sight, or motion of a fat person’s but-
tocks rubbing together as they walk,” and rawa-dawa,
“the sensation of suddenly realizing you can do something
reprehensible, and no-one is there to witness it.” Often
ideophones have special phonological characteristics, such
as vowel changes to mark changes in size or intensity,
special reduplication patterns, and unusual phonemes or
tonal patterns. (Note that English words like willy-nilly or
heeby-jeebies may seem analogous, but they differ from
ideophones in all being assimilated to other pre-existing
word classes, here adverb and noun.)
Positionals describe the position and form of persons and
objects (Ameka & Levinson 2007). These are widespread
in Mayan languages (Bohnemeyer & Brown 2007;
Brown 1994; England 2001; 2004). Examples from
Tzeltal include latz’al, “of flat items, arranged in vertical
stack”; chepel, “be located in bulging bag,” and so on. Posi-
tionals typically have special morphological and syntactic
properties.
Coverbs are a further open class outside the “big four.”
Such languages as Kalam (PNG; Pawley 1993) or the Aus-
tralian language Jaminjung (Schultze-Berndt 2000) have
only around 20 to 30 inflecting verbs, but they form
detailed event-descriptors by combining inflecting verbs
with an open class of coverbs. Unlike positionals or ideo-
phones, coverbs are syntactically integrated with inflecting
verbs, with which they cross-combine in ways that largely
need to be learned individually. In Jaminjung, for
example, the coverb dibird, “wound around” can
combine with yu, “be,” to mean “be wound around,” and
with angu, “get/handle,” to mean “tangle up.” (English
“light verbs,” as in take a train or do lunch, give a feel
for the phenomenon, but of course train and lunch are
just regular nouns.)
Classifiers are yet another word class unforeseen by the
categories of traditional grammar – whether “numeral
classifiers” in East Asian and Mesoamerican languages
that classify counted objects according to shape, or the
hand-shape classifiers in sign languages that represent
the involved entity through a schematized representation
of its shape. And further unfamiliar word classes are con-
tinuously being unearthed that respect only the internal
structural logic of previously undescribed languages.
Even when typologists talk of “ideophones,” “classifiers,”
and so forth, these are not identical in nature across the
languages that exhibit them – rather we are dealing with
family-resemblance phenomena: no two languages have
any word classes that are exactly alike in morphosyntactic
properties or range of meanings (Haspelmath 2007).
Once again, then, the great variability in how languages
organize their word-classes dilutes the plausibility of the
innatist UG position. Just which word classes are supposed
to be there in the learning child’s mind? We would need to
postulate a start-up state with an ever-longer list of initial
categories (adding ideophones, positionals, coverbs, classi-
fiers, etc.), many of which will never be needed. And,
because syntactic rules work by combining these word-
class categories – “projecting” word-class syntax onto the
larger syntactic assemblages that they head – each word-
class we add to the purported universal inventory would
then need its own accompanying set of syntactic
constraints.
2.2.5. Semantics. There is a persistent strand of thought,
articulated most forcefully by Fodor (1975), that languages
directly encode the categories we think in, and moreover
that these constitute an innate, universal “language of
thought” or “mentalese.” As Pinker (1994, p. 82) put it,
“Knowing a language, then, is knowing how to translate
mentalese into strings of words and vice versa. People
without a language would still have mentalese, and
babies and many nonhuman animals presumably have
simpler dialects.” Learning a language, then, is simply a
matter of finding out what the local clothing is for universal
concepts we already have (Li & Gleitman 2002).
The problem with this view is that languages differ enor-
mously in the concepts that they provide ready-coded in
grammar and lexicon. Languages may lack words or
constructions corresponding to the logical connectives
“if” (Guugu Yimithirr) or “or” (Tzeltal), or “blue” or
“green” or “hand” or “leg” (Ye´lıˆ Dnye). There are
languages without tense, without aspect, without
numerals, or without third-person pronouns (or even
without pronouns at all, in the case of most sign
languages). Some languages have thousands of verbs;
others only have thirty (Schultze-Berndt 2000). Lack of
vocabulary may sometimes merely make expression more
cumbersome, but sometimes it effectively limits expressi-
bility, as in the case of languages without numerals
(Gordon 2004).
In the other direction, many languages make semantic
distinctions we certainly would never think of making.
So Kiowa, instead of a plural marker on nouns, has a
marker that means roughly “of unexpected number”: on
an animate noun like “man” it means “two or more,” on
a word like “leg,” it means “one or more than two,” and
on “stone,” it means “just two” (Mithun 1999, p. 81). In
many languages, all statements must be coded (e.g., in
verbal affixes) for the sources of evidence; for example,
in Central Pomo, whether I saw it, perceived it in
another modality (tactile, auditory), was told about it,
inferred it, or know that it is an established fact (Mithun
1999, p. 181). Kwakwala insists on referents being coded
as visible or not (Anderson & Keenan 1985). Athabaskan
languages are renowned for their classificatory verbs,
forcing a speaker to decide between a dozen categories
of objects (e.g., liquids, rope-like objects, containers, flexi-
ble sheets) before picking one of a set of alternate verbs of
location, giving, handling, and so on (Mithun 1999, p. 106
ff.). Australian languages force their speakers to pay atten-
tion to intricate kinship relations between participants
in the discourse – in many to use a pronoun you must
first work out whether the referents are in even- or
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odd-numbered generations with respect to one another, or
related by direct links through the male line. On top of
this, many have special kin terms that triangulate the
relation between speaker, hearer, and referent, with
meanings like “the one who is my mother and your daugh-
ter, you being my maternal grandmother” (Evans 2003b).
Spatial concepts are an interesting domain to compare
languages in, because spatial cognition is fundamental to
any animal – and if Fodor is right anywhere, it should
be here. But, in fact, we find fundamental differences in
the semantic parameters languages use to code space.
For example, there are numerous languages without
notions of “left of,” “right of,” “back of,” “front of ” –
words meaning “right hand” or “left hand” are normally
present, but don’t generalize to spatial description. How
then does one express, for example, that the book you
are looking for is on the table left of the window? In
most of these languages by saying that it lies on the table
north of the window – that is, by using geographic
rather than egocentric coordinates. Research shows that
speakers remember the location in terms of the coordinate
system used in their language, not in terms of some fixed,
innate mentalese (see Levinson 2003; Majid et al. 2004).
Linguists often distinguish between closed-class or func-
tion words (like the, of, in, which play a grammatical role)
and open-class items or general vocabulary which can be
easily augmented by new coinages or borrowing. Some
researchers claim that closed-class items reveal a recurrent
set of semantic distinctions, whereas the open-class items
may be more culture-specific (Talmy 2000). Others claim
effectively just the reverse, that relational vocabulary (as in
prepositions) is much more abstract, and thus prone to cul-
tural patterning, whereas the open-class items (like nouns)
are grounded in concrete reality, and thus less cross-linguis-
tically variable (Gentner & Boroditsky 2001). In fact, neither
of these views seems correct, for both ends of the spectrum
are cross-linguistically variable. Consider, for example,
the difference between nouns and spatial prepositions.
Landau and Jackendoff (1993) claimed that this difference
corresponds to the nature of the so-called what versus
where systems in neurocognition: nouns are “whaty” in
that their meanings code detailed features of objects,
while prepositions are “wherey” in that they encode abstract,
geometric properties of spatial relations. These researchers
thus felt able to confidently predict that there would be
no preposition or spatial relator encoding featural properties
of objects, for example, none meaning “through a cigar-
shaped object” (Landau & Jackendoff 1993, p. 226). But
the Californian language Karuk has precisely such a spatial
verbal prefix, meaning “in through a tubular space”
(Mithun 1999, p. 142)! More systematic examination of
the inventories of spatial pre- and post-positions shows
that there is no simple universal inventory, and the mean-
ings can be very specific; for example, “in a liquid,” “astrad-
dle,” “fixed by spiking” (Levinson & Meira 2003) – or
distinguish “to (a location below)” versus “to (a location
above)” versus “to (a location on a level with the speaker).”
Nor do nouns always have the concrete sort of reference
we expect – for example, in many languages nouns tend to
have a mass or “stuff”-like reference (meaning, e.g., any
stuff composed of banana genotype, or anything made of
wax), and do not inherently refer to bounded entities. In
such languages, it takes a noun and a classifier (Lucy
1992), or a noun and a classificatory verb (Brown 1994),
to construct a meaning recognizable to us as “banana” or
“candle.”
In the light of examples like these, the view that “linguis-
tic categories and structures are more or less straightfor-
ward mappings from a pre-existing conceptual space
programmed into our biological nature” (Li & Gleitman
2002, p. 266) looks quite implausible. Instead, languages
reflect cultural preoccupations and ecological interests
that are a direct and important part of the adaptive char-
acter of language and culture.
3. Linguistic universals
The prior sections have illustrated the surprising range of
cross-linguistic variability at every level of language, from
sound to meaning. The more we discover about languages,
the more diversity we find. Clearly, this ups the ante in the
search for universals.
There have been two main approaches to linguistic uni-
versals. The first, already mentioned, is the Chomskyan
approach, where UG denotes structural principles which
are complex and implicit enough to be unlearnable from
finite exposure. Chomsky thus famously once held that
language universals could be extracted from the study of
a single language:
I have not hesitated to propose a general principle of linguistic
structure on the basis of observation of a single language. The
inference is legitimate, on the assumption that humans are not
specifically adapted to learn one rather than another human
language. . . . Assuming that the genetically determined
language faculty is a common human possession, we may con-
clude that a principle of language is universal if we are led to
postulate it as a “precondition” for the acquisition of a single
language. (Chomsky 1980, p. 48)1
Chomsky (1965, pp. 27–30) influentially distinguished
between substantive and formal universals. Substantive
universals are drawn from a fixed class of items (e.g., dis-
tinctive phonological features, or word classes like noun,
verb, adjective, and adverb). No particular language is
required to exhibit any specific member of a class. Conse-
quently, the claim that property X is a substantive univer-
sal cannot be falsified by finding a language without it,
because the property is not required in all of them. Con-
versely, suppose we find a new language with property
Y, hitherto unexpected: we can simply add it to the inven-
tory of substantive universals. Jackendoff (2002, p. 263)
nevertheless holds “the view of Universal Grammar
as a “toolkit” . . . : beyond the absolute universal bare
minimum of concatenated words . . . languages can pick
and choose which tools they use, and how extensively.”
But without limits on the toolkit, UG is unfalsifiable.
Formal universals specify abstract constraints on the
grammar of languages (e.g., that they have specific rule
types or cannot have rules that perform specific oper-
ations). To give a sense of the kind of abstract constraints
in UG, consider the proposed constraint called Subjacency
(see Newmeyer 2004, p. 537 ff.). This is an abstract prin-
ciple meant to explain the difference between the gram-
maticality of the sentence (6) and (7), below, versus the
ungrammaticality (marked by an asterisk) of sentence (8):
(6) Where did John say that we had to get off the bus?
(7) Did John say whether we had to get off the bus?
(8) Where did John saywhether we had to get off the bus?
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The child somehow has to extrapolate that (6) and (7)
are okay, but (8) is not, without ever being explicitly told
that (8) is ungrammatical. This induction is argued to be
impossible, necessitating an underlying and innate prin-
ciple that forbids the formation of wh-questions if a wh-
phrase intervenes between the “filler” (initial wh-word)
and the “gap” (the underlying slot for the wh-word).
This presumes a movement rule pulling a wh-phrase out
of its underlying position and putting it at the front of
the sentence as shown in (9):
(9) Where did John say whether we had to get off the
bus ____?
However, it turns out that this constraint does not work
in Italian or Russian in the same way, and theorists have
had to assume that children can learn the specifics of the
constraint after all, although we do not know how
(Newmeyer 2004; Van Valin & LaPolla 1997, p. 615 ff.).
This shows the danger of extrapolations from a single
language to unlearnable constraints. Each constraint in
UG needs to be taken as no more than a working hypoth-
esis, hopefully sufficiently clearly articulated that it could
be falsified by cross-linguistic data.
But what counts as falsification of these often abstract
principles? Consider the so-called Binding Conditions,
proposed as elements of Universal Grammar in the
1980s (see Koster & May 1982). One element (condition
A) specifies that anaphors (reflexives and reciprocals)
must be bound in their governing category, whereas a
second (condition B) states that (normal nonreflexive)
pronouns must be free in their governing category.
These conditions were proposed to account for the
English data in (10a–c) and comparable data in many
other languages (the subscripts keep track of what each
term refers to). The abstract notion of “bound” is tied to
a particular type of constituent-based syntactic represen-
tation where the subject “commands” the object (owing
to its position in a syntactic tree) rather than the other
way round, and reflexives are sensitive to this command.
Normal pronouns pick up their reference from elsewhere
and so cannot be used in a “bound” position.
(10a) Johnx saw himy. (disjoint reference)
(10b) Johnx saw himselfx (conjoint reference)
(10c) Himselfx saw Johnx/himx.
This works well for English and hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of other languages, but it does not generalize
to languages where you get examples as in (11a, b) (to rep-
resent their structures in a pseudo-English style).
(11a) Hex saw himx,y
(11b) Theyx,y saw thema,b/x,y/y,x.
Many languages (even Old English; see Levinson 2000)
allow sentences like (11a) and (11b): the same pronouns
can either have disjoint reference (shown as “a,b”), con-
joint reference (“x,y”) or commuted conjoint reference
(“y,x,” corresponding to “each other” in English). Does
this falsify the Binding Principles? Not necessarily,
would be a typical response in the generativist position –
it may be that there are really two distinct pronouns (a
normal pronoun and a reflexive, say) which just happen
to have the same form, but can arguably be teased apart
in other ways (see, e.g., Chung [1989] on Chamorro).
But it is all too easy for such an abstract analysis to presup-
pose precisely what is being tested, dismissing seeming
counterexamples and rendering the claims unfalsifiable.
The lack of shared rules of argumentation means that
the field as a whole has not kept a generally accepted
running score of which putative universals are left standing.
In short, it has proven extremely hard to come up with
even quite abstract generalizations that don’t run afoul of
the cross-linguistic facts. This doesn’t mean that such gen-
eralizations won’t ultimately be found, nor that there are
no genetic underpinnings for language – there certainly
are.2 But, to date, strikingly little progress has been made.
We turn now to the other approach to universals, stem-
ming from the work of Greenberg (1963a; 1963b), which
directly attempts to test linguistic universals against the
diversity of the world’s languages. Greenberg’s methods crys-
tallized the field of linguistic typology, and his empirical gen-
eralizations are sometimes called Greenbergian universals.
First, importantly, Greenberg discounted features of
language that are universal by definition – that is, we
would not call the object in question a language if it
lacked these properties (Greenberg et al. 1963, p. 73).
Thus, many of what Hockett (1963) called the “design
features” of language are excluded – for example, discre-
teness, arbitrariness, productivity, and the duality of
patterning achieved by combining meaningless elements
at one level (phonology) to construct meaningful elements
(morphemes or words) at another.3 We can add other
functional features that all languages need in order to
be adequately expressive instruments (e.g., the ability to
indicate negative or prior states of affairs, to question,
to distinguish new from old information, etc.).
Second, Greenberg (1960, see also Comrie 1989: 17–23)
distinguished the different types of universal statement
laid out in Table 1 (the terminology may differ slightly
across sources):
Although all of these types are universals in the sense
that they employ universal quantification over languages,
their relations to notions of “universal grammar” differ
profoundly. Type 1 statements are true of all languages,
though not tautological by being definitional of language-
hood. This is the category which cognitive scientists
often imagine is filled by rich empirical findings from a
hundred years of scientific linguistics – indeed Greenberg
(1986, p. 14) recollects how Osgood challenged him to
produce such universals, saying that these would be of fun-
damental interest to psychologists. This started Greenberg
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on a search that ended elsewhere, and he rapidly came to
realize “the meagreness and relative triteness of state-
ments that were simply true of all languages” (Greenberg
1986, p. 15):
Assuming that it was important to discover generalizations
which were valid for all languages, would not such statements
be few in number and on the whole quite banal? Examples
would be that languages had nouns and verbs (although
some linguists denied even that) or that all languages had
sound systems and distinguished between phonetic vowels
and consonants. (Greenberg 1986, p. 14)
To this day, the reader will find no agreed list of Type 1
universals (see Box 1). This more or less empty box is why
the emperor of Universal Grammar has no clothes. Text-
books such as those by Comrie (1989), Whaley (1997),
and Croft (2003) are almost mum on the subject, and
what they do provide is more or less the same two or
three examples. For the longest available list of hypo-
theses, see the online resources at the Konstanz Universals
Archive (http://ling.uni-konstanz.de:591/Universals).
The most often cited absolute unrestricted universals
are that all languages distinguish nouns and verbs (dis-
cussed earlier) and that all languages have vowels.
The problem with the notion “all languages have vowels”
is that it does not extend to sign languages (see Box 2),
as already mentioned. A second problem is that, for
spoken languages, if the statement is taken at a phonetic
level, it is true, but for trivial reasons: they would
otherwise scarcely be audible. A third problem is that, if
taken as a phonological claim that all languages have
distinctive vowel segments, it is in fact contested: There
are some languages, notably of the Northwestern Cauca-
sus, where the quality of the vowel segments was long
maintained by many linguists to be entirely predictable
from the consonantal context (see Colarusso 1982;
Halle 1970; Kuipers 1960), and although most scholars
have now swung round to recognizing two contrasting
vowels, the evidence for this hangs on the thread of a
few minimal pairs, mostly loanwords from Turkish or
Arabic.
This example illustrates the problems with making
simple, interesting statements that are true of all
languages. Most straightforward claims are simply false –
see Box 1. The fact is that it is a jungle out there: languages
differ in fundamental ways – in their sound systems (even
whether they have one), in their grammar, and in their
semantics. Hence, the very type of universal that seems
most interesting to psychologists was rapidly rejected as
the focus of research by Greenberg.
Linguistic typologists make a virtue out of the necessity
to consider other kinds of universals. Conditional or impli-
cational universals of Types 3 and 4 (i.e., of the kind “If a
language has property X, it has [or tends to have] property
Y”) allow us to make claims about the interrelation of two,
logically independent parameters. Statements of this kind,
therefore, greatly restrict the space of possible languages:
interpreted as logical (material) conditionals, they predict
that there are no languages with X that lack Y, where X and
Y may not be obviously related at all. Here again, however,
exceptionless or absolute versions are usually somewhat
trite. For example, the following seem plausible:
(12a) IF a language has nasal vowels, THEN it has oral
vowels.
(12b) IF a language has a trial number, THEN there is
also a dual. IF there is a dual, THEN there is also a
plural.
Statement (12a) essentially expresses the markedness
(or recessive character) of nasal vowels. However, most
markedness universals are statistical, not absolute. State-
ment (12b) is really only about one parameter, namely
Box 2. The challenge of sign languages
Many proposed universals of language ignore the existence of sign languages – the languages of the deaf,
now recognized to be full-blown languages of independent origin (Klima & Bellugi 1979). Studies of, for
example, American Sign Language, British Sign Language, and Indo-Pakistani Sign Language (Zeshan 2002)
show that these are unrelated, complex systems of their own. They can even be said to have “phonologies” –
patterns of hand shape, facial expression, and so on, which, although individually meaningless, can be combined
to make morphemes or words (Padden & Perlmutter 1987).
The typology of sign languages is in its infancy (see, e.g., Perniss et al. 2008; Perniss & Zeshan 2008; Schwager
& Zeshan 2008; Zeshan 2006a; 2006b). The Ethnologue lists 121 sign languages, but there are certainly many
not yet listed. The major sign languages show some typological similarities, but the smaller ones, only now
coming under scrutiny, are typologically diverse (see, e.g., Meir et al., in press).
Sign languages offer a model “organism” for understanding the relation between biological and cultural
aspects of language (Aoki & Feldman 1994). They also offer unique opportunities to study the emergence of
new languages under different conditions: (a) where home-signers (Goldin-Meadow 2003) are congregated
and a sign language emerges among themselves, as in Nicaragua (Senghas et al. 2004); and (b) where a localized
hereditary deaf population lives among hearers who also sign, as in Bali (Marsaja 2008) or in a Bedouin group in
Israel (Sandler et al. 2005). These studies show that although word order constraints may show early, it may take
three generations or more to evolve syntactic embedding and morphology.
When due allowance is made for the manual-visual interface, sign languages seem to be handled by the same
specialized brain structures as spoken ones, with parallel aphasias, similar developmental trajectories
(e.g., infants “babble” in sign), and similar processing strategies as spoken languages (see Emmorey 2002).
The neurocognition of sign does not look, for example, like the neurocognition of gesture, but instead recruits,
for example, auditory cortex (MacSweeney et al. 2002; Nishimura et al. 1999). These results show that our bio-
logical endowment for language is by no means restricted to the input/output systems of a particular modality.
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number, and it is not really surprising that a language that
morphologically marks pairs of things would want to be
able to distinguish singular from plural or trial (i.e.,
more than two). Nevertheless, there is at least one
language that counter-exemplifies: Basic verbs stems in
Nen are dual, with non-duals indicated by a suffix
meaning “either singular or three-or-more,” the singular
and the plural sharing an inflection!
But the main problem with absolute conditional univer-
sals is that, again and again (as just exemplified), they too
have been shown to be false. In this sense conditional uni-
versals follow the same trajectory as unconditional ones,
in that hypothesized absolute universals tend to become
statistical ones as we sample languages more widely. For
example, it was hypothesized as an unconditional universal
(Greenberg 1966, p. 50) that all languages mark the nega-
tive by adding some morpheme to a sentence, but then we
find that classical Tamil marks the negative by deleting
the tense morphemes present in the positive (Master
1946; Pederson 1993). We can expect the same general
story for conditional universals, except that, given the con-
ditional restriction, it will take a larger overall database to
falsify them.
Again making a virtue out of a necessity, Dryer (1998)
convincingly argues that statistical universals or strong
tendencies are more interesting anyway. Although at first
sight it seems that absolute implications are more easily
falsifiable, the relevant test set is after all not the 7,000
odd languages we happen to have now, but the half
million or so that have existed, not to mention those yet
to come – because we never have all the data in hand,
the one counterexample might never show up. In fact,
Dryer points out, because linguistic types always empiri-
cally show a clustering with outliers, the chances of catch-
ing all the outliers are vanishingly small. The classical
Tamil counterexample to negative marking strategies is a
case in point: it is a real counterexample, but extremely
rare. Given this distribution of phenomena, the methods
have to be statistical. And as a matter of fact, nearly all
work done in linguistic typology concerns Type 4 Univer-
sals (i.e., conditional tendencies). Where these tendencies
are weak, they may reveal only bias in the current
languages we have, or in the sampling methods employed.
But where they are strong, they suggest that there is
indeed a cognitive, communicative, or system-internal
bias towards particular solutions evolving.
With absolute universals, sampling is not an issue: just a
single counterexample is needed, and linguists should
follow whatever leads they need to find them. For this
reason, and because many of the claimed universals we
are targeting are absolute, we have not shied away in this
article from hand-picking the clearest examples that illus-
trate our point. But with statistical universals, having the
right sampling methods is crucial (Widmann & Bakker
2006), and many factors need to be controlled for.
Language family (coinherited traits are not independent),
language area (convergent traits are not independent), key
organizational features (dominant phrase orders have
knock-on effects elsewhere), other cultural aspects
(speaker population size, whether there is a written
language), modality (spoken vs. signed language), and
quality of available descriptions all impact on the choice.
Employing geographically separate areas is crucial to mini-
mize the risk of convergent mutual influence, but even this
is contingent on our current very limited understanding of
the higher-level phylogenetic relationships of the world’s
languages: if languages in two distinct regions (say,
inland Canada and Central Siberia) are found to be
related, we can no longer assume these two areas
supply independent samples. The long-term and not un-
achievable goal must be to have data on all existing
languages, which should be the target for the language
sciences.
Where do linguistic universals, of whatever type, come
from? We return to this issue in section 6, but here it is
vital to point out that a property common to languages
need not have its origins in a “language faculty,”
or innate specialization for language. First, such a
property could be due to properties of other mental
capacities – memory, action control, sensory integration,
and so on. Second, it could be due to overall design
requirements of communication systems. For example,
most languages seem to distinguish closed-class functional
elements (cf. English the, some, should) from open-class
vocabulary (cf. eat, dog, big), just as logics distinguish
operators from other terms, allowing constancies in
composition with open-ended vocabularies and facilitating
parsing.
Universals can also arise from so-called functional
factors, that is to say, the machining of structure to fit
the uses to which it would be put. For example, we can
ask: Why are negatives usually marked in languages with
a positive “not” morpheme rather than by a gap as in clas-
sical Tamil? Because (a) we make more positive than nega-
tive assertions, so it is more efficient to mark the less
common negatives, and (b) it is crucial to distinguish
what is said from its contrary, and a non-zero morpheme
is less likely to escape notice than a gap.
In addition, given human motivations, interests and
sensory perception together with the shared world we
live in, we can expect all sorts of convergences in, for
example, vocabulary items – most if not all languages
have kin terms, body part terms, words for celestial
bodies. The appeal to innate concepts and structure
should be a last resort (Tomasello 1995).
Finally, a word needs to be said about the metalanguage
in which typological (statistical) universals are couched.
The terms employed are notions like subject, adjective,
inflection, syllable, pronoun, noun phrase, and so on –
more or less the vocabulary of “traditional grammar.” As
we have seen, these are not absolute universals of Type
1. Rather, they are descriptive labels, emerging from struc-
tural facts of particular languages, which work well in some
languages but may be problematic or absent in others (cf.
Croft 2001). Consequently, for the most part they do not
have precise definitions shared by all researchers, or
equally applicable to all languages (Haspelmath 2007).
Does this vitiate such research? Not necessarily: the
descriptive botanist also uses many terms (“pinnate,”
“thorn,” etc.) that have no precise definition. Likewise, lin-
guists use notions like “subject” (sect. 4) in a prototype
way: a prototypical subject has a large range of features
(argument of the predication, controller of verb agree-
ment, topic, etc.) which may not all be present in any par-
ticular case. The “family resemblance” character of the
basic metalanguage is what underlies the essential nature
of typological generalizations, namely that of soft regu-
larities of association of traits.
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4. How multiple constraints drive multiple
solutions: Grammatical subject as a great
(but not universal) idea
We can use the notion of grammatical subject to illustrate
the multi-constraint engineering problems languages face,
the numerous independent but convergent solutions that
cluster similar properties, and at the same time the occur-
rence of alternative solutions in a minority of other
languages that weight competing design motivations
differently.
The “grammatical relations” of subject and object apply
unproblematically to enough unrelated languages that
Baker (2003) regards them as part of the invariant machin-
ery of universal grammar. Indeed, many languages around
the world have grammatical relations that map straightfor-
wardly onto the clusterings of properties familiar from
English “subject” and “object.” But linguists have also
known for some time that the notion “subject” is far
from universal, and other languages have come up with
strikingly different solutions.
The device of subject, whether in English, Warlpiri, or
Malagasy, is a way of streamlining grammars to take advan-
tage of the fact that three logically distinct tasks correlate
statistically. In a sentence like “Mary is trying to finish her
book,” the subject “Mary” is:
(a) a topic – what the sentence is about;
(b) an agent – the semantic role of the instigator of an
action;
(c) the “pivot” – the syntactic broker around which
many grammatical properties coalesce
Having a subject relation is an efficient way to organize a
language’s grammar because it bundles up different sub-
tasks that most often need to be done together. But
languages also need ways to indicate when the properties
do not coalesce. For example, when the subject is not an
agent, this can be marked by the passive: John was
kissed by Mary.
“Subject” is thus a fundamentally useful notion for the
analysis of many, probably most, languages. But when
we look further we find many languages where the proper-
ties just described do not line up, and the notion “subject”
can only be applied by so weakening the definition that it is
near vacuous. For example, the semantic dimension of
case role (agent, patient, recipient, etc.) and the discourse
dimension of topic can be dissociated, with different gram-
matical mechanisms assigned to deal with each in a dedi-
cated way: this is essentially how Tagalog works
(Schachter 1976). Or a language may use its case system
to reflect semantic roles more transparently, so that basic
clause types have a plethora of different case arrays,
rather than funnelling most event types down to a single
transitive type, as in the Caucasian language Lezgian
(Haspelmath 1993). Alternatively, a language may split
the notion subject by funnelling all semantic roles into two
main “macro-roles” – “actor” (a wider range of semantic
roles than agent) and “undergoer” (corresponding to,
e.g., the subject of English, John underwent heart
surgery). The syntactic privileges we normally associate
with subjects then get divided between these two distinct
categories (as in Acehnese; Durie 1985).
Finally, a language may plump for the advantages of
rolling a wide range of syntactic properties together into
a single syntactic broker or “pivot,” but go the opposite
way to English, privileging the patient over the agent as
the semantic role that gets the syntactic privileges of
the pivot slot. Dyirbal (Dixon 1972; 1977) is famous for
such “syntactic ergativity.” The whole of Dyirbal’s gram-
matical organization then revolves around this absolutive
pivot – case marking, coordination, complex clause con-
structions. To illustrate with coordination, take the
English sentence “The woman slapped the man and ø
laughed.” The “gap” (represented here by a zero) is inter-
preted by linking it to the preceding subject, forcing the
reading “and she laughed.” But in the Dyirbal equivalent,
yibinggu yara bunjun ø miyandanyu, the gap is linked to
the preceding absolutive pivot yara (corresponding to
the English object, the man), and gets interpreted as
“and he laughed.”
Dyirbal, then, is like English in having a single
syntactic “pivot” around which a whole range of con-
structions are organized. But it is unlike it in linking this
pivot to the patient rather than the agent. Because this
system probably strikes the reader as perverse, it is
worth noting that a natural source is the fact that cross-
linguistically most new referents are introduced in “abso-
lutive” (S or O) roles (Dubois 1987), making this a
natural attractor for unmarked case and thus a candidate
for syntactic “pivot” status (see also Levinson, under
review).
Given languages like Dyirbal, Acehnese, or Tagalog,
where the concepts of “subject” and “object” are dismem-
bered in language-specific ways, it is clear that a child pre-
equipped by UG to expect its language to have a “subject”
could be sorely led astray.
5. The claimed universality of constituency
In nearly all recent discussions of syntax for a general cog-
nitive science audience, it is simply presumed that the
syntax of natural languages can basically be expressed in
terms of constituent structure, and thus the familiar tree
diagrams for sentence structure (Hauser et al. 2002;
Jackendoff 2002; 2003a; Pinker 1994, p. 97 ff.).
In the recent debates following Hauser et al. (2002),
there is sometimes a conflation between constituent struc-
ture and recursion (see, e.g., Pinker & Jackendoff 2005,
p. 215), but they are potentially orthogonal properties of
languages. There can be constituent structure without
recursion, but there can also be hierarchical relations
and recursion without constituency. We return to the
issue of recursion in the next section, but here we focus
on constituency.
Constituency is the bracketing of elements (typically
words) into higher-order elements (as in [[[[the][tall
[man]]] [came]] where [[[the][tall [man]]] is a
Noun Phrase, substitutable by a single element (he, or
John). Many discussions presume that constituency is an
absolute universal, exhibited by all languages. But in fact
constituency is just one method, used by a subset of
languages, to express constructions which in other
languages may be coded as dependencies of other kinds
(Matthews 1981; 2007). The need for this alternative
perspective is that many languages show few traces of
constituent structure, because they scramble the words,
as in the following Latin line from Virgil (Matthews
1981, p. 255):
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Here the lines link the parts of two noun phrases, and it
makes no sense to produce a bracketing of the normal sort:
a tree diagram of the normal kind would have crossing
lines. A better representation is in terms of dependency –
which parts depend on which other parts, as in the
following diagram where the arrowhead points to the
dependent item:
Classical Latin is a representative of a large class of
languages, which exhibit free word order (not just free
phrase order, which is much commoner still). The Austra-
lian languages are also renowned for these properties. In
Jiwarli and Thalanyji, for example, all linked nominals
(part of a noun phrase if there was such a thing) are
marked with case and can be separated from each other;
there is no evidence for a verb phrase, and there are no
major constraints on ordering (see Austin & Bresnan
1996). Example (15) illustrates a discontinuous sequence
of words in Thalanyji, which would correspond to a con-
stituent in most European languages; “the woman’s dog”
is grouped as a single semantic unit by sharing the accusa-
tive case.
ð15Þ Kupuju-lu kaparla-nha yanga-lkin wartirra-ku-nha
child-ERG dog-ACC chase-PRES woman-DAT-ACC
‘‘The child chases the woman’s dog.’’ (Austin 1995, p. 372)
Note how possessive modifiers – coded by a special use of
the dative case – additionally pick up the case of the noun
they modify, as with the accusative –nha on “dog” and
“woman-Dat” in (15). In this way multiple case marking
(Dench & Evans 1988) allows the grouping of elements
from distinct levels of structure, such as embedded posses-
sive phrases, even when they are not contiguous. It is this
case-tagging, rather than grouping of words into constitu-
ents, which forms the basic organizational principle in
many Australian languages (see Nordlinger 1998 for a
formalization).
It is even possible in Jiwarli to intermingle words that in
English would belong to two distinct clauses, since the
case suffixes function to match up the appropriate
elements. These are tagged, as it were, with instructions
like “I am object of the subordinate clause verb,” or “I
am a possessive modifier of an object of a main clause
verb.” By fishing out these distinct cases, a hearer can
discern the structure of a two-clause sentence like “the
child (ERG) is chasing the dog (ACC) of the woman
(DAT-ACC) who is sitting down cooking meat (DAT)”
without needing to attend to the order in which words
occur (Austin & Bresnan 1996). The syntactic structure
here is most elegantly represented via a dependency form-
alism (supplemented with appropriate morphological fea-
tures) rather than a constituency one.
Although languages like Jiwarli have been increasingly
well documented over the last forty years, syntactic theories
developed in the English-speaking world have primarily
focussed on constituency, no doubt because English fits
this bill. In the Slavic world, by contrast, where languages
like Russian have a structure much more like Jiwarli or
Latin, models of syntactic relations have been largely
based on dependency relations (Melcˇuk 1988). The most
realistic view of the world’s languages is that some yield com-
pletely to one representational system, some to the other,
most to a mix. Some outgrowths of generative theory, such
as Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG), effectively incorpor-
ate analogues of dependency representations alongside
constituency-based ones, in the form of f-structures
besides c-structures, with an interface system linking the
two structures (see Bresnan 2001; Hudson 1993, p. 329). It
is also worth emphasizing, at this point, that dependency-
based representations are just as capable of expressing
recursive structure as constituency-based ones are.
A way of saving the claimed primacy of word order and
constituency would be to impose an English-like structure
on a sentence like the Latin one given earlier (reordered,
say, as [ [ [[ultima][aetas]] [[carminis][Cumae]] ] [[iam]
[venit]]] ) and then to scramble the words with a secondary
operation (see Matthews 2007, for critical review). A more
sophisticated variant is to separate out the hierarchical
from the ordering information and specify them separately
in a differently construed version of a Phrase Structure
Grammar (PSG) (Gazdar & Pullum 1982). But the point
is that order and constituency are playing no signalling
role for the hearer – they cannot therefore play a role in
the parsing of such a sentence. In all the recent appli-
cations in the cognitive sciences mentioned earlier,
where recursion has played such an important theoretical
role, the experimental evidence was from a comprehen-
sion or parsing perspective where the universality of con-
stituency was assumed (Fitch & Hauser 2004; Friederici
2004). A further point is that there is not the slightest evi-
dence for the psychological reality of any such imposed
constituent structure in a language like Jiwarli. (Research-
ers on Australian languages have repeatedly reported the
inability of speakers to repeat a sentence with the same
word order: for Warlpiri “sentences containing the same
content words in different linear arrangements count
as repetitions of one another” [Hale 1983, p. 5] and
“[w]hen asked to repeat an utterance, speakers depart
from the ordering of the original more often than not”
[Hale et al. 1995, p. 1431].)
Syntactic constituency, then, is not a universal feature of
languages.4 Just like dependency relations, it is simply one
possible way to mark relationships between the parts of a
sentence. Just like the grammatical relation of subject
(sect. 5), employing constituency as a coding device is a
common and workable solution that many languages
have evolved, but it is totally absent in others, while in
others again it is in the process of evolving without
having yet quite crystallized (Himmelmann 1997).
It follows that any suggestion about UG that presumes
the universality of constituent structure will be false.
Models of the evolution of language (e.g., Bickerton
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1981) that presume the operation of phrase-structure
grammar (PSG) generating sentences with surface consti-
tuency (Hauser et al., p. 1577) are also therefore aimed at a
particular kind of (English-like) language as the target of
evolutionary development. But it is clear that the child
must be able to learn (at least) both types of system, con-
stituency or dependency. It will not always be the case that
the child needs to use constituency-detecting abilities in
constructing its grammar, because constituency relations
are, as shown, not universal.
6. Recursion in syntax as a non-universal
We turn now to recursion, the feature which is at the heart
of recent heated discussions: Indeed, Hauser et al. (p.
1569) hypothesize that recursion is “the only uniquely
human component of the faculty of language.”5 Recent
findings are said to show that “animals lack the capacity
to create open-ended generative systems,” whereas
human “languages go beyond purely local structure by
including a capacity for recursive embedding of phrases
within phrases” (Hauser et al. 2002, p. 1577). Recursion,
in syntax, is commonly defined as the looping back into a
set of rules of its own output, so as to produce a potentially
infinite set of outputs. It is sometimes assumed in the
debate that recursion is defined over constituent structure,
in that recursion “consists of embedding a constituent in a
constituent of the same type” (Pinker & Jackendoff 2005,
p. 211). However, because dependency structures are
also generated by rule, it is equally possible to have
recursive structures that employ dependency relations
rather than constituency structures (Levelt 2008, Vol 2,
pp. 134 ff.).
The terms of the debate were set fifty years ago by
Chomsky (1955; 1957) when he introduced the hierarchy
of formal languages, using methods from logic and
mathematics, and applied them to constituent structure.
He showed that English constituent structure could not
be generated by a grammar limited to state transitions (a
finite state grammar, or FSG). Rather, the indefinitely
embedded structures of English required at least a
phrase-structure grammar, or PSG, as in “If A, then B,”
where A itself could be of the form “X and Y,” and “X” of
the form “W or Z.” Taken as a whole, this generates struc-
tures like If John comes or Mary comes and Bill agrees, let’s
go to the movies. Chomsky has consistently held that this
recursion in constituent structure is the magic ingredient
in language, which gives it its expressive power.
Since then, a vast amount of work in theoretical linguis-
tics has elaborated on the mathematical properties of
abstract grammars (Gazdar et al. 1985; Partee et al.
1990), while many non-Chomskyan linguistic theories
have moved beyond this syntactic focus, developing
models of language that reapportion generativity to other
components of grammar (see, e.g., Bresnan 2001;
Jackendoff 2003a; 2003b). But recently this classic “syntac-
tocentricism” (as Jackendoff [2003b] has called it), never
relinquished by Chomsky, has re-emerged centrally in
interdisciplinary discussions about the evolution of
language, re-enlivened by Hauser et al.’s (2002) proposal
that the property of recursion over constituent structures
represents the only key design feature of language that is
unique to humans: sound systems and conceptual
systems (which provide the semantics) are found in
other species. Fitch and Hauser (2004) have gone on to
show that despite impressive learning powers over FSGs,
tamarin monkeys don’t appear to be able to grasp the
patterning in PSG-generated sequences, while O’Donnell
et al. (2005) argue that comparative psychology should
focus on these formal features of language. Meanwhile
Friederici (2004), on the basis of these developments,
suggests different neural systems for processing FSG
versus PSGs, which she takes to be the critical juncture in
the evolution of human language.
In this context where recursion has been suggested to
be the criterial feature of the human language capacity,
it is important for cognitive scientists to know that many
languages show distinct limits on recursion in this sense,
or even lack it altogether.
First, many languages are structured to minimize embed-
ding. For example, polysynthetic languages – which
typically have extreme levels of morphological complexity
in their verb, but little in the way of syntactic organization
at the clause level or beyond – show scant evidence for
embedding. In Bininj Gun-wok, for example (Evans
2003a, p. 633), the doubly-embedded English sentence
“[They stood [watching us [fight]]]” is expressed, without
any embedding, as “they_stood / they_were_watching_us /
we_were_fighting_each_other,” where underscores link
morphemes within a word. In fact, the clearest cases of
embedding are morphological (within the word) rather
than syntactic: to a limited degree one verb can be incorpor-
ated within another, for example: barri-kanj-ngu-nihmi-re
[they-meat-eat-ing-go], “they go along eating meat.” But
this construction has a maximum of one level of embed-
ding – so that even if it were claimed that polysynthetic
languages simply shift the recursive apparatus out of the
syntax into the morphology (Baker 1988), the limit to one
degree of embedding means it can be generated by a finite
state grammar in Bininj Gun-wok. Mithun (1984) counted
the percentage of subordinate clauses (embedded or other-
wise) in a body of texts for three polysynthetic languages
and found very low levels in all three: 7% for oral Mohawk
texts, 6% in Gunwinggu (a dialect of Bininj Gun-wok), and
just 2% in Kathlamet. Examples like this show how easily a
language can dispense with subordination (and hence with
the primary type of recursion), by adopting strategies that
present a number of syntactically independent propositions
whose relations are worked out pragmatically.
Kayardild is another interesting case of a language
whose grammar allows recursion, but caps it at one level
of nesting (see Evans 1995a; 1995c). Kayardild forms sub-
ordinate clauses in two ways: either it can nominalize the
subordinate verb (something like English -ing), or it can
use a finite clause for the subordinate clause. Either way, it
makes special use of a case marking – the oblique (OBL) –
which can go on all or most clausal constituents. This
oblique case marker then stacks up outside any other case
markers that may already be there independently. We shall
illustrate with the nominalized variant, but identical argu-
ments carry through for the finite version. For example, to
say, “I will watch the man spearing the turtle,” you say,
ð16Þ ngada kurri-ju dangka-wu raa-n-ku banga-wuu-nth
I watch-FUT man-OBJ spear-NOMZR-OBJ turtle-OBJ-OBL
The object marker on “man” is required because it is the
object of “watch,” and the object marker on “turtle”
because it is the object of “spear.” Of particular relevance
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here is that “turtle” is marked with the object case plus the
oblique case because the verb “spear” of which it is the
object has been nominalized.
Now the interesting thing is that, even though in general
Kayardild (highly unusually) allows cases to be stacked up
to several levels, the oblique case has the particular limit-
ation (found only with this one case) that it cannot be fol-
lowed by any other case. This morphological restriction,
combined with the fact that subordinate clauses require
their objects and other non-subject NPs to be marked
with an oblique for the sentence to be grammatical,
means that the morphology places a cap on the syntax: at
most, one level of embedding.
In discussions of the infinitude of language, it is normally
assumed that once the possibility of embedding to one level
has been demonstrated, iterated recursion can then go on to
generate an infinite number of levels, subject only to
memory limitations. And it was arguments from the need
to generate an indefinite number of embeddings that
were crucial in demonstrating the inadequacy of finite-
state grammars. But, as Kayardild shows, the step from
one-level recursion to unbounded recursion cannot be
assumed, and once recursion is quarantined to one level
of nesting it is always possible to use a more limited type
of grammar, such as a finite state grammar, to generate it.
The most radical case would be of a language that
simply disallows recursion altogether, and an example of
this has recently been given for the Amazonian language
Piraha˜ by Everett (2005), which lacks not only subordina-
tion but even indefinitely expandable possessives like
“Ko’oi’s son’s daughter.” This has been widely discussed,
and we refer the reader to Everett’s paper for the
details. Village-level sign languages of three generations’
depth or more also systematically show an absence of
embedding (Meir et al., in press), suggesting that recur-
sion in language is an evolved socio-cultural achievement
rather than an automatic reflex of a cognitive specialism.
The languages we have reviewed, then, show that
languages can employ a range of alternative strategies to
render, without embedding, meanings whose English ren-
ditions normally use embedded structures. In some cases
the languages do, indeed, permit embedding, but it is
rare, as with Bininj Gun-wok or Kathlamet. In other
cases, like Kayardild nominalized clauses, embedding is
allowed, but to a maximum of one iteration. Moreover,
since this is governed by clear grammatical constraints, it
is not simply a matter of performance or frequency.
Finally, there is at least one language, Piraha˜, where
embedding is impossible, both syntactically and morpho-
logically. The clear conclusion that these languages point
to is that recursion is not a necessary or defining feature
of every language. It is a well-developed feature of some
languages, like English or Japanese, rare but allowed in
others (like Bininj Gun-wok), capped at a single level of
nesting in others (Kayardild), and in others, like Piraha˜,
it is completely absent. Recursion, then, is a capacity
languages may exhibit, not a universally present feature.
The example of Piraha˜ has already been raised in debate
with Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch, by Pinker and Jackend-
off (2005). Fitch et al. (2005) replied that “the putative
absence of obvious recursion in one of these languages is
no more relevant to the human ability to master recursion
than the existence of three vowel languages calls into
doubt the human ability to master a five- or ten-vowel
language” (p. 203). That is, despite the fact that recursion
is the “only uniquely human component of the language
faculty,” recursion is not an absolute universal, but just
one of the design features provided by UG from which
languages may draw: “as Jackendoff (2002) correctly
notes, our language faculty provides us with a toolkit for
building languages, but not all languages use all the
tools” (2002, p. 204).
But we have already noted that the argument from
capacity is weak. By parity of argument, every feature of
every language that has ever been spoken must then be
part of the language faculty or UG. This seems no more
plausible than claiming that, because we can learn to ride
a bicycle or read music, these abilities are part of our
innate endowment. Rather, it is the ability to learn bicycle
riding by putting together other, more basic abilities
which has to be within our capacities, not the trick itself.
Besides, if syntactic recursion is the single core feature of
language, one would surely expect it to have the strong
form of a “formal universal,” a positive constraint on poss-
ible rule systems, not just an optional part of the toolkit,
in the style of one of Chomsky’s “substantive universals.”
No one doubts that humans have the ability to create
utterances of indefinite complexity, but there can be
serious doubt about where exactly this recursive property
resides, in the syntax or elsewhere. Consider that instead
of saying, “If the dog barks, the postman may run away,”
we could say: “The dog might bark. The postman might
run away.” In the former case we have syntactic embed-
ding. In the latter the same message is conveyed, but the
“embedding” is in the discourse understanding – the
semantics and the pragmatics, not the syntax. It is
because pragmatic inference can deliver embedded
understandings of non-embedded clauses that languages
often differ in what syntactic embeddings they allow. For
example, in Guugu Yimithirr there is no overt con-
ditional – and conditionals are expressed in the way just
outlined (Haviland 1979).
In these cases, the expressive power of language lies
outside syntax. It is a property of conceptual structure,
that is, of the semantics and pragmatics of language.
This is a central problem for the “syntactocentric”
models associated with Chomsky and his followers, but
less so of course for the kind of view championed by Jack-
endoff in these pages (see Jackendoff 2003a), where
semantics or conceptual structure is also argued to have
generative capacity. More specifically, the generative
power would seem to lie in the semantics/pragmatics or
the conceptual structure in all languages, but only in
some is it also a property of the syntax.
To recapitulate:
1. Many languages do not have syntactic constituent
structure. As such, they cannot have embedded structures
of the kind indicated by a labelled bracketing like [A[A]].
Most of the suggestions for rule constraints (like Subja-
cency) in UG falsely presume the universality of constitu-
ency. The Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch versus Pinker and
Jackendoff controversy simply ignores the existence of this
wide class of languages.
2. Many languages have no, or very circumscribed
recursion in their syntax. That is, they do not allow embed-
ding of indefinite complexity, and in some languages there
is no syntactic embedding at all. Fitch et al’s (2005)
response that this is of no relevance to their selection of
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syntactic recursion as the single unique design feature of
human language reveals their choice to be empirically
arbitrary.
3. The cross-linguistic evidence shows that although
recursion may not be found in the syntax of languages, it
is always found in the conceptual structure, that is, the
semantics or pragmatics – in the sense that it is always
possible in any language to express complex propositions.
This argues against the syntacticocentrism of the Chomsk-
yan paradigm. It also points to a different kind of possible
evidence for the evolutionary background to language,
namely, the investigation of embedded reasoning across
our nearest phylogenetic cousins, as is required, for
example, in theory of mind tasks, or spatial perspective
taking. Even simple tool making can require recursive
action patterning (Greenfield 1991).
7. The new synthesis: Evolutionary approaches to
language
A linguist who asks “Why?” must be a historian.
—Martin Haspelmath (1999, p. 205)
Our message has been that the languages of the world
offer a real challenge to current theory and analysis
about the place of language in human cognition. From
the perspective of some approaches, the message of diver-
sity may suggest that there is no clear way forward. In fact,
however, there is a growing body of work that shows
exactly where the language sciences are headed, which is
to tame the diversity with theories and methods that
stem ultimately from the biological sciences. Evolutionary
approaches, in the broadest sense, are transforming the
theoretical terrain.
This work is of different kinds. In the first instance,
there is a great deal of speculation, elegant theory, and
mathematical modelling aimed at the problem of language
origins (Christiansen & Kirby 2003). Some of this is
devoted to the preconditions – for example, the origin of
human cooperation (Boyd & Richerson 2005; Tomasello
2000, 2008), or the properties of human interaction or
theory of mind (Enfield & Levinson 2006). Other work
is centrally concerned with the coevolution of cognition
and culture generally, arguing for a twin-track model in
which biological and cultural evolution run partially inde-
pendently, but with reciprocal interaction (Durham 1991;
Levinson & Jaisson 2006). This provides a mechanism for
the biological evolution of traits adaptive to cultural
environments, for which the neuroanatomical foundations
for language must be a prime example.6
Language diversity can best be understood in terms of
such a twin-track model, with the diversity largely
accounted for in terms of diversification in the cultural
track, in which traits evolve under similar processes to
those in population genetics, by drift, lineal inheritance,
recombination, and hybridization. These create the popu-
lation conditions in which new variants arise in separate
social groups. A range of selectors – characteristics of
the brain and vocal tract, constraints on the communica-
tive channel, internal constraints within the system, and
transition constraints on what can turn into what – then
shape the chances of different variants catching on.
Historical linguistics is the oldest branch of scientific
linguistics, with long-standing interests in lineal inheri-
tance versus horizontal transfer through contact and bor-
rowing. Its greatest achievement was the development of
rigorous methods for the tracking of vocabulary through
descendant languages. But brand new is the application
of bioinformatic techniques to linguistic material, allowing
the quantification of inheritance versus borrowing in voca-
bulary (McMahon & McMahon 2006); see also Pagel et al.
(2007) and Atkinson et al. (2008) for further examples of
statistical phylogenetic approaches to understanding
language evolution. Application of cladistics and Bayesian
phylogenetics to vocabulary allow much firmer inferences
about the date of divergences between languages
(Atkinson & Gray 2005; Gray & Atkinson 2003). These
methods can also be applied to the structural (phonologi-
cal and grammatical) features of language, and this can be
shown to replicate the findings based on traditional voca-
bulary methods (Dunn et al. 2005; Dunn et al. 2008),
while potentially reaching much further back in time.
These explicit methods allow the comparison between,
for example, linguistic phylogeny, human genetics, and
the diversification of cultural traits in some area of the
world. A stunning result is that, in at least some parts of
the world, linguistic traits are the most tree-like, least
hybridized properties of any human population (Hunley
et al. 2007), with stable linguistic groupings solidly main-
tained across thousands of years despite enormous flows
of genes and cultural exchange across groups.
These bioinformatic methods throw new light on the
nature of Greenbergian universals (Dunn et al. 2008).
Using Bayesian phylogenetics, we can reconstruct family
trees with the structural properties at each node, right
back to the ancestral proto-language of a family. We can
then ask how much these structural features are, over mil-
lennia, codependent (i.e., changing together, or instead
evolving independently). First impressions from these
new methods show that the great majority of structural
features are relatively independent; only a few resemble
the Greenbergian word-order conditional universals,
with closely correlated state-transitions. The emerging
picture, then, confirms the view that most linguistic diver-
sity is the product of historical cultural evolution operating
on relatively independent traits. On the other hand, some
derived states are inherently instable and unleash chains
of changes till a more stable overall state is reached.
As Greenberg once put it, “a speaker is like a lousy auto
mechanic: every time he fixes something in the language,
he screws up something else” (quoted in Croft 2002, p. 5).
In short, there are evolutionarily stable strategies, local
minima as it were, that are recurrent solutions across time
and space, such as the tendency to distinguish noun and
verb roots, to have a subject role, or mutually consistent
approaches to the ordering of head and modifier, which
underlie the Greenbergian statistical universals linking
different features. These tendencies cannot plausibly be
attributed to UG, since changes from one stable strategy
to another take generations (sometimes millennia) to work
through. Instead, they result from myriad interactions
between communicative, cognitive, and processing con-
straints which reshape existing structures through use. A
major achievement of functionalist linguistics has been to
map out, under the rubric of grammaticalization, the
complex temporal sub-processes by which grammar
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emerges as frequently used patterns sediment into conven-
tionalized patterns (Bybee 2000; Givo´n 2008). Cultural pre-
occupations may push some of these changes in particular
directions, such as the evolution of kinship-specific pro-
nouns in Australia (Evans 2003b). And social factors, most
importantly the urge to identify with some groups by speak-
ing like them, and to maximize distance from others by
speaking differently (studied in fine-grained detail by
Labov 1980), act as an amplifier on minor changes that
have arisen in the reshaping process (Nettle 1999).
Gaps in the theoretically possible design space can be
explained partly by the nature of the sample (we have
7,000 survivors from an estimated half-million historical
languages), partly by chance, partly because the biased
state changes above make arriving at, or staying in, some
states rather unlikely (Dunn et al. 2008; Evans 1995c).
An advantage to this evolutionary and population biology
perspective is that it more readily accounts for the cluster-
and-outlier pattern found with so many phenomena when a
broad sample of the world’s languages is plumbed. We
know that “rara” are not cognitively impossible, because
there are speech communities that learn them, but it may
be that the immediately preceding springboard state
requires such specific and improbable collocations of rare
features that there is a low statistical likelihood of such
systems arising (Harris 2008). It also accounts for
common but not universal clusterings, such as grammatical
subject, through the convergent functional economies out-
lined in section 4, making an all-purpose syntactic pivot an
efficient means of dealing with the statistically correlated
roles of agent and discourse topic in one fell swoop. And
it explains why conditional universals, as well, almost
always turn out to be mere tendencies rather than absolute
universals: Greenberg’s word-order correlations – for
example, prepositions where verb precedes object, postpo-
sitions where verb follows object – are functionally econ-
omical. They allow the language user to consistently stick
to just one parsing strategy, right- or left-branching as
appropriate, and channel state transitions in particular
directions that tend to maintain the integrity of the
system. For example, where adpositions derive from
verbs, if the verb follows its object it only has to stay
where it is to become a post- rather than a pre-position.
The fertile research program, briefly summarized in the
preceding paragraphs, allows us to move our explanations
for the recurrent regularities in language out of the pre-
wired mind and into the processes that shape languages
into intricate social artefacts. Cognitive constraints and
abilities now play a different role to what they did in the
generative program (cf. Christiansen & Chater 2008):
their primary role is now as stochastical selective agents
that drive along the emergence and constant resculpting
of language structure.
We emphasize that this view does not, of itself, provide a
solution to the other great Chomskyan question: What cog-
nitive tools must children bring to the task of language
learning? If anything, this question has become more chal-
lenging in two vital respects, and here we part company
with Christiansen and Chater (2008), who assume a much
narrower spectrum of structural possibilities in language
than we do: First, because the extraordinary structural vari-
ation sketched in this article presents a far greater range of
problems for the child to solve than we were aware of fifty
years ago; and second, because the child can bring
practically no specific hypotheses, of the UG variety, to
the task. But, however great it is, this learning challenge is
not peculiar to language – it was set up as the crucial
human cognitive property when we moved into a coevolu-
tionary mode, using culture as our main means of adap-
tation to environmental challenges, well over a million
years ago.
8. Conclusion: Seven theses about the nature of
language and mind
The new and more complex emerging picture that we have
sketched here, however uncomfortable it may be for
models of learning that minimize the challenge by postu-
lating some form of universal grammar, in fact promises
us a much better understanding of the nature of language
and the cognition that makes it possible.
On the one hand, there are thousands of diverse
languages, with the organizing principles that sort them
being largely similar to the radiation and diversification
of species. In other words, language diversification and
hybridization works just like the evolution of biological
species – it is a historical process, following the laws of
population biology. Consider the fact that linguistic diver-
sity patterns just like biological diversity generally, so that
the density of languages closely matches the density of bio-
logical species across the globe, correlating with rainfall
and latitude (Collard & Foley 2002; Mace & Pagel 1995;
Nettle 1999; Pagel 2000). Minor genetic differences
between human populations may act as “attractors” for
certain linguistic properties which are then easier to
acquire and propagate (Dediu & Ladd 2007).
On the other hand, the human cognition and physiology
that has produced and maintained this diversity is a
single system, late evolved and shared across all
members of the species. It is a system that is designed to
deal with the following shared Hockettian design features
of spoken languages: the use of the auditory-vocal
channel with its specialized (neuro)anatomy, fast
transmission with output-input asymmetries (with a pro-
duction-comprehension rate in the proportion 1 : 4, see
Levinson 2000, p. 28), multiple levels of structure (phono-
logical, morphosyntactic, semantic) bridging sound to
meaning, linearity combined with nonlinear structure
(constituency and dependency), and massive reliance on
inference. The learning system has to be able to cope
with an amazing diversity of linguistic structures, as
detailed in this article. Despite this, the hemispherical
lateralization and neurocognitive pathways are largely
shared across speakers of even the most different
languages, to judge from comparative studies of European
spoken and signed languages (Emmorey 2002). Yet there
is increasing evidence that few areas of the brain are
specialized just for language processing (see, e.g., recent
work on Broca’s area in Fink et al. 2005 and Hagoort 2005).
How are we to reconcile diverse linguistic systems as the
product of one cognitive system? Once the full diversity is
taken into account, the UG approach becomes quite
implausible – we would need to stuff the child’s mind
with principles appropriate to thousands of languages
working on distinct structural principles. That leaves just
two possible models of the cognitive system. Either the
innate cognitive system has a narrow core, which is then
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augmented by general cognition and general learning
principles to accommodate the additional structures of a
specific language (as in, e.g., Elman et al. 1996), or it is
actually a “machine tool,” prebuilt to specialize and con-
struct a machine appropriate to indefinitely variable local
conditions – much the picture assumed in cross-linguistic
psycholinguistics of sound systems (Kuhl 1991). Either
way, when we look at adult language processing, we find
a hybrid: a biological system tuned to a specific linguistic
system, itself a cultural historical product.
The fact that language is a bio-cultural hybrid is its most
important property, and a key to understanding our own
place in nature. For human success in colonizing virtually
every ecological niche on the planet is due to adaptation
through culture and technology, made possible by brains
gradually evolved specifically to do that. The rapidly
expanding theory of coevolution explores the twin-track
descent mechanisms of culture and biology, and the feed-
back loops between them (Boyd & Richerson 2005;
Durham 1991; Laland et al. 2000; Odling-Smee et al.
2003). Language is one of the best exemplars of such coe-
volution, with evolved biological underpinnings for cultu-
rally variable practices, where the biology constrains and
canalizes but does not dictate linguistic structures.
We may summarize this emerging general picture in the
following seven theses, each linked to a specifically implicated
research initiative. Some of these initiatives are already under
way across a range of subliteratures (linguistic typology, cog-
nitivist and functionalist treatments, optimality theory),
others not. But in either case the initiatives need to be
linked across schools into an integrated general theory with
hypothesis-testing procedures accepted by the whole field.
1. The diversity of language is, from a biological point of
view, its most remarkable property – there is no other
animal whose communication system varies both in form
and content. It presupposes an extraordinary plasticity
and powerful learning abilities able to cope with variation
at every level of the language system. This has to be
the central explicandum for a theory of human communi-
cation. (It seems inevitable that part of the explicans will
be that language has coevolved with culture, which itself
evolved to give rapid adaptation to fast-changing environ-
ments and migration across niches; see thesis 5.) Research
initiative: a principled and exhaustive global mapping of
the world’s linguistic diversity.
2. Linguistic diversity is structured very largely in phylo-
genetic (cultural-historical) and geographical patterns.
Understanding these patterns basically involves the
methods of population biology and cladistics, together
with the principles that generate change and diversity. To
the extent that there are striking similarities across
languages, they have their origin in two sources: historical
common origin or mutual influence, on the one hand, and
on the other, from convergent selective pressures on what
systems can evolve. The relevant selectors are the brain
and speech apparatus, functional and cognitive constraints
on communication systems, including conceptual con-
straints on the semantics, and internal organizational prop-
erties of viable semiotic systems. Research initiatives: First,
a global assessment of structural variability comparable to
that geneticists have produced for human populations,
assembled in accessible synthesis like the World Atlas of
Language Structures (WALS) (http://WALS.info/) and
the structural phylogenetics database (Reesink et al.
under review). Second, we need a full and integrated
account of how selectors generate structures.
3. Language diversity is characterized not by sharp
boundaries between possible and impossible languages,
between sharply parameterized variables, or by selection
from a finite set of types. Instead, it is characterized by
clusters around alternative architectural solutions, by
prototypes (like “subject”) with unexpected outliers, and
by family-resemblance relations between structures
(“words,” “noun phrases”) and inventories (“adjectives”).
Hypothesis: There are cross-linguistically robust system-
preferences and functions, with recurrent solutions (e.g.,
subject) satisfying several highly ranked preferences, and
outliers either satisfying only one preference, or having
low-probability evolutionary steps leading to their states.
4. This kind of statistical distribution of typological vari-
ation suggests an evolutionary model with attractors (e.g.,
the CV syllable, a color term “red,” a word for “arm”),
“canals,” and numerous local peaks or troughs in an adaptive
landscape. Some of the attractors are cognitive, some func-
tional (communicational), some cultural-historical in nature.
Some of the canalization is due to systems-biases, as when
one sound change sparks off a chain of further changes to
maintain signalling discreteness. Research initiative: Each
preference of this kind calls for its own focussed research
in terms of which selectors are at work, along with a model-
ling of system interactions – for example, computational
simulations of the importance of these distinct factors
along the lines reported by Steels and Belpaeme (2005).
5. The dual role of biological and cultural-historical
attractors underlines the need for a coevolutionary
model of human language, where there is interaction
between entities of completely different orders – biologi-
cal constraints and cultural-historical traditions. A coevo-
lutionary model explains how complex socially shared
structures emerge from the crucible of biological and cog-
nitive constraints, functional constraints, and historically
inherited material. Such a model unburdens the neonate
mind, reapportioning a great deal of the patterning to
culture, which itself has evolved to be learnt. Initiative:
Coevolutionary models need to work for two distinct
phases: one for the intensely coevolutionary period
leading to modern humans, where innovations in hard-
ware (human physiology) and software (language as cul-
tural institution) egged each other on, and a second
phase where the full variety of modern languages mutate
regularly between radically different variants against a
relatively constant biophysical backdrop, although popu-
lation genetics may nevertheless predispose to specific
linguistic variants (Dediu & Ladd 2007).
6. The biological underpinnings for language are so
recently evolved that they cannot be remotely compared,
for example, to echolocation in bats (pace Jackendoff
2002, p. 79). Echolocation is an ancient adaptation shared
by 17 families (the Microchiroptera) with nearly 1,000
species and over 50 million years of evolution (Teeling
et al. 2005), whereas language is an ability very recently
acquired along with spiralling culture in perhaps the last
200,000 to 300,000 years by a single species.7 Language
therefore must exploit pre-existing brain machinery,
which continues to do other things to this day. Language
processing relies crucially on plasticity, as evidenced by
the modality switch in sign languages. The major biological
adaptation may prove to be the obvious anatomical one, the
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vocal tract itself. The null hypothesis here is that all needed
brain mechanisms, outside the vocal-tract adaptation for
speech, were co-opted from pre-existing adaptations not
specific to language (though perhaps specific to communi-
cation and sociality in a more general sense).
7. The two central challenges that language diversity
poses are, first, to show how the full range of attested
language systems can evolve and diversify as sociocul-
tural products constrained by cognitive constraints on
learning, and second, to show how the child’s
mind can learn and the adult’s mind can use, with
approximately equal ease, any one of this vast range of
alternative systems. The first of these challenges
returns language histories to centre stage in the research
program: “Why state X?” is recast as “How does state X
arise?”. The second calls for a diversified and strategic
harnessing of linguistic diversity as the independent
variable in studying language acquisition and language
processing (Box 3): Can different systems be acquired
by the same learning strategies, are learning rates
really equivalent, and are some types of structure in
fact easier to use?
This picture may seem to contrast starkly with the
assumption that was the starting point for classic cognitive
science, namely, the presumption of an invariant mental
machinery, both in terms of its psychological architecture
and neurocognitive underpinnings, underlying the
common cognitive capacities of the species as a whole.
Two points need to be made here. First, there is no
logical incompatibility with the classic assumption, it is
simply a matter of the level at which relative cognitive
uniformity is to be sought. On this new view, cognition
is less like the proverbial toolbox of ready-made tools
than a machine tool, capable of manufacturing special
tools for special jobs. The wider the variety of tools that
can be made, the more powerful the underlying mechan-
isms have to be. Culture provides the impetus for new
tools of many different kinds – whether calculating,
playing the piano, reading right to left, or speaking
Arabic.
Second, the classic picture is anyway in flux, under
pressure from increasing evidence of individual
differences. Old ideas about expertise effects are now
complemented with startling evidence for plasticity in
Box 3. Using linguistic diversity as a “natural laboratory” in cognitive science
Instead of yearning for simple language universals, cognitive scientists should embrace the diversity and use it
for what it is good for: supplying rich independent variables for experimental purposes. Listed here are some of
the existing outstanding uses of this natural laboratory of variation in the communication system of our species
(see also Bates et al. 2001; Guo et al. 2008; Li et al. 2006; Nakayama et al. 2006; Slobin 1997a).
Modality: Sign versus Speech
The modality transfer in sign versus spoken language can be exploited to explore the nature of language pro-
cessing when the input/output systems are switched, thus allowing glimpses into language-specific cognition
beyond the vocal-auditory specializations (Emmorey 2002; MacSweeney et al. 2002).
Sound Systems and How We Process Them
Kuhl (1991; 2004) and Werker and Tees (2005) have exploited cross-linguistic differences in sound systems,
showing that infants from 6 months of age are already “tuning” their acoustic space to the sound system of
the language they are learning.
Cutler et al. (1983) have shown that parsing the sound stream for word recognition crucially involves the rhyth-
mic structure of the language, which can be of at least three distinct kinds: based on syllable timing (e.g.,
Spanish), stress timing (e.g., English) and on the mora (e.g., Japanese). Even the best bilinguals tend to use
only one system (Cutler et al. 1989).
Morphology
Psycholinguists have exploited structural differences between languages to explore, for example, the cognitive
effects of gender systems (Boroditsky et al. 2003) or the effects on processing (Vigliocco et al. 2005).
Syntax
The full variety of syntax types has hardly begun to be exploited by psycholinguists (but see MacWhinney &
Bates 1989). For some first psycholinguistic investigations of a free word order language (Odawa), see
Christianson and Ferreira (2005).
Semantics and Conceptual Structure
Differences in the linguistic coding of, for example, space can be shown to correlate with differences in the
non-linguistic conceptual coding (Levinson 2003; Levinson & Wilkins 2006; Majid et al. 2004), suggesting
that linguistic distinctions affect how we think (see also Boroditsky 2001; Lucy 1992; Lucy & Gaskins 2001).
Lexicon
Lexical gaps can impact perception (e.g., of color: Davidoff et al. 1999; Kay & Kempton 1984) and cognition
(e.g., of number: Gordon 2004). Meaning diversity has obvious implications for language acquisition: do we
name pre-existing concepts or construct the concepts during learning (Bowerman & Levinson 2001)?
Acquisition of Morphosyntax
The diversity of the child’s target has been the focus of a great deal of acquisition research (see, e.g., Slobin 1997a).
Controlled comparison across languages can be very revealing of children’s learning strategies (Pye et al. 2007).
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the brain – behavioral adaptation is reflected directly in
the underlying wetware (as when taxi drivers’ spatial
expertise is correlated with growth in the hippocampal
area; Maguire et al. 2000). Conversely, studies of individ-
ual variance show that uniform behavior in language
and elsewhere can be generated using distinct under-
lying neural machinery, as shown for example in the
differing degrees of lateralization of language in
individuals (see, e.g., Baynes & Gazzaniga 2005; Knecht
et al. 2000).
Thus, the cognitive sciences are faced with a double
challenge: culturally variable behavior running on what
are, at a “zoomed-out” level of granularity, closely
related biological machines, and intra-cultural uniformity
of behavior running on what are, from a zoomed-in per-
spective, individually variable, distinct machines. But
that is the human cognitive specialty that makes language
and culture possible – to produce diversity out of biologi-
cal similarity, and uniformity out of biological diversity.
Embedding cognitive science into what is, in a broad
sense including cultural and behavioral variation, a popu-
lation biology perspective, is going to be the key to under-
standing these central puzzles.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was partially supported by the Australian Research
Council (Social Cognition and Language Grant DP878126) to
Nicholas Evans, and by the Max Planck Society to Stephen
Levinson. Author order is alphabetical. We thank Jos van
Berkum, Lera Boroditsky, Morten Christiansen, Peter Hagoort,
Martin Haspelmath, Wolfgang Klein, Asifa Majid, Fritz
Newmeyer, and Karl-Magnus Petersson for helpful comments;
Barbara Finlay, Adele Goldberg, Russell Gray, Shimon
Edelman, Mark Pagel, and two further anonymous BBS
referees for their suggestions on improvement; and Edith
Sjoerdsma for her work on the manuscript.
NOTES
1. See also Postal (1970, p. 130), responding to a challenge: “I
would be willing to postulate universals on the basis of an even
weaker study, namely of one language.”
2. There will certainly prove to be a genetic basis for the
input/output mechanisms for language, and very probably for
vocal learning. The FOXP2 story points in these directions
(Fisher & Marcus 2006, Vernes et al. 2008). Whether the
higher, more abstract aspects of language reside in language-
specific abilities, however, remains quite unclear (but see
Box 2).
3. Such “design features” may, it is thought, offer us at least a
bedrock of exceptionless universals. Even here, though, excep-
tions are reported: for example, not all sign languages appear
to show duality of patterning (Aronoff et al. 2008).
4. For example, Hornstein et al. (2005, p. 7) describe constitu-
ent structure as one of the uncontentious “big facts” about
language. See Matthews (2007) for a careful demolition of this
position.
5. There is some lack of clarity over what is meant here by
recursion: In the Chomsky hierarchy, all formal languages are
recursively enumerable, but only some are recursive in the
sense of decidable (Levelt 2008, vol. 1, p. 113). As far as struc-
tures are concerned, tail (or peripheral) recursion (sometimes
hard to distinguish from mere iteration) is usefully differentiated
from nested recursion or centre-embedding, which requires
push-down stack memory (see Parker 2006; Pinker & Jackendoff
2005, p. 203).
6. For examples of ongoing coevolution in the language
domain, see Dediu and Ladd (2007) and Aoki and Feldman
(1989).
7. Any date for the origin of a graduated capacity will be
arbitrary, but consider, for example, the breathing control
necessary for extended speech (MacLarnon & Hewitt 2004):
the relevant thoracic vertebral enervation dates after Homo
erectus and before the split between modern humans
and Neanderthals at perhaps 325,000 years ago (Wall & Kim
2007).
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Abstract: I present the so-called Verb-Object Constraint as a serious
proposal for a true linguistic universal. It provides an example of the
kind of abstraction in linguistic analysis that seems warranted, of how
different languages can confirm such a universal in different ways, and
why approaches that avoid all abstractness miss important linguistic
generalizations.
I agree with Evans & Levinson (E&L) that natural languages
display an amazing diversity, and that this has great significance
for cognitive science. Like them, I have devoted myself to study-
ing this diversity. But I do not agree that the descriptive data
becoming available refute the Chomskian notion of a rich Uni-
versal Grammar (UG). On the contrary, each new language I
have studied presents both fascinating new examples of diversity
and important new evidence that human languages are all vari-
ations on the same theme. E&L are looking at only one side of
this paradox.
The root of the paradox is that – according to generative
linguistics – natural languages are properly described at several
distinct levels of analysis (Chomsky 1957; 1965). Given this, it
is perfectly possible for new languages to demonstrate diversity
at one level and uniformity at another. It is easy to imagine
how “comparative architecture” might find that the fac¸ade
designs of buildings vary much more than expected, whereas
fundamental structural support systems vary very little. This is
parallel to what I believe comparative linguistics shows us
about language.
As an example (synopsized from Baker 2001; Baker, in press),
consider (1) as a possible linguistic universal:
(1) The Verb-Object Constraint (VOC): A nominal that
expresses the theme/patient of an event combines with the
event-denoting verb before a nominal that expresses the agent/
cause does.
One obvious reflection of the VOC in English is that (normally)
objects immediately follow the verb, the two forming a verb
phrase, whereas subjects do not. Comparison with other
languages shows that many (35%; Dryer 2005) are like English
in this respect – but also that many have a different word
order, or no fixed order at all. At this level of description, there
is substantial diversity. Nevertheless, we find other reflections
of the VOC in language after language. For example, some
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40% of languages (Turkish, Japanese, etc.) have Subject-Object-
Verb order, with the object left-adjacent to the verb rather than
right-adjacent to it. This is different from English but equally
consistent with the VOC.
Languages with Verb-Subject-Object order (7%) look like
violations of (1), but careful research has shown that many of
them (at least) are not. For example, Irish clearly has a
(Subject þ [Verb þ Object]) structure when there is no tense
marking; Verb-Subject-Object order arises only when the verb
needs to combine with tense (McCloskey 1991); see also
Chung 1998 on Chamorro. These languages thus support the
VOC, understood as holding at an abstract level.
Mohawk is a language in which word order gives no evidence
of constituency. But Mohawk also has noun incorporation, where
an argument can combine with the verb to form a compound.
Crucially, the theme-object of the verb can incorporate into
the verb, but the agent-subject argument cannot: Mohawk (and
Bininj Gun-wok) allows “The baby meat-ate” but not “Baby-
ate the meat.” This is another manifestation of the VOC, the com-
positional asymmetry showing up at the level of compounding
rather than phrase formation (Baker 1988; 1996).
Unusual features of newly described languages can reveal uni-
versal properties in new ways. Kayardild has the very rare prop-
erty of copying tense marking onto every constituent related to
the verb phrase (Evans 1995a, pp. 399–401). Strikingly, this
marking shows up on the theme-object but not on the agent-
subject (see E&L’s example [16]) – which is new support for
the VOC. Including minor types (like Verb-Object-Subject
languages), we now have solid leads that the VOC is valid for
well over 90% of the known linguistic diversity. And I know of
no counterexamples that have been investigated directly by
mutually correcting research communities that include some
researchers open to using abstractness.
The descriptive and typological research that E&L draw on
summarily rejects most abstractness in linguistic analysis. E&L
say it is a misconception that the differences among languages
can be resolved by postulating a more abstract formal level,
declaring this to be a false dogma. But the only support they
give for this declaration is saying that “the experts either
cannot formulate it clearly or do not agree that it is true”
(target article, sect. 2). There is a real issue underlying this: It
is a serious intellectual challenge to find exactly the right formu-
lations of principles like the VOC (or Subjacency, or the Binding
Principles). Generativists thus offer different formulations, and
they do not claim to have found the definitive ones yet. But
these formulations share a common core. Saying that UG is
false on these grounds is thus like saying (as some do) that evol-
ution is false because experts disagree about the details.
The challenge and opportunity of finding the right statement
of universals can be seen in the putative contrast between
“dependency” languages and “constituency” languages, which
E&L emphasize. I find it striking that the dependency relations
they identify for Latin in their example (14) are exactly the
same as the dominance relations in the phrase structure of the
English equivalent in example (13). We can thus isolate some-
thing substantive that these allegedly different language types
have in common by finding a neutral mode of representation
that expresses this important topological equivalence.
E&L also voice the widespread concern that abstractness
allows generative theories to immunize themselves from counter-
examples. No doubt this happens. But the VOC is not an unfal-
sifiable dogma for generativists. On the contrary, they have
seriously considered alternative possibilities. For example,
Marantz (1984) proposed that the VOC is a feature of language
that varies parametrically, to account for “deep ergative”
languages like Dyirbal. This hypothesis was investigated, but
the preponderance of evidence showed it to be false, as more
data came in from languages like Inuit (Bok-Bennema 1991).
That the VOC is universal is simply the hypothesis that has
fared better empirically than any well-articulated alternative.
Note that if the VOC is universal, this is certainly of great inter-
est to cognitive science. Why should verbs combine with their
theme arguments before their agent arguments? It is easy to
write formal languages that do it the other way around. Presum-
ably this tells us something contingent and potentially profound
about how humans mentally represent events.
Linguistic universals are thus not myths, but hypotheses –
hypotheses that gain new support from much of the same
research that E&L cite. This research shows that we cannot be
superficial in our approach to language, not that we cannot be
universalist.








Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) argue against Universal Grammar on
the basis of language diversity. A related and fundamental issue is
whether the language input provides sufficient information for a child
to acquire it. I briefly discuss the more integrated approaches to
language acquisition which focus on the mechanisms, and research
showing that input cues provide valuable information for the language
learner.
Evans & Levinson (E&L) argue against the notion of Universal
Grammar (UG), illustrating the huge diversity in human
language – a diversity that exists at all levels. A justification for
UG was the assumption that language is too complex for a
child to acquire and that the input does not contain sufficient evi-
dence for the child to learn the system; prior knowledge of
language was therefore assumed. Hence, information about the
process of language acquisition is fundamental in any discussion
of UG and the domain specificity of language, something that
E&L do not elaborate on.
Acquisition data are available from a range of languages,
including those represented in the cross-linguistic studies pio-
neered by Dan Slobin (1985a; 1985b; 1992; 1997a; 1997b) and
from more recent publications. The data indicate that young
children quickly attune to the input language at all levels.
Young children are adept at identifying the recurrent patterns
of organisation within the input language, whether these are
related to case systems, tense and aspect systems, word order,
syntactic alternations, complex sentences, pronominal systems,
the encoding of spatial relations, or other features. Based on
the findings, the proposed UG principles and parameters are
not adequate to explain the acquisition process. Nor do they con-
vince all researchers that the language input lacks sufficient
evidence for acquisition without prior knowledge of language
structures, or that children from different language environments
follow the same path in acquisition.
The crucial question is: What does the child bring to the task?
A related question is: What factors influence language develop-
ment? In the UG approach, the focus is on the end state, the
mature grammar. Abstract linguistic concepts are available to
the child, and language forms in the input are mapped onto
these concepts. Both absolute and relative universals have been
proposed, candidates for possible innate syntactic content
(Valian 2009, p. 18). The relative universals allow for variation
across languages including syntactic features and categories
from which languages are built and from which they can select,
as well as proposed binary parameters of syntactic variation
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(Valian 2009, p. 19). Given the diversity of syntactic features and
categories in languages discussed by E&L, there would need to
be numerous relative universals to accommodate them.
However, the child will need to process the input to determine
which were relevant to the target language.
Many researchers in the field reject the formal UG approach;
they do not assume domain (language)-specific constraints to
facilitate language acquisition. Rather domain-specific knowl-
edge emerges as a product of development. Their concern is
with the mechanisms, processes, and strategies involved in
acquiring a language or languages. The assumption is that
language development cannot be isolated from the child’s brain
development or social and cognitive development. In the emer-
gentist approaches, language structures are not innate; they
emerge from known processes linking “a growing understanding
of the brain with new theories of cognition” (MacWhinney 1999,
p. xvii). The child uses the cues available in the input to identify
the language specific patterns (Bates & MacWhinney 1987), with
some cues more reliable than others. In constructivist usage-
based approaches, children are assumed to build up syntactic
categories and structures of their language gradually, using
cues such as frequency and regularity of specific constructions
(e.g., Lieven et al. 2003; Tomasello 2003a; 2009). Instead of
assuming that the input lacks sufficient cues for the child to
acquire the language, the research focuses on which cues it
does provide and the cognitive and perceptual tools brought by
the child to the task of acquisition.
A large proportion of the research designed to test proposed
UG principles has focused on complex syntax. However, by the
time children are processing complex structures, they have vast
experience with their language and the contexts of use. In devel-
oping a language, new knowledge is built on existing knowledge.
In the initial stages, perceptual biases, attentional mechanisms,
and cognitive abilities are involved in processing the rich infor-
mation provided in the input language. Rhythmic and distribu-
tional information provide cues to segmentation (Jusczyk 1997;
Werker & Curtin 2005; Werker & Tees 1984). Research on stat-
istical learning (e.g., Saffran et al. 1996) shows that young infants
are sensitive to language-specific transitional probabilities, corre-
lational probabilities, and distributional features of the input
(Ho¨hle et al. 2004; Mintz 2006; Thiessen 2009). The developing
sensitivities allow for segmentation of syllables, words, and other
grammatical units of the input language, segmentation that is an
essential precursor to acquiring the system. As shown by Kuhl
(2004), as infants become attuned to the sound contrasts of
their environmental language, reorganisation of their perceptual
abilities takes place; similarly, infants’ developing statistical
knowledge influences what they later perceive from the input.
Thus, knowledge is advanced as they map sound sequences to
meaning and retain these mappings in memory (e.g., Hollich
et al. 2000) and as they identify category membership, for
example, by linking the language context to properties of refer-
ents in particular domains (Smith 1999). Similarly, in the later
stages of acquisition, knowledge of language structures gained
facilitates the acquisition of new knowledge.
Phonological memory is important in forming mental rep-
resentations of new words (Gathercole & Baddeley 1989), and
vocabulary development is a precursor of vocabulary develop-
ment (Bates & Goodman 1999). By assuming that language
acquisition is guided by universal principles specific to the
language domain, as in the UG approach, the role of cognitive
skills and the influence of individual cognitive abilities on
language development are not adequately considered.
However, the link is clear from typical language development
as well as atypical, an example of which is specific language
impairment (SLI). It was first proposed that SLI supports separ-
ation of language from other cognitive domains, and explanations
for language problems in SLI were related to principles of UG
(e.g., Rice & Wexler 1996). Although children identified as
having SLI are judged to have nonverbal abilities in the normal
range, a significant body of research has revealed memory and
information processing deficits (e.g., Archibald & Gathercole
2007; Bavin et al. 2005; Montgomery et al. 2009). In addition, sig-
nificantly lower scores on standardised cognitive assessments are
typically reported for SLI groups compared to age-matched, non-
impaired children. Thus, an alternative explanation is that cogni-
tive deficits lead to difficulty in processing information from the
input, information required in acquiring the language (Leonard
et al. 2007).
Theorists need to understand more about the diversity of
languages, such as discussed by E&L, and the impact that such
typological features have on the acquisition process; and, in
addition, develop a greater understanding of language in atypical
situations. Such understanding can only advance discussion
about constraints on human language.
Unveiling phonological universals: A linguist
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Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) are right to hold theories of language
accountable for language diversity, but typological data alone cannot
determine the structure of mental phonological grammars.
Grammatical universals are nonetheless testable by formal and
experimental methods, and the growing research in experimental
phonology demonstrates the viability of a comparative experimental
evaluation of the Universal Grammar (UG) hypothesis.
There is little doubt that the twin challenges of language univer-
sals and language diversity are critical for understanding the
architecture of the language faculty, its domain-specificity and
evolutionary origins. Despite their crucial import, these ques-
tions remain unaddressed in most existing psycholinguistic
research. Evans & Levinson (E&L) should be commended for
reminding the cognitive science community of its outstanding
intellectual debt in this area. Nonetheless, E&L’s own con-
clusion – that the hypothesis of universal grammar is false –
does not follow from the evidence they present. Here, I specifically
consider E&L’s analysis of phonological universals – the role of
syntactic and semantic universals falls beyond the scope of this
commentary.
In its bare minimum, the hypothesis of Universal Grammar
(UG) states that the brains of all speakers represent a shared
set of grammatical constraints. Although this hypothesis is
often associated with the claims that UG constraints are innate,
and domain- and species-specific, these additional claims are
not logically linked to the basic hypothesis of grammatical univer-
sals. E&L appear to reject all four claims on the grounds that
language typology exhibits no absolute, exceptionless regularities.
Typological universals, however, are distinct from grammatical
universals, and the link between them is complex. Grammatical
universals – the object of cognitive inquiry – are mental rep-
resentations (I-language), whereas typological universals are
statistical generalizations concerning external linguistic outputs
(E-language). Such outputs are shaped by multiple factors, of
which putative grammatical universals are only one force – the
restrictions on perception, motor control, conceptual structure
and memory, coupled with cultural and social factors, are
equally strong determinants.
Consider, for example, the typological prevalence of CV sylla-
bles (discussed by E&L). One theory of UG, Optimality Theory
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(Prince & Smolensky 1993/2004), attributes this fact to a univer-
sal, but violable, well-formedness constraint that requires all syl-
lables to begin with an onset. Such a constraint, however, does
not guarantee that CV syllables are most frequent typologically
(typological frequency is also determined by extra-grammatical
factors); nor does it preclude the existence of onsetless syllables
(e.g., V – such syllables can be protected by other constraints
enforcing faithfulness to grammatical inputs). Instead, the
Onset constraint predicts that no grammatical process will
actively transform syllables with an onset to onsetless ones (de
Lacy, 2008). Whether the case of Arrernte (cited by E&L) coun-
ters this prediction is debatable (Berry 1998; Smith 2005), but
typological frequency alone clearly cannot decide this matter.
Although this conclusion calls for a more careful interpretation
of the typological diversity, it does not render the UG hypothesis
unfalsifiable: optimality theory asserts that universal well-form-
edness constraints are active in the grammars of all speakers, irre-
spective of whether the relevant structures are present or absent
in their linguistic experience. This strong hypothesis has sparked
a productive research program that uses experimental tools to
test the role of grammatical language universals – an enterprise
that has unfortunately gone unnoticed by E&L. The available
findings suggest that speakers are sensitive to putatively UG
restrictions unattested in their language while ignoring other
regularities that are equally motivated on statistical and phonetic
grounds (Becker et al., submitted; Davidson 2006; Hayes et al.,
submitted; Moreton 2008; Wilson 2006).
Consider, for example, the restrictions on onset clusters (e.g., bl
in blocks). It is well known that onsets such as bl are typologically
more frequent than lb, and languages that tolerate syllables like lba
tend to allow bla. This fact is attributed to sonority – a scalar prop-
erty that correlates with the intensity of consonants: least sonorous
(softest) on the scale are stops (e.g., b,d), followed by nasals (e.g.,
n) and liquids (e.g., l). Accordingly, bla rises in sonority, whereas
lba manifests a sonority fall. The typological preference for
onsets like bl is captured by a scalar UG constraint that favors
onsets with large sonority distances (e.g., bl.bn. bd.lb,
where.indicates preference; Clements 1990; Smolensky 2006).
Although sonority restrictions are widely documented, the
typological evidence reflects only implicational tendencies, and
many languages manifest outright reversals (e.g., Russian
allows sonority falls, e.g., lb). Such observations might lead
E&L to conclude that sonority restrictions are not grammatical
universals, but rather, artifacts of modality-specific acoustic and
articulatory preferences. However, sonority-based restrictions
have been documented in sign languages (Corina 1990; Sandler
& Lillo-Martin 2006), and recent experimental work suggests
that they are active in the brains of individual speakers even
when the relevant structures are absent in their language.
English speakers, for example, favor syllables that rise in sonority
(e.g., bnif) compared to sonority plateaus (e.g., bdif), which, in
turn, are preferred to sonority falls (e.g., lbif), and this preference
shapes the perception of these syllables (Berent 2008; Berent
et al. 2007): the worst-formed onsets of falling sonority (e.g.,
lbif) are more likely to be misperceived (as lebif) compared to
sonority plateaus (e.g., bdif), which, in turn, are misperceived
relative to sonority rises (e.g., bnif). The misperception of ill-
formed onsets is not due to an inability to extract their surface
form from the acoustic input (e.g., it obtains with printed
materials; Berent et al. 2009); nor is it explained by the statistical
properties of English – similar results have been reported
among speakers of Korean, a language that arguably lacks onset
clusters altogether (Berent et al. 2008). Instead, these systematic
misperceptions imply broad grammatical knowledge that triggers
the active recoding of ill-formed structures. The convergence of
sonority preferences across phonological systems, both spoken
and signed (Sandler 1993), is consistent with a domain-specific
phonological mechanism.
Nonetheless, the present results cannot determine whether
phonology preferences are, in fact, universal or innate.
Markedness (i.e., well-formedness) hierarchies, such as sonority,
could vary in detail due to both predictable grammatical pro-
cesses (e.g., conflation; de Lacy 2006) and variation in fine-
grained phonetic properties that could inform their inference
(Hayes & Steriade 2004). Whether phonological markedness
hierarchies are experience-independent or learned is unknown,
and there is vanishingly little information on their domain- and
species-specificity. Far from being untestable, however, these
questions call for a comparative cross-linguistic research
program that combines typological, formal, and experimental
methods. The emerging field of experimental phonology demon-
strates the viability of this approach in evaluating the UG
hypothesis.
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Abstract: This commentary argues that Evans & Levinson (E&L) should
expand their two-track model to a three-track model in which biological
and cultural evolution interact with the evolution of an individual’s
language repertories in ontogeny. It also comments on the relevance of
the argument from the poverty of the stimulus and offers a caveat,
based on analogous issues in biology, on the metaphor of language as a
container, whether of meanings or of other content.
I welcome the arguments of Evans & Levinson (E&L) and offer
only some supplementary remarks perhaps relevant to the future
elaboration of their case. I strongly agree that, given the shared
properties of the world we live in, our appeals to innate concepts
and structures should be a last resort. My primary recommen-
dation is that they expand their model from two tracks to three,
so that they can deal with the ways in which biological and
cultural evolution must necessarily interact with the evolution
of an individual’s language repertories in ontogeny. I also
comment on the relevance of the argument from the poverty of
the stimulus, and I offer a caveat, based on analogous issues in
biology, on the metaphor of language as a container of meanings
or other content. I have elsewhere addressed related issues,
including the primacy of behavior in shaping brain structure
(Catania 2008), the interpretation of learning in terms of selec-
tion rather than in terms of associations (Catania 1995; 2003;
Catania & Shimoff 1998), and the distinction between language
structure and function and its implications (Catania 1973; 1990;
2001; 2004; Catania & Cerutti 1986).
E&L make a persuasive case for the interaction of biological
and cultural evolution. But languages can survive only if acquired
and maintained by individuals who then pass them on. This
acquisition and maintenance involves a third variety of selection
operating on individual behavior, at every level: from the shaping
of complex vocalizations as the child masters phonetic structures,
through the semantic and syntactic details of those languages, to
the sophisticated social interactions of mature speakers. Without
selection at the level of individual language repertories, those lin-
guistic and social practices cannot last long enough to be trans-
mitted across successive generations. For this to work, by the
way, ontogenetic and cultural selection must operate upon
similar kinds of linguistic units; what is acquired in learning
must share dimensions with what is culturally transmitted.
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Adequate scenarios for language evolution must take into
account these three varieties of selection. Each requires vari-
ations among the units upon which it operates; each entails
different mechanisms by which environments select surviving
variants. Biological contingencies must select requisite physio-
logical attributes (e.g., vocal tract structure, neural organization).
Ontogenetic contingencies must maintain the features of
languages acquired by individuals. Cultural selection must per-
petuate language practices across generations. E&L’s discussion
of language diversity nicely accommodates these processes,
because it allows for substantial ranges of variation while still
showing how languages can be maintained within and across
generations.
These different varieties of selection often complement one
another, but selection at one level may oppose selection at
another. For example, behavior selected through ontogenetic pro-
cesses during an individual’s lifetime may reduce the individual’s
reproductive fitness at the phylogenetic level (consider substance
abuse or sexual behavior involving partners at risk for AIDS).
Although they do so sparingly, and typically only implicitly,
E&L sometimes discuss language as a container of meanings
or of other content expressed in words and sentences. The
conduit metaphor of language is pervasive but too often mis-
leading (Reddy 1979). Assuming that language expresses or
contains something transmitted from one individual to
another raises some of the same difficulties as the assumption
that genetic materials transmit information. Dawkins (1982)
made that point when distinguishing between blueprints and
recipes in characterizing genetic materials, which do not
contain body plans or other information about the organism
that will be their product. Rather than blueprints, they are
recipes for development; the relevant information is not
about past selective environments or about the way mature
organisms will interact with their environments. A parallel
distinction is relevant to language and has implications for
language evolution. Words are not carriers of meanings or
schemas or other information relevant to the selective environ-
ments that engendered them; we should look at words not in
terms of what they contain but rather in terms of what they
do (Catania 1987). Of all that they can do, one irreducible
function of language is providing a mechanism by which one
individual can change the behavior of others. This alone may
be a sufficient basis for the origins of language. Other functions
of language (e.g., communication, calculation, narrative, truth)
may then be its derivatives.
I was surprised that E&L did not mention Chomsky’s argu-
ment from the poverty of the stimulus (Chomsky 1965),
because claims that the relevant structures cannot be found in
the environmental contingencies justify the reification and
internalization of language universals. The argument that chil-
dren learn grammatical structures even in the absence of
examples of negative instances seems to assume that learning
any distinction requires exposure to all possible negative exem-
plars. But, for example, a bird raised in monochromatic light
does not discriminate among wavelengths. Yet after learning to
discriminate between the original wavelength and just a single
new one not seen before, the bird responds in an orderly way
to wavelengths across the entire visual spectrum (Terrace
1975). Similarly, any verbal environment including contrasts
between several grammatical structures provides the differences
on which learning can be based: for example, both active and
passive voice are grammatical but provide a contrast that
may enable later discrimination of grammatical versus
ungrammatical.
Of course, these outcomes tell us about the structure of the
underlying continua (the orderliness of the color continuum
could be described as its universal grammar). But with regard
to grammatical dimensions, those structures are so highly vari-
able across languages, as E&L so aptly argue, that it would be
as reasonable to assume that they are driven by language cultures
within lifetimes in social environments as that they are driven by
brain structures evolved over biological time (Catania 2008;
Moerk 1992). This is consistent with evidence that rich verbal
environments in which parents spend lots of time interacting
verbally with their children make vast and lasting differences in
their verbal competence, as measured by vocabulary growth
rate, school performance, and IQ scores (Hart & Risley 1995).
Verbal environments matter.
The myth of language universals and the myth
of universal grammar
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Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) argue that language universals are a
myth. Christiansen and Chater (2008) have recently suggested that innate
universal grammar is also a myth. This commentary explores the
connection between these two theses, and draws wider implications for
the cognitive science of language.
It has been widely argued that an innate Universal Grammar
(UG) must be postulated to explain two key observations: first,
that languages share putatively “universal” patterns, which
appear arbitrary from a functional, communicative point of
view; and second, that children acquire language so readily
from an apparently impoverished linguistic input (the “poverty
of the stimulus” argument).
The second point has been the subject of considerable recent
interest, with many theorists arguing that linguistic input is richer
than has previously been suspected (e.g., Pullum & Scholz 2002;
Reali & Christiansen 2005) or that modern learning methods are
richer than is often presumed (e.g., Chater & Vita´nyi 2007;
Harman & Kulkarni 2007). The first argument, based on
language universals, has gone relatively unchallenged in the cog-
nitive science literature – but no longer. Evans & Levinson
(E&L) provide powerful evidence that language universals are
myth rather than reality, and hence, that this line of defense of
UG is swept aside. It remains to be explained, though, how
languages came to display such stunning diversity, and this is
where research on language evolution may offer some insight.
We have recently argued (Christiansen & Chater 2008) that
an innate UG is not merely poorly evidenced, but indefensible
on evolutionary grounds. Specifically, we argue that the
cultural variability of language provides a “moving target,”
which changes too rapidly to support the biological adaptation
that would be required to lead to an innate UG (Chater et al.
2009). Thus, language is best viewed as the product of cultural
evolution, not biological evolution (Christiansen et al., in
press).
The cultural evolution of language does not, of course, take
place in a biological or social vacuum, but rather, is shaped by
multiple constraints. One type of constraint derives from the
nature of the thoughts that language expresses. For example,
whatever the nature of our mental representations, they appar-
ently afford an infinite range of different thoughts, promoting
the likely emergence of compositionality in language (Kirby
2007). Linguistic structure is also shaped by socio-pragmatic
principles relating to the communicative function of language;
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for example, as embodied by Gricean implicatures (Grice 1967).
A further source of constraints on language evolution derives
from the operation of our perceptuo-motor apparatus, which,
for example, enforces substantial seriality in both spoken and
signed languages. Similarly, cognitive limitations on learning,
processing, and memory also provide strong constraints on lin-
guistic structure; for example, our limited working memory pro-
motes a general tendency to resolve ambiguities as quickly as
possible in both linguistic (Clark 1975) and perceptual input
(Pomerantz & Kubovy 1986).
Individual languages are seen as evolving under the pressures
from these constraints, as well as cultural-historical factors
(including language contact and sociolinguistic influences),
resulting over time in the kind of linguistic diversity described
by E&L. Cross-linguistically recurring patterns do emerge due
to similarity in constraints and culture/history, but such patterns
should be expected to be probabilistic tendencies, not the rigid
properties of UG (Christiansen & Chater 2008). Thus, we con-
strue recurring patterns of language along the lines of Wittgen-
stein’s (1953) notion of “family resemblance”: although there
may be similarities between pairs of individual languages, there
is no single set of features common to all languages.
This perspective on language evolution and universals has
important implications for language acquisition and proces-
sing. The ready learnability of language is explicable not
because language fits an innate UG within each child; but
rather, because language itself embodies patterns that are
most naturally acquired from past generations of learners.
We have argued, more generally, that learning cultural forms
(C-induction) is very much easier than learning aspects of
the natural world (N-induction) – because learning merely
requires that each new generations agrees with the previous
generation. For example, the number sequence 1, 2, 3. . .
could be continued in any numbers of ways using repetition
(1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1. . .), oscillation (1, 2, 3, 2, 1, 2. . .), as a Fibo-
nacci sequence (1, 2, 3, 5, 8. . .), or some entirely irregular
pattern (1, 2, 3, 73, 0, 18. . .). In the context of N-induction,
the learner faces real difficulties: In encountering the
sequence in some aspect of the natural world (e.g., the
number of planets observed on successive nights), it is very dif-
ficult to know how the sequence will continue. However, C-
induction is much more reliable and straightforward. The
vast majority of people would find it most natural to continue
the sequence with “. . .4, 5, 6. . . .” Thus, predicting how
other people will continue the sequence is relatively easy, at
least if people have the same inductive biases. Similarly, chil-
dren must extrapolate a language from the sample of language
they encounter; but such extrapolation is likely to be correct,
given that it is the result of prior extrapolations by previous
generations of learners. Again, the learning problem is dra-
matically easier if the objective is to mirror a cultural form
that has been learned by others. Indeed, through prior gener-
ations of cultural selection, the form itself will have been opti-
mized to embody whatever inductive biases the learner may
have (Chater & Christiansen, in press).
Our emphasis on C-induction in language acquisition dovetails
with a usage-based approach to language processing. Connec-
tionist cognitive science has for some time explored the compu-
tational implications of a usage-based approach to language in
which constituency and recursion are not built into the architec-
ture of the language system but rather emerge through learning
as probabilistic generalizations (Christiansen & Chater 2003).
Importantly, we have developed usage-based models of recursive
sentence processing that are capable of constituent-like general-
ization and have quasi-recursive abilities comparable to human
performance on a variety of complex recursive constructions
(Christiansen & Chater 1999; Christiansen & MacDonald, in
press). Thus, at least some aspects of cognitive science do fit
with the picture of language outlined by E&L, in which recursion
and constituency are not innately defined universals.
E&L’s important paper will substantially shift the debate in
the cognitive science of language. Cognitive scientists have
often taken rigid language universals as a “given,” to be
explained by theories of language acquisition and processing
(e.g., by the postulation of an innate UG). E&L make clear
that this is a mistake – and that a much more nuanced view of
the patterns in the world’s languages is required. We argue
that this perspective is consistent with the view that an innate
UG is as much a myth as language universals; and that language
should be viewed as primarily a product of cultural, rather than
biological, evolution.
Syntax is more diverse, and evolutionary
linguistics is already here
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Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) perform a major service for cognitive
science. The assumption of Chomskyan generative linguistics – that
there are absolute unrestricted universals of grammatical structure – is
empirically untenable. However, E&L are too reluctant to abandon
word classes and grammatical relations in syntax. Also, a cognitive
scientist can already draw on a substantial linguistics literature on
variationist, evolutionary models of language.
Evans & Levinson (E&L) make an important point to cognitive
scientists about language universals. The nature of language is
seriously misrepresented by Chomskyan generative linguistics,
which is all too often taken as the standard theory of language
that must be accommodated by any interdisciplinary research
in cognitive science. In particular, the Chomskyan emphasis on
absolute unrestricted universals of grammatical structure flies
in the face of overwhelming empirical evidence of the structural
diversity of languages. This structural diversity has to be the start-
ing point for any theory that attempts to come up with universals
of language. I have only two additions to make to E&L’s argu-
ment: First, their critique of syntax, the heartland of Chomskyan
linguistics, is too timid; and second, the dynamic evolutionary
approach to language that E&L advocate already has a lengthy
pedigree in linguistics.
E&L’s approach to syntax contrasts with their assertions
about sound structure. E&L state that phonologists are aban-
doning the idea of a fixed inventory of possible human
speech sounds in favor of a model where languages construct
sound systems from fine phonetic details that vary substan-
tially. But in syntax, they assume that word classes of the tra-
ditional sort (noun, verb, adjective, etc.) exist, and they
respond to diversity by arguing that some languages do not
take advantage of some of these classes or add others. This is
very much like Jackendoff’s notion of a syntactic toolkit,
which the authors otherwise reject. In fact, E&L should
abandon the assumption that nouns, verbs, and so on, have
theoretical, cross-linguistic validity as part of a fixed inventory
of word classes, just as they have abandoned the parallel
assumption for sound inventories.
Linguists identify word classes by using syntactic criteria or
tests. These criteria are the possible occurrence of words of a par-
ticular class in a set of grammatical constructions (including mor-
phological inflectional contexts), and their inability to occur in
other constructions. This is called the distribution of the words,
or word class. But the fact of all languages, including English,
is that the distribution of words is highly variable, so that there
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are no large coherent word classes in any language (see Gross
1979). Thus, it makes no sense to say (as E&L do) that English
words like willy-nilly and heeby-jeebies differ from ideophones
in other languages in kind rather than degree, or that lunch and
train in do lunch or take a train are just regular nouns; they are
not (Wierzbicka 1982). Instead, the only cross-linguistically valid
– and language-internally valid – conclusion is that each con-
struction defines its own word classes; words do not enter into
a small number of large classes; and noun, verb, and so on,
should be abandoned as word classes (Croft 1991; 2001; 2007;
2009).
This is not to deny that there are language universals constrain-
ing syntax, just as one cannot deny universals governing sound
inventories; but they are not in the form of universal word
classes found in traditional grammar and generative grammar.
Instead, there are typological prototypes for parts of speech
reflecting the preference of particular propositional acts (refer-
ence, predication, modification) for particular semantic classes;
these are basically the same as E&L’s clusters or attractors.
A similar argument applies to E&L’s analysis of so-called sub-
jects. A division of functions into topic, agent, and pivot is insuffi-
cient to reflect the diversity of encoding participants in clauses
and the categorization of participant roles across constructions
with different functions. Unlike word classes and propositional
acts, there is no simple typological prototype to account for the
diversity of participant encoding in clauses. Yet there are univer-
sal patterns that constrain the types of grammatical relations used
for different construction types (Croft 2001; Kazenin 1994) and
that constrain grammatical relations relative to each other in a
clause (Croft 1991).
The chief sense in which the dynamic, complex adaptive
systems approach to language that E&L advocate is now emer-
ging (as they put it) is that it is finally emerging from under the
shadow of generative linguistics. Cognitive science must
embrace language diversity and the consequences it entails for
our understanding of the nature of language. But cognitive scien-
tists need not wait for linguists to draw those consequences; there
is much existing research to guide a nonlinguist cognitive scien-
tist interested in the approach to language presented by E&L.
A few examples are given here, linked to E&L’s seven theses in
their conclusion.
Linguistic diversity (thesis 1) is the basic starting point of typo-
logical analysis. An important omission in an article asserting the
centrality of linguistic diversity is the existence of diversity (vari-
ation) within speech communities, not just across speech commu-
nities (see Labov 1994; 2001; Milroy 1992). Numerous databases
and inventories of typological diversity (thesis 2) already exist.
Although there are clusters (thesis 3) or attractors (thesis 4) gov-
erning the distribution of some linguistic diversity (typological
prototypes), these are only some of the patterns of typological dis-
tribution that have been observed, as mentioned earlier. Green-
berg (1969; 1978a; 1979) presents a model of language that
shifts away from synchronic language states to language history
(thesis 7). A detailed evolutionary theory of language (theses 2
and 5) which integrates variation across languages, within speech
communities, and in language use is presented in Croft (2000a)
and in Mufwene (2001; 2008). Although this work is not coevolu-
tionary, it balances the extensive recent work on the biological
evolutionary origins of the language capacity by providing a cul-
tural evolutionary framework for understanding language. Cogni-
tive and functional constraints have been investigated in cognitive
linguistics for a quarter of a century (theses 2 and 6; see Croft &
Cruse [2004] and Langacker [2008] for recent overviews, and
Tomasello [1998; 2003b] for an introduction oriented to cognitive
scientists).
Much of course remains to be done in evolutionary linguistics.
Cognitive science can draw on these strands of linguistic theory
and empirical discovery, and evolutionary linguistics can draw
on the rest of cognitive science for a better understanding of
the factors that motivate speakers’ creation and use of the
linguistic structures that are found in the world’s languages –
before they disappear.
A note on methodology in linguistics
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Abstract: Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) critique of Universal Grammar
fails because their methodology is flawed, as illustrated in their
discussion of the Subjacency Condition. The lack of explicit analysis
leads the authors to a false conclusion that is refuted by work
published in this journal twenty years ago. They miss the point that
unanalyzed data cannot disprove grammatical hypotheses.
From the outset, modern generative grammar has been con-
cerned with the construction of precise models for linguistic
structure. As Chomsky noted in the preface to Syntactic
Structures, such models
can play an important role, both negative and positive, in the process of
discovery itself. By pushing a precise but inadequate formulation to an
unacceptable conclusion, we can often expose the exact source of this
inadequacy and, consequently, gain a deeper a deeper understanding
of the linguistic data. More positively, a formalized theory may auto-
matically provide solutions for many problems other than those for
which it was explicitly designed. Obscure and intuition-bound
notions can neither lead to absurd conclusions nor provide new and
correct ones, and hence they fail to be useful in two important respects.
(Chomsky 1957, p. 5)
One can evaluate competing proposals in linguistics to the
extent that they are formulated precisely. In the case of the
target article, this is not possible because there are no such
proposals.
In general, the target article eschews precise analysis and
offers instead a number of general descriptive statements about
a range of languages that are taken to be refutations of proposed
universals. Often these are offered without citation of data or,
more importantly, the explicit analysis that would support the
claims. Such refutations are based on unstated and unverified
assumptions about grammatical analysis. In general, such discus-
sion is not useful.
Consider the discussion of the Subjacency Condition in section
3, one of only two UG principles in generative grammar
discussed.1 Evans & Levinson (E&L) give no formulation of
this condition; nor do they give explicit syntactic analyses of
the examples cited in (6–8). Example (6) is actually ambiguous
(i.e., ‘where-said’ versus ‘where-got off’) and Example (8),
which is marked deviant, is grammatical under the interpretation
of ‘where-said’. The inadequate analysis of (8) offered in
Example (9) does not distinguish between the possible and
impossible interpretations because a place adverbial modifying
the main clause VP occurs in the same linear position as
one modifying the subordinate clause VP. Only the analysis of
hierarchical structure disambiguates the two interpretations.
Either where starts out as a constituent of the subordinate
clause (the impossible interpretation) or of only the main
clause (the possible interpretation). Moreover, if whether is
analyzed as a complementizer on a par with that in Example
(6) rather than a wh-phrase, then the Subjacency Condition
does not account for the deviance of (8) on the ‘where-get off’
interpretation.
To understand E&L’s criticism, one needs to know that the
Subjacency Condition is a locality constraint that restricts the
scope of syntactic movement, thereby contributing to an
account of so-called island phenomena in natural language, a
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central topic with an extensive literature.2 E&L attempt to
dismiss the Subjacency proposal on the grounds that it “does
not work in Italian or Russian in the same way, and theorists
have had to assume that children learn the specifics of the
constraint after all” (sect. 3, para. 6). This is simply wrong, as
illustrated for Italian in Rizzi’s famous 1978 paper, which demon-
strates that Subjacency holds in Italian but is parameterized in
terms of which clause boundary type counts as a bounding
domain for the constraint (CP for Italian, but TP for English)3
(Rizzi 1978). The parametric analysis (including Russian, which
apparently has no interclausal wh-movement) has been spelled
out in detail in this journal; see Freidin and Quicoli (1989),
which analyzes the poverty of stimulus issues for parameters,
arguing that the choice of parameter settings for Subjacency
cannot be made solely from presentation of data.4 Thus, some
parameters that account for variation across languages are also
part of UG.
E&L conclude their discussion of Subjacency by saying, “Each
constraint in UG needs to be taken as no more than a working
hypothesis, hopefully sufficiently clearly articulated that it
could be falsified by cross-linguistic data” (sect. 3, para. 6). The
first part is a truism. However, the assumption in the second
part that data alone can falsify any working hypothesis (especially
one that works for a significant range of data) is clearly false. As
Chomsky noted about Subjacency more than thirty years ago,
It is easy enough to find phenomena that appear to violate the subja-
cency condition. Consider, e.g., the sentences (9), (10), where there
is a relation between the phrase in bold face and the position
marked by t, “violating” subjacency under the assumption that the
rule in question is a movement rule:
(9) John seems [S0 to be certain [S0 t to win] ]
(10) who did Mary hope [S0 that Tom would tell Bill [S0 that he should
visit t] ]
Putting the matter more carefully, a proposed condition on rules, such as
subjacency, cannot be confirmed or refuted directly by phenomena of
this (or any other) sort. A condition on rules can be confirmed or
refuted only by rules, which observe or violate it, respectively. If the
rule of NP movement that yields (9) applies successive cyclically, as
often assumed, then the rule will observe subjacency. If, as I have
argued in the references cited, the rule of wh-movement applies succes-
sive cyclically, then it too will observe subjacency, giving (10). To find
evidence to support or to refute a proposed condition on rules, it does
not suffice to list unexplained phenomena; rather, it is necessary to
present rules, i.e., to present a fragment of a grammar. The confirmation
or refutation will be as convincing as the fragment of grammar pre-
sented. This is a simple point of logic, occasionally overlooked in the lit-
erature. The status of conditions on rules is empirical, but evidence can
only be indirect and the argument, one way or another, is necessarily
rather abstract and “theory bound.” (Chomsky 1977, p. 74)
Data alone cannot speak to the validity of explicit proposals
about the content of UG. What is required is an explicit analysis
of data that follows from a precisely formulated fragment of a
grammar. This is a comment about methodology, independent
of any particular linguistic theory. In science there is no alterna-
tive to providing explicit analysis of data. The discussion of UG in
this article misses the mark entirely.
NOTES
1. The other is Principle B of binding theory, although not identified
as such nor explicitly formulated.
2. This is well understood within generative linguistics but possibly
not to the wider readership of Brain and Behavioral Sciences. For
recent accounts, see Chomsky (2008) and Boeckx and Hornstein
(2008). The original work goes back to Chomsky (1964) and Ross
(1967). See Chomsky (1973; 1977) for the original Subjacency proposal
and subsequent modifications. Note that Newmeyer (2004), which is
the only citation E&L give, also provides no explicit formulation for
Subjacency.
3. The core principle is the same for all languages that manifest syntac-
tic movement. Subjacency can be formulated as in (i):
(i) No movement rule can extract a constituent out of more than one
bounding domain per movement operation.
NP and the clausal constituents CP and TP have been proposed as
binding domains. See Note 2 for references.
4. For a similar parametric analysis of binding conditions, see Freidin
(1992, Chs. 7 and 8), and the works cited there.
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Abstract: The recognition that contentful universals are rare and often
“banal” does not undermine the fact that most non-universal but
recurring patterns of language are amenable to explanation. These
patterns are sensical or motivated solutions to interacting and often
conflicting factors. As implied by the Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) article,
linguistics would be well served to move beyond the essentialist bias that
seeks universal, innate, unchanging categories with rigid boundaries.
The Evans & Levinson (E&L) target article is a welcome concise
summary of the problems and confusions created by facile claims
of universality (see also Croft 2001). Given the authors’ own
extensive fieldwork on understudied languages, they clearly
know the typological terrain. The article provides another remin-
der that the 50-year-old promise of a contentful “Universal
Grammar” has gone unfulfilled.
And yet, many sympathetic linguists may be concerned that
the picture portrayed appears a bit nihilistic. Surely the regu-
larities of languages that have caught smart linguists’ attention
cannot be pure chance or complete accidents of language
contact. In fact, as E&L note, recurrent patterns are solutions
that satisfy “multiple design constraints, reflecting both
cultural-historical factors and the constraints of human cogni-
tion” (target article, Abstract). This point is clearly central to
the alternative approaches the authors and others espouse, and
it is worth emphasizing.
A key idea is that most patterns of language are neither strictly
predictable nor arbitrary: they are sensical or motivated solutions
to interacting and often conflicting demands (cf. Lakoff 1987).
We cannot predict that every language should have a given
option, and we should not assume that because one language
has the option, all languages do so “underlyingly.” But neither
are all the logical combinations of options attested, as we might
expect if the options were arbitrary and simply learned from what-
ever unsystematic input a child might be exposed to. Importantly,
we should not require that all languages show the same recurrent
pattern in order to recognize the pattern as being motivated.
Haiman (1985) wrote that polysemy (one word form with more
than one related meaning) can be defined as recurrent homo-
nymy: that is, if the same two meanings are named by one
label in unrelated languages, then it is reasonable to conclude
that there is a motivated relationship between the two meanings.
We do not require that the same polysemy exists in every
language in order to understand that it is motivated by semantic
and pragmatic factors.
The recognition of multiple motivating factors should make
languages more, not less interesting to cognitive scientists.
Instead of decreeing that a certain recurrent pattern exists just
because it exists – because it is part of a “Universal Grammar” –
we ask, how does the recurrent pattern develop and what indepen-
dently needed factors conspire to motivate it? Explanation often
comes from an understanding of historical processes, processing
and developmental constraints, and a clear understanding of the
functions of the constructions involved.
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Recognition of conflicting motivations can reveal explanations as
to why exceptions, as well as the generalizations themselves, exist.
For example, regular morphological forms are compositional, but
at times they license violations of general phonotactic constraints.
For example, the consonant cluster /-lkd/ does not occur in root
English words, and yet we tolerate it in walked and talked.
Compositional morphology is motivated because it allows
interpretations to be transparent, and it allows us to use old
words in new ways. Irregular forms often satisfy one or more
other demands, while violating compositionality. Irregular made
allows for phonotactic regularity and reduction that would have
been lacking if we used the word maked (Burzio 2002).
Unfortunately, providing “motivation” may fail to satisfy the
way that prediction does. A normal reaction could be: “Surely
necessary and sufficient criteria and simple predictive causes
exist, even if we have not managed to discover them yet!” An
understanding of this reaction may ultimately lead to a better
understanding of why Universal Grammar has held such great
appeal to so many for so long.
People, even young children, prefer explanations that appeal
to essentialist categories (e.g., Gelman 2003). An essentialist cat-
egory, C, combines several key ideas: (1) Though surface reality
may differ, there exists an underlying invariant essence that
defines C; (2) C has clear boundaries: one can determine categ-
orically whether an entity is or is not a member of C; (3) the
essence of C does not change over time; and (4) if C is construed
as a biological category, the essence of C is assumed to be
innately determined.
Essentialist explanations were sought throughout the biological
and social sciences, perhaps on the model of mathematics or
physics where such programs are often successful (but see Ander-
son 1972). And yet, most biological and social sciences have moved
beyond the essentialist perspective. For example, evolutionary
biologists in the nineteenth century thought of species as having
an “essence” characterized by certain necessary, abstract features;
but by the middle of the twentieth century, essentialism was
replaced by “population thinking” (Mayr 1975) in which species
were conceptualized as populations of individuals related to one
another closely but in myriad complex ways. Similarly, within
genetics, researchers had sought single genes that might be
responsible for all kinds of syndromes and phenotypes, but more
recently this view has given way to systems biology that rests on
the recognition that most phenotypes are influenced by multiple
interacting factors that include subtle environmental effects
(Karmiloff-Smith 2006; Lander 1994).
Much of linguistics has remained in a stranglehold of the
essentialist mindset, although important work in laboratory pho-
nology and computational, experimental, and corpus linguistics
has successfully moved beyond it. From definitions of word
meanings to feature assignments for grammatical categories or
constructions, the quest for simple, universal, unchanging,
necessary, and sufficient conditions continues.
Yet such essentialist conditions are hard to come by, even for
categories within a single language. For example, we like to
think English adjectives form a clear-cut set. Definitions might
appeal to their semantic property of noun modification, their
prenominal attributive distribution, or their appearance after
copular verbs such as seem. And yet there are exceptions to
each of these criteria. For instance, a subclass of adjectives begin-
ning with an unstressed schwa resists prenominal position (??the
asleep/alive boy), the adjective use of quantifiers like occasional
do not semantically modify the following noun (as in, the
occasional cigarette), and adjectives do not all readily appear
after seem (?The idiot seems blithering). Motivations for these
exceptions exist (see e.g., Coppock 2008; Goldberg & Boyd
2009), but the fact remains that the category of English adjectives
requires a more nuanced, multifaceted characterization.
E&L wonder aloud why the notion of a Universal Grammar
has remained such a compelling notion within our field,
despite the lack of consensus about what exactly it is. The lure
of essentialism may provide a part of the explanation: “Universal
Grammar” (UG) provides an essentialist answer to the question,
What is human language? As with all essentialist explanations: (a)
UG is assumed to offer an underlying invariant essence of
language, although surface realities are recognized to differ; (b)
UG is assumed to have clear boundaries: all human languages,
and no other communication systems, are assumed to share
UG; (c) UG is viewed as unchanging over time; and (d) UG is
assumed to be innately determined.
Each of these assumptions is controversial at best and nonsen-
sical at worst (e.g., Christiansen & Chater 2008; Goldberg 2006;
Tomasello 2004). Emergent phenomena, widespread statistical
generalizations, and multi-source interacting causes undermine
the essentialists’ program, as does the sort of widespread variation
documented in the E&L article. It is time we let go of the essen-
tialist mindset and embraced motivation as linguistic explanation.








Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) claim Kiowa number as a
prime example of the semantically unexpected, threatening both
Universal Grammar and Linguistic Universals. This commentary, besides
correcting factual errors, shows that the primitives required for Kiowa
also explain two unrelated semantically unexpected patterns and derive
two robust Linguistic Universals. Consequently, such apparent
exceptionality argues strongly for Universal Grammar and against E&L.
According to Evans & Levinson (E&L), the search for semantic
universals is misguided because “many languages make semantic
distinctions we . . . would never think of” (sect. 2.2.5, para. 3): no
theory of universals can capture local linguistic exceptionality.
This commentary shows that the exact opposite is true: apparent
exceptionality provides highly robust evidence for Universal
Grammar (UG). Here I summarize E&L’s semantic argument,
expose its fundamental flaw, then empirically refute their claim:
two primitives are proposed that explain not only their primary
example of “semantic distinctions we . . . would never think of,”
but derive two Universals and two further semantic Surprises.
Consider E&L’s argument from semantics. For limited counting,
languages may use noun/verb marking instead of numerals: for
example, English king~king-s; Sanskrit ra¯jan~ra¯jan-au~ra¯jan-as
“one~two~many kings.” Faced with singular~plural versus singu-
lar~dual~plural, accounting for number variation hardly appears
challenging. However, Kiowa, say E&L (mis-citing Mithun), pos-
sesses “a marker that means roughly ‘of unexpected number’: on
. . . ‘man’ it means ‘two or more,’ on . . . ‘leg’ . . . ‘one or more
than two, . . . on ‘stone’ . . . ‘just two’” (sect. 2.2.5, para. 3). Thus,
number systems present semantic distinctions too diverse for any
universals to subsume. So, number variation refutes UG.
To reveal the flaw, consider chemistry. Common oxygen-
carbon compounds (CO, CO2) are odorless, colorless gases; but
C3O2 is a colorless, odorous gas and C12O9, a white solid. Does
such diversity mean these are not all constructed from the
same two basic building blocks? No. Chemists simply recognize
that atoms combined in surprising ways yield surprising proper-
ties. Analogously, linguists seek universal primitives and aim to
explain cross-linguistic differences through the different ways
these may combine. For Kiowa to refute UG, one must (a) look
beyond surface appearances, (b) discover, by analysis, the
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building blocks it uses, and (c) show that these are irreconcilable
with any universal (non-Kiowa-specific) set of primitives. E&L
do none of these: Like early chemists, their interest lies only in
listing differences between substances, not in discovering how
their components explain those properties.
Such criticism is more than methodological. It empirically
undermines E&L’s position. To explain Kiowa requires just
two primitives (rooted in Thomas 1955), and these same primi-
tives derive two robust Universals (U1/2) and two semantic Sur-
prises (S1/2) from unrelated languages. Thus, local linguistic
exceptionality, properly analyzed, argues strongly for UG.
UG number theory is basic set theory, so the two primitives
concern sets. The first asserts ([þatomic]) or denies
([2atomic]) that a set is a singleton. The second asserts ([þ
augmented]) or denies ([2augmented]) that some given property
of the whole set also holds of a subset.1 English uses just
[+atomic]: king is [þatomic], kings [2atomic]. Sanskrit uses
both (momentarily ignore typefaces):
singular ¼ [þatomic2augmented] — singletons without single-
ton subsets
dual ¼ [2atomic2augmented] — nonsingletons without non-
singleton subsets
plural ¼ [2atomicþaugmented] — nonsingletons with non-
singleton subsets
For example, fHenry, Richardg is [2atomic] (nonsingleton)
and [2augmented] (lacking [2atomic] subsets).
UG aims to explain constraints on cross-linguistic variation.
The primitives just cited do precisely this, deriving robust two
universals concerning the expression of number in natural
languages. In broad outline:
(U1) Three is the highest number expressible grammatically in any
language, without specialized numeral vocabulary (contra quadrals,
see Corbett 2000). Derivation: three kings (e.g., fAlfred, Henry,
Richardg) is a collection (hence [2atomic]); it has nonatomic
subsets (fAlfred, Henryg) (hence [2atomic þ augmented]); but
no such subset itself has nonatomic subsets (hence [2atomic þ-
augmented2augmented]). Therefore, [2augmented þaugmented
2atomic] ¼ 3. Moreover, by basic set theory, addition of extra pri-
mitives is either contradictory or redundant.2 So, trial (3) is the
highest the number primitives of UG can reach.
(U2) Languages with dual invariably have singular/plural
(Corbett 2000), because the primitives required for dual
([+atomic], [+augmented]) also generate singular/plural (see
Sanskrit above).3 Likewise, languages with trial invariably have
singular/dual/plural because the resources for trial
([+atomic], [+augmented], opposing þ/2 specifications)
include [+atomic]/[+augmented], which generate dual, and
so on.4 (Harbour, in press, derives further analogous results.)
Important as such Universals are, the true test of these primi-
tives, and UG, is whether they capture systems “we . . . would
never think of.” In fact, these capture two semantic surprises
E&L do not discuss, in addition to Kiowa.
(S1) Although 2= 1 þ 3, languages may create dual from
singularþ plural. Consider Hopi “this (one) ran/these (ones)
ran” (Hale 1997). Plural puma, “these,” and singular wari, “ran,”
combine to create dual puma wari, “these two ran,” as follows:
singular ¼ pam wari
Dual ¼ puma wari
Plural ¼ puma yu`utu
The semantic surprise that 1 þ 3 ¼ 2 follows from the
primitives. The boldfacing in both tables is identical:
dual/plural share [2atomic]/puma; singular/dual share
[2augmented]/wari.
(S2) Although “we” is plural, some languages treat the meaning
{me, you} as singular. Winnebago -wı˜ pluralizes both sh-’u˜, “you
do,” and hı˜-’u˜, “you and I do,” giving sh-’u˜-wı˜, “you and other(s)
do,” and hı˜-’u˜-wı˜, “you, I and other(s) do” (Lipkind 1945). Anom-
alously, singular “we” arises because Winnebago uses only
[+augmented] (Noyer 1992). Consequently, “we” ¼ fme, you,
other(s)g is [þaugmented] relative to “contains me, you”: it and
its subset fme, youg both contain me, you. However,
“we” ¼ fme, youg is [2augmented]: it contains me, you but has
no proper subset that does. Thus, [+augmented] explains the
semantically surprising singularity of some senses of “we.”
Finally, Kiowa. First, correcting E&L’s errors, unsuffixed,
“man”/”leg” mean “one or two”; “stick,” “more than one”;
“hair,” “just two”; “stone,” “any number.” Suffixation yields
“more than two men/legs,” “one stick,” “one, or three or more,
hair(s)” (e.g., aa, “sticks,” aa-dau, “one stick”; aul, “two hairs,”
au-dau, “one, or three or more, hair[s]”).
Nobody thinks groups of men odd, but pairs of hairs and
solo legs normal. So, -dau does not mean “unexpected
number of.” Actually, Kiowa is like French, with two minor
differences. Both languages organize their nouns into classes,
but, where French uses a property of animates [+feminine],
Kiowa uses number primitives: for example, the “gender” of
stick is [2atomic]. This cleverly avoids the French problem
of giving sticks anatomical gender. However, it encounters a
different difficulty: talking about “one stick” (where “one” is
[þatomic] but “stick” is [2atomic]). All -dau does is register
when such þ/2 conflicts occur (French faces similar
mismatches – when [þ feminine] la sentinelle references a
[2feminine] guard – but lacks an analogous suffix). Nothing
more exotic need be said (see Harbour 2006 for Jemez and
full details in Harbour 2007).
E&L claim that there are no Universals and that semantic Sur-
prises vitiate attempts to discover UG. Both claims have been
refuted here: two primitives suffice to derive two Universals,
E&L’s prime example of something “we . . . would never think
of,” and two further Surprises besides. Linguists, like chemists,
must look beyond surface appearances to discover universal
building blocks and their properties. E&L’s critique of this
program succeeds only in highlighting some of its compelling
results.
NOTES
1. Semi-formally: S satisfies [þatomic] iff jSj ¼ 1; S satisfies
[þaugmented], relative to predicate P, iff S, and S0 , S, satisfy P.
2. [þatomic 2atomic] means 1= jSj ¼ 1. [þaugmented
2augmented þaugmented . . .] ¼ [þaugmented 2augmented . . .] by
Axiom: fa, ag ¼ fag.
3. Arbitrarily narrow focus misleads: Kiowa ‘hair’ (below) contrasts
just dual/nondual, but Kiowa globally does not (cf. Nen, E&L’s pur-
ported, unreferenced counterexample).
4. Occurrence of opposing þ/2 specifications varies cross-linguistically:
Sanskrit does not permit them, Kiowa (below) does but not for counting.
Both consequently lack trial.
The best-supported language universals
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Abstract: Conditional universals have always interested linguists more
than unrestricted universals, which are often impossible to demonstrate
empirically because categories cannot be defined in a cross-
linguistically meaningful way. But deep dependencies have not been
confirmed by more recent empirical research, and those universals with
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solid empirical support mostly relate to scalar patterns that can plausibly
be related to processing cost.
For a long time, linguists have been more interested in general
dependencies between different aspects of language structure
than in categories shared by all languages, or, in other words,
they have found conditional universals (“if a language has X, it
also has Y”) more interesting than unrestricted universals (“all
languages have X”) (cf. Table 1 in Evans & Levinson’s [E&L’s]
target article). Although there are obvious similarities between
the kinds of categories languages have, and linguists have
found it possible to carry over category labels from one language
to another ever since Greek grammatical terminology was
adopted for Latin, there is something unsatisfactory about
claiming, for instance, that “all languages have nouns and
verbs.” Clearly, all languages allow their speakers to talk about
people, things, and events (nobody disputes this), and all
languages have specialized words for meanings such as
“mother,” “tree,” “sleep,” and “hit.” But how do we know
whether the “tree” word in a language is a noun? The basic
problem is that there is no way of defining structural
categories such as noun, article, dative case, or future tense in
such a way that the definition applies to different languages,
other than via meanings that they share – but that these mean-
ings are cross-linguistically comparable is not at issue. Thus,
whether the Straits Salish words for “run” and “(be a) man” are
verbs and nouns, or whether they are merely subclasses of a
more general word-class “major word,” is not decidable (Croft
2000b). There are no agreed upon criteria for nounhood,
which makes debates about this rather pointless; and the same
applies to all kinds of other structural categories (even word;
cf. Haspelmath 2009).
Not all comparative linguists share this view, and E&L (sect.
2.2.4) seem to regard it as an empirical question whether the
noun-verb distinction will be found to be universal; but in any
event the literature has put much more emphasis on dependen-
cies (or correlations) between structural patterns. Since the
eighteenth century (cf. Plank 2001), linguists have often felt
that given a certain property X, a language simply had to have
property Y as well. Language structures were often seen as
coherent systems in which a change in one place would necess-
arily entail changes elsewhere, perhaps multiple changes
throughout the system. This view is particularly associated
with the structuralist movement of circa 1920 to 1970, and a
famous dictum is A. Meillet’s “une langue est un syste`me ou`
tout se tient” (‘a language is a system where everything hangs
together’). Although Noam A. Chomsky’s original interest in uni-
versals came from the claim that languages are unlearnable
without rich innate structures, and he dissociated himself from
structuralism, the 1980s and 1990s saw a strong movement of
generative research into deep dependencies between different
structures, due to a few “macroparameters,” whose setting
during language acquisition fixes a whole range of patterns
(Baker 2001). In Pinker’s (1994) words, children “are not acquir-
ing dozens or hundreds of rules; they are just setting a few
mental switches” (p. 112).
However, this work on macroparameters has not been a success,
and it has largely been abandoned by mainstream generative lin-
guists (cf. Haspelmath 2008b). Similarly, a large number of the
proposals for deep connections between different parts of
grammar that were made outside of the generative paradigm
have not been confirmed by subsequent research. What has hap-
pened again and again is that a particular proposal for a correlation
was based on a few languages (e.g., “languages with vowel
harmony tend to have object-verb order,” based on Turkish and
Hungarian), but subsequent research on more languages showed
that the generalization was too rash. Languages were found to
cohere less than the intuitions of linguists indicated.
This does not mean, however, that universal dependencies
(“conditional universals”) are not more than a “myth.” Although
the structuralist and macroparametric hope that languages have
an overall coherence across the entire system has not been con-
firmed, there are many generalizations with narrower domains
that hold true, and for which there is massive empirical
support. Consider the examples (1) to (6) (see Haspelmath
2008b for more discussion).
1. If a language has an [ø] sound (front rounded mid vowel), it
also has an [e] sound (front unrounded mid vowel).
2. If a language has a [u] sound (interdental fricative), it also
has an [s] sound.
3. If a language allows two consonants at the end of a syllable,
it also allows one or zero consonants at the end of a syllable.
4. If a language requires accusative marking on a patient
object of some type, it also requires marking on patients of all
types to the left on the following scale: speaker/hearer . 3rd-
person pronoun . definite NP . indefinite specific NP .
nonspecific NP.
5. If a language can form a relative clause on some clause pos-
ition, it allows relativization on all other positions to the left on
the following scale (Hawkins 2004): subject . object .
oblique . possessor.
6. If a language uses a special reflexive pronoun for an adnom-
inal possessor (e.g., Latin suum), then it also uses a special reflex-
ive pronoun for the patient object (e.g., Latin se) (see
Haspelmath 2008a).
All these universals, and quite a few more of a similar kind,
refer to scales (or “hierarchies”; cf. Croft’s [2003, p. 122]
notion of “implicational hierarchies”). These scales can generally
be interpreted in terms of processing cost. For example, the [u]
sound requires more articulatory effort than the [s] sound; the
[ø] sound is less easy to distinguish from other vowels than the
[e] sound; accusative marking is less redundant on patient
objects that are pronouns or definite than on indefinite and non-
specific NPs; and reflexive use is more remarkable (and hence
better coded) in patient object position than in adnominal posses-
sive position (cf. He1 criticized himself1 versus He1 criticized his1
colleague).
E&L primarily attack the Chomskyan rhetoric of “Universal
Grammar” (UG) for understandable reasons, given the wide-
spread acceptance of his approach outside of linguistics. But
the cross-linguistic research of the last few decades has put to
rest quite a few earlier hunches and claims by linguists about
deep dependencies. What remains, however, is no less interest-
ing from a cognitive science perspective than Chomsky’s innate
UG: Language structures can be shown to follow scalar patterns
that in most cases have fairly straightforward explanations in
terms of processing cost.
Animal comparative studies should be
part of linguistics
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Abstract: Universal Grammar promotes the study of an idealization of
language behavior and language learning. In examining the diversity of
actual behavioral strategies used to achieve linguistic goals, Evans &
Levinson (E&L) move towards studying language as a behavior. This
approach can benefit from studying communicative and cognitive
capacities more broadly – across species. We exhort like-minded
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linguists to cast off the remaining intellectual shackles of linguistic
speciesism.
The fundamental premise for generativist linguists is that the
diversity of languages springs from a common cognitive struc-
ture, latent in all humans, called Universal Grammar (UG).
The assumption of this core cognitive construct, from which
language emerges and by which language structures are con-
strained, is closely tied to assumptions that the structural frame-
work of language is innate and unlearnable, that the processing
capacities necessary for language are unique to humans, and
that language is inherently a cognitively isolated module and
therefore a computationally unique aspect of human cognition.
This black box approach to a fundamental question in cognitive
science ignores the potential of an evolutionary approach to cog-
nitive processing, including such an approach to language. It also
trains linguists to avoid consideration of evolutionary biology, and
animal research in general. Evans & Levinson (E&L) address the
first limitation head on but fall prey to the second. The good news
is that it is a modest and easy extension of their work to complete
the revolution.
By shifting the terms of scientific discourse from the unsup-
ported and untestable assumption of a common core set of
linguistic universals, a sort of mystical construction, to the
actual distinctive behaviors of language populations, E&L
move the study of language in the direction of the research
methods of the experimental sciences and away from enclosed
personal belief systems. The idea of studying real behavior as
opposed to a platonic idealization also brings with it the obli-
gation to consider real mechanisms that can explain that behav-
ior. This calls into question the longstanding barrier of the
competence/performance distinction to empirical study of
language use and processing. This also brings with it a different
standard for language research and what should count as
evidence in understanding language processes.
This is particularly important in considering the issue of the
human uniqueness of language. Hauser et al. (2002) have
claimed that the single property of recursion as applied to voca-
lizations is the uniquely human computational capacity of the
faculty of language. To address this point, E&L discuss the defi-
nition of recursion at length, from recursively enumerable pat-
terns to nested recursion of patterns, and they allude to the
computational differences among these. However, it is important
to have clarity regarding what capacity is being described. If
recursive syntactic processing in humans is a concept tractable
to experimental science, then recursion refers not to the concept
of putatively infinite (or, in any case, exceedingly long) patterns
that no human produces or ever produced, as best as we know,
but to an aspect of the computational complexity of pattern pro-
cesses in actual human vocalizations. The real functional limits
on what humans do produce and can perceive matter, and these
should not be disregarded under the rubric of performance limit-
ations independent of linguistic competence. Research with
animals is irrefutably essential to address any claims of human
uniqueness. In psychology and biology a single counterexample
may not destroy a theory as it does in physics, but a whole class
or classes of counterexamples can do so.
E&L refer to a study by Fitch and Hauser (2004) that reports
the “impressive learning powers over FSGs [finite state gram-
mars]” displayed by cotton-top tamarins, in spite of their failure
to “grasp the patterning in PSG-generated sequences” (i.e.,
phrase-structure grammar generated sequences) (see target
article, sect. 6, para. 3). Here E&L fall prey to becoming the “out-
siders . . . [heeding] . . . the articulate envoys from the universalis-
ing generativist” (sect. 1, para. 4). E&L accept a null (PSG) result
reported in tamarin study with species-irrelevant signals (human
speech syllables), no clear learning procedure (mere exposure to
stimuli), and with possible biases by additional cues (male/
female voicing distinctions available for the FSG stimuli).
Indeed, it might not have even been clear to the tamarins that
there was a task since they were not behaviorally shaped to
make a particular response.
The experimental paradigm that Fitch and Hauser (2004) used
to distinguish tamarin failure of perception at the PSG level
became broadly controversial only after it was used to demon-
strate that operantly trained European starlings are able to
learn both the FSG and PSG sequences (Gentner et al. 2006).
Claims and counterclaims surrounding these results have
appeared elsewhere and need not be repeated here. Neverthe-
less, one clear distinction of the starling results stands out in com-
parison to the tamarin studies. Whether one accepts or rejects
the claims regarding recursive processing in assessing the learn-
ing of the PSG sequences, the starlings displayed far more
complex vocal processing behavior than was displayed by tamar-
ins. Our point is that animals that engage in vocal sensorimotor
learning (starlings are songbirds and are excellent mimics) also
demonstrate heightened vocal perceptual skills. Understanding
the functional relationship between perceptual and motor
skills, and the functional utility of such abilities in the daily life
and social needs of an organism – including humans – is critical
to assessing biological and computational capacities. This fact
alone importantly informs the program of E&L, but about it
they are mute.
E&L appropriately reach towards cladistic methods developed
by evolutionary biologists to help sort out relations among human
languages. They do not reach far enough. There are also
examples of rapid changes in learned vocal patterns within non-
human species based on cultural transmission of vocal patterns –
famously studied in the songbirds (e.g., Marler & Tamura 1964).
These studies have stimulated assessment of different learning
models and extensive analysis of learning mechanisms. Applying
this knowledge must be part of E&L’s program, but they failed to
recognize it as such.
As long as linguistics will be tied up in generativist nativism,
animal studies won’t matter and will contribute little. If linguis-
tics truly becomes an experimental science, then animal studies
are informative, and a synthesis of animal and human work
becomes a useful goal to try to conceive.
E&L have staked out an important position: that there is an
ethology of language, that it is available for study, and that it is
essential that models of language use and mechanisms of
language be inexorably related to actual language usage across
humans. We agree, and maintain that this program is fundamen-
tally rooted in experimental science and evolutionary biology. As
such, it can be deeply informed by biological work on animal
communication systems. Linguistics, and psychology, are
subsets of organismal biology.
Variability in languages, variability in
learning?
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990926
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Abstract: In documenting the dizzying diversity of human languages,
Evans & Levinson (E&L) highlight the lack of universals. This suggests
the need for complex learning. Yet, just as there is no universal
structure, there may be no universal learning mechanism responsible
for language. Language is a behavior assembled by many processes, an
assembly guided by the language being learned.
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A rough heuristic can be deployed in comparative approaches to
learning: If a behavior is fixed, it derives from the organism (e.g.,
early genetic or epigenetic processes); if it is moderately variable,
it is learned, although possibly with constraints; if it is highly flex-
ible, it is acquired by highly context-sensitive learning processes.
Language may be the quintessentially flexible behavior. So, why
have classical approaches focused so heavily on what might lie
within the organism?
Evans & Levinson (E&L) offer a remarkable gift to cognitive
science. In their sweeping synthesis of typological linguistics
and their daring criticism of prevailing orthodoxy, they push us
to focus on the flexibility and prowess of the language capacity,
if there even is such a thing anymore.
Chomsky proposed Universal Grammar (UG) to ease the
learning of language; yet, thanks to E&L, we see that in many
cases even basic assumptions like syllabification or word order
might set children learning certain languages down the wrong
path. Although it is possible to soften UG by positing limits on
the form of languages (as opposed to features that languages
must have), even this maneuver may fail. Swedish, for example,
violates the hallowed “size principle” in phonology: using two fea-
tures to represent a binary contrast for which one would suffice
(Helgason & Ringen 2008). Given the linguistic data described
by E&L, we suspect that a UG based on limits will fare no
better than one based on necessary features.
E&L, by questioning whether anything about language is uni-
versal (and therefore could be properly deemed innate), compel
us to consider a flexible learning process that is capable of giving
rise to a great deal of emergent complexity. So, a language
learner may rely on a rich, redundant set of cues, using seemingly
irrelevant speaker information to acquire phonology (Rost &
McMurray 2009) and seemingly irrelevant phonological detail to
acquire syntax (Christiansen et al. 2009), all in the context of a
reinforcement environment that surpasses that of all other
species in complexity.
Therefore, why do only humans acquire language? Hold-outs
might argue that disparities in basic learning processes among
species (Newport et al. 2004) are responsible. And, indeed,
there is longstanding and compelling evidence that animals
differ in basic, although perhaps parametric ways (Bitterman
1975). Yet, other than Skinner (1957), no other learning theorist
has attempted to apply basic learning processes to language acqui-
sition as a whole (although connectionist approaches have begun
to address this piecemeal; e.g., Christiansen & Chater 2001).
One might also observe that basic cognitive capacities like
categorization (Lazareva & Wasserman 2008), same-different
discrimination (Cook & Wasserman 2006), sequence learning
(Gentner et al. 2006), and expectation generation and evaluation
(Keller & Hahnloser 2009) can be seen in various forms among
diverse species. Yet, exhibiting many of these complex forms of
cognition, all necessary for language, may be insufficient to
move animals to a level of communication performance compar-
able to humans.
So where does that leave us? When confronted with such
diversity of possible language inputs, one might first look for
even more powerful learning mechanisms. But, perhaps
language is not the product of a single mechanism. There is tre-
mendous diversity of learning and cognition among animals
(Wasserman & Zentall 2006). Finding one simple mechanism
across many different species is highly improbable (Bitterman
1975). Given the diversity of human language so richly detailed
by E&L, perhaps the parallel holds across humans.
This possibility would seem at first blush to undermine the
view of humans sharing fundamental cognitive capacities. Yet,
perhaps that is not so. Language may not be a monolithic struc-
ture to be internalized. Rather, language may be an ensemble of
skilled behaviors that are shaped by a variety of forces and are
sensitive to any available source of information. In this light,
humans (much like evolution) assemble language with a variety
of learning mechanisms and sources of information, this
assembly being guided by the particularities of the language
they are learning.
Learning even something as restricted as the phonology of
English may demand mechanisms as diverse as unsupervised clus-
tering (McMurray et al. 2009), dimensional weighting or cue neu-
tralization (Rost & McMurray 2009), anticipatory learning of
transitions (Elman 1990; Saffran et al. 1996), top-down feedback
from the lexicon (Thiessen 2007), and nonspecific social contin-
gencies (Goldstein et al. 2003). Perhaps none of them is necessary
for mastery of all languages; but most of them are necessary for any
given language. Still, none of these learning mechanisms could
operate without a rich information source consisting of overlap-
ping categories, information buried in the relative variation in par-
ticular cues, sequential relationships between sounds, and vertical
relationships between sound and meaning. These relationships are
provided by the language and the culture. Although this may
appear circular, as is so often the case in evolution, it is merely evi-
dence of coevolving systems. Language is not a structure to be
internalized; rather, it is an extremely complex assembly of beha-
viors to be developed.
Is language a thing? Or is it a skill? If it is a skill, we should not be
studying “structure” at all, but rather, studying moment-by-
moment behaviors. Evolution does not select for genes, it selects
for phenotypes, or rather, for the developmental processes that
give rise to them (Lickliter & Honeycutt 2003). Similarly, in
language, the fundamental unit is not a piece of structure – it is
an ongoing behavior, the learning processes that give rise to it,
and the cultural factors that make it useful. So what is language?
It is a behavior . . . that develops . . . in a culture . . . that develops . . .
The evidence and argument of E&L have freed developmental
theorists from having to explain the abstract and arcane of narrow
linguistic theories; language can be virtually anything. The
authors have moved us to a more productive consideration of
what is central to language: how language is used and acquired,
and what flexible and emergent mechanisms are needed to
accomplish this remarkable behavior.
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Abstract: Conflation of our unique human endowment for language with
innate, so-called universal, grammar has banished language from its
biological home. The facts reviewed by Evans & Levinson (E&L) fit
the biology of cultural transmission. My commentary highlights our
dedicated learning capacity for vocal production learning as the form of
our language endowment compatible with those facts.
The synoptic sketch of language diversity presented by Evans &
Levinson (E&L) suggests that the scope and depth of this diver-
sity itself is a pivotal fact of language. The sheer variety in pat-
terns of usage by which different languages map between
linguistic form and meaning points to cultural transmission as
the biological model of choice for human language. Handed
down the generations in a family setting, languages not only
provide a good match to the details of human population struc-
ture worldwide (Cavalli-Sforza 1997), but each one of them, lin-
guistic isolates included, is in a state of perpetual change.
Grammars (as the rest of language) undergo constant transform-
ations in historical time, exhibiting shared modes of change
driven by language use, modes that may in fact harbor the true
laws of language (Bybee 2006; Greenberg 1969; Lehmann 1995).
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Add the fact that any human being, placed in any one of these
language communities at birth, will acquire full competence in
the local language, and the cultural model equates to two null
hypotheses: Every extant and past mapping between linguistic
form and meaning is learnable under the circumstances in
which humans typically encounter them, and we come into the
world equipped with the capacity to acquire, and eventually to
transmit, such mappings across generations by cultural learning.
The impression that language requires constraints on its forms
(such as its grammar) other than those imposed by the logic of
cultural transmission itself stems from a half-century old strategic
confound introduced into linguistics by Noam Chomsky (1959).
One argument Chomsky opposed to behaviorist claims regard-
ing language acquisition was a formal one: The sophisticated
Suppes-Estes formalization of behaviorist learning theory lacks
the power to acquire a grammar of human caliber (Chomsky
1975, in Piattelli-Palmarini 1980, p. 111). Although the logical
possibility remained that behaviorist learning theory is
inadequate as learning theory, Chomsky took the unlearnability
of human grammar by its means to support the proposition
that grammar is innate. Through his persistent efforts, the fact
that humans have a unique biological endowment for language
has come to be identified with a presumptive innate grammar
to which learning contributes but “minor modifications that
give one language or another, depending on experience”
(Chomsky, in Harnad 1976), as if this were the only way to
have an endowment for language.
There is neither need nor justification for biologically oriented
work on human language to continue to accommodate this stra-
tegic confound. Cultural transmission delivers the restricted
search space needed to enable language learning, not by con-
straining the form language takes on an innate basis, but by
ensuring that the form in which language is presented to the
learner is learnable (Zuidema 2003). The target of the new gen-
eration’s learning process is itself the outcome of a learning
process (previous generation). Gold’s 1967 theorem – cited as
recently as 2002 by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (see Hauser
et al. 2002) – accordingly cannot decide between learned and
innate grammar (Zuidema 2003; see also Clark 2001; Horning
1969; Johnson 2004; Lappin & Shieber 2007). Moreover, across
generations of learning agents, cultural transmission has the
power to transform a state of arbitrary strings randomly paired
with meanings into a shared and efficient grammar without inter-
vention of natural selection or differential reinforcement of out-
comes (Kirby 2002). This apparent magic results from
competition among strings for access to subsequent generations
via the “learner bottleneck,” a central aspect of the “poverty of
the stimulus” argument. In this competition more efficient and
general forms tend to outlast others over generations.
What remains is to complete the cultural model with a way to
sustain the chain of transmission of initial nonsense (unsemanti-
cized, ungrammaticized strings) over the many generations
required for convergence on a shared grammar. The ideal prior
state for this can be found among the cultural traditions of
complex learned song of many songbirds and a few mammals.
Some of these are not confined to cultural variations on an
innate pattern, the “species-specific song” recently invoked by
Fitch (2008), but are emancipated from innate constraint on the
form song takes (calls and songs of 76 species of birds from two
continents have been identified in the repertoire of the marsh
warbler: Baylis 1982; Dowsett-Lemaire 1979). Under circum-
stances explored in Merker and Okanoya (2007), a prelinguistic
human adaptation for emancipated song would provide the mech-
anism to sustain string transmission for however long convergence
might take, because it would be driven by the need to impress by
elaborate vocal display rather than to communicate meaning.
But “Something about the faculty of language must be unique
in order to explain the differences between humans and other
animals” (Fitch et al. 2005, p. 182, emphasis in original).
Indeed, this is a condition met by the very adaptation needed
for song learning to be possible, as first proposed by Darwin
(1871). It is a dedicated learning capacity missing in all other pri-
mates – our ape relatives included – but essential for every word
and sentence we know how to pronounce, namely the capacity to
learn to reproduce, by voice, patterns of sound originally received
by ear, technically known as vocal production learning (Janik &
Slater 1997). We share this capacity with some of the singers
and all mimics among the birds, and with a few mammals, yet
we alone, of all species, have evolved vocal learning in the
setting of a primate brain.
Supported by a conformal motive (Merker 2005) and de novo
evolution of a direct projection from primary motor cortex to the
respiratory and phonatory motor nuclei of the lower brainstem
(Brown et al. 2008; Okanoya & Merker 2007), vocal learning
turns the cerebral territories centered on Wernicke’s and Broca’s
areas from their non-language uses in other primates to the
service of human language by recruiting them to the generative
production and intergenerational transmission of culturally
learned vocal lore. To it we owe not only our developmental trajec-
tory for language learning, infant babbling included, but our pro-
pensity for imitation and ritual culture more generally (Merker
2005), along with a robust selection pressure for encephalization
(Merker, in press; Merker & Okanoya 2007). As repeatedly urged
by students of birdsong (Doupe´ & Kuhl 1999; Marler 1970; Notte-
bohm 1975), this distinctive capacity of ours for vocal learning holds
the biological key to the singularity of human language. Through it,
and unconstrained by innate so-called universal grammar, the
historical filter of cultural transmission – which passes only the
possible – continually adapts the actual forms of languages to
multiple interacting constraints such as use, utility, learnability,
and neural resources (Christiansen & Chater 2008), as well as
cultural norms (Everett 2005), with diversity in train.
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Abstract: Understanding the universal aspects of human language
structure requires comparison at multiple levels of analysis. While
Evans & Levinson (E&L) focus mostly on substantive variation in
language, equally revealing insights can come from studying formal
universals. I first discuss how Artificial Grammar Experiments can test
universal preferences for certain types of abstract phonological
generalizations over others. I then discuss moraic onsets in the
language Arrernte, and how its apparent substantive variation
ultimately rests on a formal universal regarding syllable-weight sensitivity.
The target article by Evans & Levinson (E&L), questioning not
only the existence of universals but the methodology of pursuing
them, raises many issues for discussion. In this commentary, I
limit my remarks to the importance of formal (as opposed to sub-
stantive) universals – a distinction E&L do not draw with suffi-
cient clarity. Formal universals in phonology are constituted by
the analytic elements that human minds employ in constructing
representations of sound structure. Put simply, formal universals
refer to the set of available data structures (e.g., binary features,
metrical grids, autosegmental tiers) and the possible operations
on them that can be used in constructing a grammar of a language.
Phonotactic dependencies of the form Given segments A, B in
the same word, if A has feature F, then B must have feature G are
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constrained by analytic restrictions on what can be referred to.
These analytic restrictions are, by hypothesis, formal universals
that are independent of the historical contingencies or cultural
practices of any given language community. One of the best
ways of studying formal universals of this kind is by constructing
Artificial Grammar Learning experiments, using the method-
ology of cognitive science.
In one such recent study, Moreton (2008) conducted an exper-
iment in which participants were taught a miniature artificial
language containing phonotactic dependencies of the form out-
lined above. There were three conditions: in one, F and G
were both vowel height; in a second, F and G were both obstru-
ent voicing; and in a third, F was vowel height and G was obstru-
ent voicing. Importantly, the rules of English phonotactics do not
contain any of these three dependencies. The results, however,
showed that the height-voice dependency was not learned by
participants. Moreton’s conclusion was that an analytic bias
favors learning certain phonotactic dependencies over others;
the resulting formal phonological universal is in (1):
(1) Learning phonotactic dependencies of the form Given seg-
ments A, B in the same word, if A has feature F, then B must
have feature G is universally easier when F and G are the
same feature than when F and G are different features.
Formal universals like (1) lend themselves to eminently more
possibilities for integration with the cognitive sciences than
E&L’s proposed research program based on “the dual role of bio-
logical and cultural-historical attractors” (target article, sect. 8,
para. 6, E&L’s thesis 5). Formal universals allow for experimental
testing in laboratory conditions under which the historical-
cultural factors are completely controlled for, and hence
irrelevant to the outcomes.
It is worth considering how apparent exceptions to universals
are analyzed in other fields. As an example, consider the case
of the Jacana bird, one of nature’s species exhibiting a “sex-role
reversal,” whereby it is the females that engage in polyandry
and cuckolding of the males. At the right level of analysis, the
sex-role reversal in these shorebirds is entirely unsurprising,
because it is the males that perform the raising of the chicks.
The correct asymmetry between sexes is not that males have mul-
tiple mates while females do not, but rather, that the sex that
commits to what biologists call “parental investment” is the one
who is stuck in the harem. When the universal is correctly formu-
lated, the Jacana bird is actually an exception that proves the rule.
I argue that E&L err in concluding that there are no universals
within human phonology based on apparent substantive exceptions:
But in 1999, Breen and Pensalfini published a clear demonstration that
Arrernte organizes its syllables around a VC(C) structure and does not
permit consonantal onsets(Breen & Pensalfini 1999). With the addition
of this one language to our sample, the CV syllable gets downgraded
from absolute universal to a strong tendency, and the status of the
CV assumption in any model of UG must be revised. (target article,
sect. 2.2.2, para. 2)
Arrernte is not, as E&L would have it, but one language that
recently “ruined the entire sample,” so to speak. The question of
VC syllabification in Australian languages was raised by Sommer
(1970; 1981) on the language Oykangand, later insightfully ana-
lyzed in terms of onset-maximization by McCarthy and Prince
(1986). There was, historically, a widespread loss of initial conso-
nants throughout Australian languages, which Hale (1964) and
Blevins (2001) attributed to stress shift and lenition processes.
Although Arrernte was apparently no exception to this sweeping
change, nonetheless, “25% of Arrernte words are pronounced in
isolation with an initial consonant” (Breen & Pensalfini 1999,
p. 2). To account for words such as mpwar and ta˛k, Breen and
Pensalfini (1999) have to propose that these words have an under-
lying hidden initial vowel, a red-flag for any “clear demonstration”
that the language disallows consonantal onsets.
In general, the deduction of which syllabification pattern a
word contains depends on particular phonological processes
that refer to syllabic divisions. In this light, consider the following
formal universal:
(2) Stress assignment, weight-sensitive allomorphy, compensa-
tory lengthening and prosodic morphology, when sensitive to
distinctions among syllable types, refer exclusively to the rep-
resentational unit of weight called the mora.
The phonological universal in (2), developed by Hyman (1985),
McCarthy and Prince (1986), and Hayes (1989), is formal, not sub-
stantive in nature: it restricts the data structures that can be
referred to by morphophonological processes, and is not about
the substantive question of which segments can bear moras. In
fact, Topintzi (2009) has gathered evidence from a wide range of
languages demonstrating the ability of onset consonants to be
moraic. The existence of metrical processes referring to onsets
has been a topic of research for many years; see Davis (1988),
Downing (1998), Goedemans (1998), and Gordon (2005), who
discuss onset-sensitivity of stress in languages ranging from
English and Italian to Piraha˜ and Iowa-Oto.
If vowels and onset consonants, but not coda consonants, are
moraic in Arrernte, the statement of stress assignment and
weight-sensitive allomorphy become quite straightforward in
the light of (2). In Arrernte, stress is assigned within a word to
the first vowel preceded by a consonant: mpwa´.rem, “is
making,” versus i.kwe´nt, “policeman.” Since onset consonants
are moraic, the stress rule is simple: the left-most bimoraic sylla-
ble receives stress. Similarly, the statement of plural allomorphy
in Arrernte is simple: bimoraic-or-greater forms like i.˛el and
ta˛k take the suffix -ewar, while monomoraic forms like ar and
a˛k take the suffix -erir. The reduplication patterns can receive
a similar treatment in terms of moraic targets, within the prosodic
morphology framework: for example, the copying of VC strings to
a reduplicant is driven by the demand to fill a bimoraic template.
Like the Jacana bird’s sex-role reversal, which has a mechanis-
tic and principled explanation at a different level of primitives
(partner with greater parental investment, instead of male and
female), the patterning of weight-sensitive process in Arrernte
exhibits a principled conformity to a formal universal at the
level of which consonants are moraic, instead of in terms of syl-
labification. Rather than positing a silent initial vowel for 25%
of Arrernte words, attention to the statement of formal universals
enables a consistent representational property for syllables
throughout the language. The universal in this case pertains to
the set of data structures that learners use to encode sound pat-
terns: moras, and only moras, are the formal unit that can be
referred to by weight-sensitive properties.
E&L trumpet the slogan “A linguist who asks ‘Why?’ must be a
historian” (sect. 7, epigram, quoting Haspelmath 1999, p. 205).
Integration with the cognitive sciences, however, will come
from mechanistic explanations, not from hand-waving at diachro-
nic contingencies. Formal universals are restrictions on represen-
tational vocabulary, and they rear their heads even when history
deals them an odd shuffle or, as in the case of artificial grammar
experiments, no historical shuffle at all.
Universal grammar and mental continuity:
Two modern myths
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Abstract: In our opinion, the discontinuity between extant human and
nonhuman minds is much broader and deeper than most researchers
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admit. We are happy to report that Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) target
article strongly corroborates our unpopular hypothesis, and that the
comparative evidence, in turn, bolsters E&L’s provocative argument.
Both a Universal Grammar and the “mental continuity” between
human and nonhuman minds turn out to be modern myths.
If Evans & Levinson (E&L) are right (and we believe they are),
the dominant consensus among comparative psychologists is as
specious as the Universal Grammar (UG) hypothesis in
linguistics.
At present, most comparative psychologists believe that the
difference between human and other animal minds is “one of
degree and not of kind” (Darwin 1871; for recent examples of
this pervasive consensus, see commentaries on Penn et al.
[2008] in BBS, Vol. 31, No. 2). Among researchers willing to
admit that the human mind might be qualitatively different,
most argue that our species’ cognitive uniqueness is limited to
certain domain-specific faculties, such as language and/or
social-communicative intelligence.
We believe this view of the human mind is profoundly mista-
ken. In our opinion, the discontinuity between extant human
and nonhuman minds is much broader and deeper than most
researchers admit. We are happy to report that E&L’s target
article strongly corroborates our unpopular hypothesis; conver-
sely, the comparative evidence bolsters E&L’s provocative
argument.
The case for a domain-general discontinuity. Linguists can
(and should) argue about which human languages employ consti-
tuency and which do not. Or about which employ syntactic recur-
sion and which do not. But from a comparative psychologist’s
perspective, the spectacular fact of the matter is that any
normal human child can learn any human language, and no
human language is learnable by any other extant species. Why?
Why are human languages so easy for us to learn and so unthink-
able for everyone else?
The standard explanation is that only humans have a “language
instinct” (Pinker 1994), which fits nicely with the presumption
that the rest of the human mind is more or less like that of any
other ape (e.g., Hauser et al. 2002). But as E&L point out, the
diversity of human languages suggests that our faculty for
language relies largely on domain-general cognitive systems
that originally evolved for other purposes and still perform
these non-linguistic functions to this day.
If E&L are right, there should be significant differences
between human and nonhuman minds outside of language. Con-
versely, E&L’s case would be in bad shape if the nonverbal
cognitive abilities of nonhuman apes turned out to be highly
similar to those of humans.
We recently reviewed the available comparative evidence
across a number of domains – from “same-different” reasoning
and Theory of Mind (ToM) to tool-use and spatial cognition
(Penn et al. 2008). Across all these disparate domains, a consist-
ent pattern emerges: Although there is a profound similarity
between the ability of human and nonhuman animals to learn
about perceptually grounded relations, only humans reason in
terms of higher-order structural relations. Nonhuman animals,
for example, are capable of generalizing abstract rules about
“same” and “different” relations in terms of the perceptual varia-
bility between stimuli. But unlike human children (Holyoak et al.
1984), they appear incapable of making analogical inferences
based on structural, logical, or functional relationships. Nonhu-
man animals are able to predict the actions of others on the
basis of the past and occurrent behavior of these others. But
they are incapable of forming higher-order representations of
others’ mental states or of understanding others’ subjective
experience by analogy to their own (Penn & Povinelli 2007b; in
press; Povinelli & Vonk 2003). Nonhuman animals can infer
the first-order causal relation between observable contingencies
and reason in a means-end fashion. But they show no evidence of
being able to cognize the analogy between perceptually disparate
causal relationships or to reason in terms of unobservable causal
mechanisms (Penn & Povinelli 2007a; Povinelli 2000). And
although nonhuman animals can learn the first-order relationship
between symbols and objects in the world, they are incapable of
cognizing combinatorial hierarchical schemas in any domain –
causal, social, spatial, or symbolic.
So here is the central explanadum that most comparative psy-
chologists and linguists seem to be avoiding: Why is it that the
discontinuity between human and nonhuman forms of communi-
cation appears at the same degree of relational complexity as does
the discontinuity between human and nonhuman cognition in
every other domain?
The hypothesis that human and nonhuman minds differ only in
their social-communicative intelligence (cf. Tomasello 2008)
does not explain why the discontinuities between human and
nonhuman minds in non-communicative tasks (e.g., causal
reasoning) are just as profound as those between human and
nonhuman forms of communication; nor does it explain why
the human learning system is the only one that can cope with
the relational complexity of human language. Furthermore, the
evidence from high-functioning autistic populations demon-
strates that normal relational intelligence can be preserved in
the absence of normal social-communicative intelligence,
whereas the converse is not the case (see Morsanyi & Holyoak
[in press] and references therein). This suggests that our
unique social-communicative skills rely on our unique relational
intelligence – not the other way around.
The hypothesis that the communicative and cognitive func-
tions of language played an important role in rewiring the
human brain makes good sense to us (Bermudez 2005; Bickerton
2009). And it is clear that language still enables, extends, and
shapes human cognition in many profound ways (Clark 2006;
Loewenstein & Gentner 2005; Majid et al. 2004). But the evi-
dence from comparative psychology points to the same con-
clusion as does that from comparative linguistics: It is not
language alone that made or makes humans so smart (see our dis-
cussion in Penn et al. 2008). Rather, the diversity of human
languages seems to have been shaped by the capabilities and
limitations of the human mind (Christiansen & Chater 2008).
And our species’ unique relational abilities seem to be a necess-
ary precursor for the advent of even the most rudimentary
human language. As Darwin himself put it: “The mental
powers of some early progenitor of man must have been more
highly developed than in any existing ape, before even the
most imperfect form of speech could have come into use”
(Darwin 1871, p. 57).
The model of a physical symbol system (PSS; Newell 1980)
provides a useful heuristic framework for understanding what
happened to the human mind. According to our hypothesis
(Penn et al. 2008), animals of many taxa evolved the ability to rep-
resent first-order symbolic relations; but only humans evolved
the ability to approximate the higher-order capabilities of a
PSS. As a result, only humans can make the kind of analogical,
modality-independent, role-governed inferences necessary to
master the spectacular complexity of human language (Holyoak
& Hummel 2000). This capability is not specific to language,
nor did it originally evolve for language. Rather, our domain-
general ability to reason about higher-order relations co-
evolved with and continues to subserve all our uniquely human
abilities.
An object lesson for comparative research. We cannot help
but notice an unfortunate parallel between the current state of
comparative psychology and generative linguistics: in both
cases, researchers have gone to elaborate lengths to minimize
any possible differences from English-speaking humans.
To our mind, this is a gross travesty of Darwin’s legacy. Wasn’t
the entire point of Darwin’s (1859) magnum opus to show that
the natural processes of variation and selection combined with
“Extinction of less-improved forms” could create enormous
differences between extant organisms, some so great as to consti-
tute different species altogether? Human minds and human
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languages may both be bio-cultural hybrids. But, in our view, the
principles of evolution that apply to bodies apply, mutatis mutan-
dis, to minds and languages.
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Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) advocate taking linguistic diversity at
“face value.” Their argument consists of a list of diverse phenomena and
the assertion that no non-vacuous theory could possibly uncover a
meaningful unity underlying them. I argue, with evidence from Tlingit
and Warlpiri, that E&L’s list itself should not be taken at face value –
and that the actual research record already demonstrates unity amidst
diversity.
From a distance, the structures of the world’s languages do look
gloriously diverse and endlessly varied. But since when is it sound
strategy to take diversity at “face value”? All other sciences have
progressed precisely by taking nothing at face value – diversity
included. Evans & Levinson (E&L) claim, in effect, that linguis-
tics is different from all other fields. If they are right, the search
for deeper laws behind linguistic structure is a fool’s errand, and
languages are just as inexplicably diverse as they seem at first
glance. It is thus surprising that E&L’s article contains no discus-
sion of the actual research to which they supposedly object.
Instead, their article offers only (1) a parade of capsule descrip-
tions of phenomena from the world’s languages, coupled with
(2) blanket assertions that each phenomenon falls outside the
scope of all (non-vacuous) general theories of linguistic structure.
The argument must therefore rest on two premises: (1) that the
capsule descriptions of phenomena are correct, and (2) that these
phenomena fall so obviously beyond the pale of research on Uni-
versal Grammar (UG) that no argument is necessary. I believe
there are reasons for caution about the first supposition and
that the second is simply wrong.
Confidence in the accuracy of E&L’s examples is undermined
at the outset by a comparison of E&L’s claims with their sources.
For example, as a demonstration that “semantic systems may
carve the world at quite different joints” (sect. 2, para. 2), E&L
cite Mithun (1999, p. 81) for an “unexpected number” marker
(sect. 2.2.5, para. 3) in Jemez (misidentified by E&L as Kiowa).
It is supposedly because “two” is an expected number of legs
but not stones that the marker means “any quantity but two”
when added to “leg” but “exactly two” when added to “stone.”
According to Mithun, however, the actual determinant is the
Noun-Class to which the noun belongs, a partly arbitrary classi-
fication (like Indo-European gender). In Jemez, “nose” belongs
to the same class as “leg,” and “arm” belongs to the same class
as “stone.” Consequently, if the number marker truly indicates
how Jemez speakers “carve the world,” “one” must be an unex-
pected quantity of noses, but an expected quantity for arms (cf.
Harbour 2006). Similarly, although E&L use Mundari ideo-
phones to exemplify a “major word class” whose very existence
“dilutes the plausibility of the innatist UG position” (sect. 2.2.4,
para. 10), their source, Osada (1992, pp. 140–44), actually does
not discuss ideophone syntax at all. Mayan positionals are men-
tioned for the same reason – but although they do constitute a
distinct category of root (used to derive words belonging to stan-
dard classes), they do not appear to constitute a syntactically dis-
tinguishable word class – at least not in Mam (England 1983,
p. 78), Tzotzil (Haviland 1994, p. 700), Chol (Coon & Preminger
2009), or Tzeltal (Brown 1994, p. 754; cited by E&L).
But even if E&L’s sources had been quoted perfectly, there is
a deeper danger in arguments founded on capsule descriptions.
Because linguistic puzzles are complex, even the best descrip-
tions are incomplete. Fundamental generalizations often
remain undiscovered for years, until a creative researcher sud-
denly asks a question whose answer unlocks one of the language’s
secrets. And how does one find such questions? As it happens,
among the most productive question-generating devices is the
very idea that E&L deride: that languages share structural prop-
erties, often masked by one of their differences. Again and again,
investigations guided by this possibility have altered our basic
picture of the world’s languages.
Compare E&L’s assertion that “syntactic constituency . . . is
not a universal feature of languages” (sect. 5, para. 8), supposedly
supported by the existence of languages with “free word order,”
with the alternative – that such languages do not fundamentally
differ from others in basic constituent structure, but merely allow
these constituents to be reordered more freely. Although E&L
attribute the appeal of this alternative to mere anglophone
prejudice, its actual appeal rests on a body of hard-won results,
achieved by researchers pursuing lines of inquiry that no one
previously thought to pursue.
One recent example is Cable’s (2007; 2008) investigation of
wh-questions in Tlingit, a language of Alaska with considerable
word order freedom. In languages with more rigid word order,
there is a well-known split in how they form wh-questions. In
languages like English and Italian, interrogative wh-phrases
move to a dedicated position near the left periphery of the
clause, precedable only by discourse topics (cf. This book, who
would read it?; Rizzi 1997). In languages like Chinese and
Korean, by contrast, there is no dedicated position for wh-
phrases. Instead, they appear wherever their noninterrogative
counterparts would:
(1) (a) English
Who did John see?
(b) Chinese (Huang 1982)
Zhangsan kajian-le shei
Zhangsan see-asp who
At first glance, Tlingit appears to pattern with Chinese rather
than English in lacking a dedicated wh-position, as expected if
free word order entails absence of constituent structure:
(2) Tlingit (Cable 2007; 2008)
a. Ya´ x’u´x’ aado´och sa´ kwgwato´ow?
this book who-erg Q he.will.read.it
“Who will read this book?”
b. Aado´och sa´ ya´ x’u´x’ kwgwato´ow?
who-erg Q this book he.will.read.it
(¼ a)
c. Ke´et daa sa´ axa´?
killer.whale what Q he.eats.it
“What do killer whales eat?”
On the basis of his fieldwork and analysis of Tlingit texts, Cable
showed that, contrary to appearances, Tlingit wh-phrases do
occupy a dedicated wh-position – in fact, a position syntactically
and semantically identical to its counterpart in languages like
English. Specifically, Cable discovered that phrases to the left
of an interrogative wh-phrase – “this book” in (2a) and “killer
whale” in (2c) – are always discourse topics, and if a wh-phrase
appears to the right of the verb, the result is not interpretable
as a wh-question. These findings are explained if the interroga-
tive phrase in both Tlingit and English must occupy the same
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position at the left periphery, precedable only by a discourse
topic – that is, if this aspect of Tlingit clause structure resembles
English, despite first impressions. Cable’s findings constitute a
discovery, not anglophone prejudice. Earlier work on Tlingit,
though excellent, had failed to spot the evidence for a wh-pos-
ition. Cable’s discoveries were made precisely because his inves-
tigation was informed by what linguists had learned about wh-
questions in other languages.
Remarkably, the same type of discovery has been reported by
Legate (2001; 2002, building on Laughren 2002) for Warlpiri, the
free word order language par excellence. Legate not only found
the same dedicated wh-position in Warlpiri (precedable by
topics) but also showed that the full array of standard tests for
phrase structure in languages like English yield the same
results for Warlpiri – important findings directly attributable to
the very research program that E&L consider bankrupt.
Questions like those addressed by Legate and Cable must be
asked for every item in E&L’s linguistic Wunderkammer. Are
they truly as “different” as they seem? Sometimes, of course,
the answer might be “yes.” But how will we ever distinguish
real differences from those that merely reflect our ignorance if
we grant – even for an instant – E&L’s dictum that apparent
structural differences must just “be accepted for what they are”
(sect. 1, para. 1)?
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Abstract: While endorsing Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) call for rigorous
documentation of variation, we defend the idea of Universal Grammar as
a toolkit of language acquisition mechanisms. The authors exaggerate
diversity by ignoring the space of conceivable but nonexistent
languages, trivializing major design universals, conflating quantitative
with qualitative variation, and assuming that the utility of a linguistic
feature suffices to explain how children acquire it.
Though Evans & Levinson (E&L) cite us as foils, we agree
with many of their points: that the documentation of linguistic
diversity is important for cognitive science; that linguists have
been too casual in assuming universals and formulating a
defensible theory of universal grammar; that the language
faculty is a product of gene-culture coevolution; that languages
are historical compromises among competing desiderata; and
that cross-linguistic generalizations are unlikely to be exception-
less. We do, however, endorse a version of the Universal
Grammar (UG) hypothesis: that the human brain is equipped
with circuitry, partly specific to language, that makes language
acquisition possible and that constrains human languages to a
characteristic design.
E&L do not make it easy to evaluate their position. Their claim
that linguistic variation is “extraordinary,” “fundamental,”
“amazing,” and “remarkable” is not just unfalsifiably vague but
also myopic, focusing on differences while taking commonalities
for granted. Any survey that fails to consider the larger design
space for conceivable languages is simply unequipped to
specify how “remarkable” the actual diversity of languages is.
Consider these hypothetical languages:
Abba specifies grammatical relations not in terms of agent,
patient, theme, location, goal, and so on, but in terms of evo-
lutionarily significant relationships: predator-prey, eater-food,
enemy-ally, permissible-impermissible sexual partners, and
so on. All other semantic relations are metaphorical extensions
of these.
Bacca resembles the two-word stage in children’s language devel-
opment. Speakers productively combine words to express
basic semantic relations like recurrence, absence, and agent-
patient, but no utterance contains more than two morphemes.
Listeners use the context to disambiguate them.
The speakers of Cadda have no productive capacity: they draw on
a huge lexicon of one-word holophrases and memorized for-
mulas and idioms. New combinations are occasionally coined
by a shaman or borrowed from neighboring groups.
The grammar of Daffa corresponds to quantificational logic,
distinguishing only predicates and arguments, and using
morphological markers for quantifiers, parentheses, and
variables.
Fagga is a “rational” language spoken in a utopian commune. It
lacks arbitrary signs larger than a phoneme, allowing the
meaning of any word to be deduced from its phonology.
Gahha is a musical language, which uses melodic motifs for
words, major and minor keys for polarity, patterns of tension
and relaxation for modalities, and so on.
These and countless other conceivable languages are not
obviously incompatible with cognitive limitations or communica-
tive limitations (unless stipulated post hoc), and fall well outside
the envelope reviewed by E&L.
Indeed, E&L concede an enormous stratum of universals in
endorsing an innate core of Hockett-syle “design features”: discre-
teness, arbitrariness, productivity, duality of patterning, auditory-
vocal specialization, multiple levels of structure between sound
and meaning (including morphosyntax and semantics), and linear-
ity combined with nonlinear structure (constituency and depen-
dency). But if this set of universal mechanisms were laid out
explicitly, as computational machinery consistent with the details
of actual languages, we doubt that it would differ “starkly” from
the kind of Universal Grammar that the two of us have posited
(Jackendoff 1997; 2002; Pinker & Jackendoff 2005; Culicover &
Jackendoff 2005).
E&L’s focus on differences of detail, moreover, leads them to
exaggerate differences in underlying design. Whether a
language’s inventory of phonemes or verbs is large or small,
whether grammatical agreement plays a role that is indispensable
or vestigial, whether a noun-verb difference is obvious to a lin-
guist in every language or subtle in a few, whether grammatical
combination is florid inside phrases but rudimentary inside
words, or vice versa, whether embeddings are found in a high
or a low percentage of phrases – none of these pertains to under-
lying computational systems, just the extent to which different
parts of it are deployed (which we agree depends on the vagaries
of history).
The force of many of E&L’s examples depends more on having
a splitter’s (rather than a lumper’s) temperament than on the
existence of “extraordinary” variation. English, for example, has
phenomena similar to Chinese classifiers (e.g., a piece of paper,
a stick of wood), Athabaskan verb distinctions (among locative
verbs; Levin 1993; Pinker 1989; 2007), ideophones (response
cries such as yum, splat, hubba-hubba, pow!; Goffman 1978),
and geocentric spatial terms (e.g., north, upstream, crosstown;
Li & Gleitman 2002). There are differences, to be sure, but it
is unparsimonious to insist that they lack any common psycholin-
guistic mechanisms.
E&L try to minimize their own commitment to Universal
Grammar in two ways. First, they try to trivialize it as “true by
definition,” claiming that any system lacking these features
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would not be called a “language.” But that is both factually false
(the word “language” is commonly applied to bee dance, ape
signing, computer programming protocols, etc.) and theoretically
misleading. The proposition that all human societies have
“language” according to that definition is neither circular nor
trivial.
Second, the authors note that these features are functional, as
if that suffices to explain how children acquire them. But func-
tionally useful structures do not materialize by magic. Even
after they have developed historically as part of a tacit convention
within a community of speakers, a child still has to acquire them,
including the myriad grammatical details which do not percept-
ibly contribute to that child’s ability to communicate but are
simply part of the target language (semi-regular inflectional para-
digms, arbitrary grammatical categories, complex co-occurrence
restrictions, etc.). This requires sufficiently powerful learning
abilities, which have evolved as the “gene” side of the “gene-
culture coevolution” we all embrace.
The construct “Universal Grammar” (UG), as we have invoked
it, refers to these learning abilities. UG is emphatically not a
compendium of language universals (though it has often been
taken to be such). UG, in our conception, is a toolkit. This
implies that it does not, as E&L claim, contain all possibilities
for all languages: one builds structures with tools, not from
tools. We have suggested that UG may be a set of “attractors”
for grammars (Culicover 1999; Culicover & Jackendoff
2005; Jackendoff 2002) – strong biases on the child’s learning
that produce statistical tendencies in grammars, but that can be
overcome by exceptional input, a possibility that E&L endorse.
These learning mechanisms are a black box for E&L, who
suggest that they can be borrowed off the shelf from other
domains of cognition. But they do not cite any analysis showing
that some independently motivated set of cognitive processes
actually suffices to acquire the detailed and complex structures
mastered by children. In practice, attempts to model specific
phenomena of language development using generic infor-
mation-processing machinery (notably, connectionist networks)
habitually smuggle innate linguistic structure in the back door
in the form of unheralded design features and kluges (Marcus
2001; Pinker & Ullman 2002a; 2002b; 2003).
For all these disagreements, we applaud E&L’s call for a more
rigorous study of linguistic variation and universals. When com-
bined with rigorous specification of the psychological mechan-
isms that make language acquisition and use possible, we
predict that the resulting psycholinguistic universals that give
rise to the diversity of human language will be far from
“unprofound.”
For universals (but not finite-state learning)
visit the zoo
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Abstract: Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) major point is that human
languages are intriguingly diverse rather than (like animal
communication systems) uniform within the species. This does not
establish a “myth” about language universals, or advance the ill-framed
pseudo-debate over universal grammar. The target article does,
however, repeat a troublesome myth about Fitch and Hauser’s (2004)
work on pattern learning in cotton-top tamarins.
The take-home message from the target article by Evans &
Levinson (E&L) is not in their title but in their subtitle. They
don’t show that language universals are a myth; their point is
that what makes human languages really interesting for cognitive
science is their diversity, not their uniformity. Boas would have
endorsed this view, but it seems fresh and novel in the current
context. You want species-wide universal grammar? Visit the
zoo. Study puttynose monkeys (Arnold & Zuberbu¨hler 2006),
or your cat. What human beings bring to animal communication
is not rigid universals but a flexible ability to employ any of a
gigantic range of strikingly varied systems. That seems to be
what E&L are saying.
Regrettably, though, the authors repeat a wildly false
claim about results on syntactic learning in nonhuman primates.
E&L were apparently misled by a statement in the litera-
ture they critique: they cite Fitch and Hauser (2004) as having
demonstrated that cotton-top tamarins have “impressive
learning powers over FSGs [finite state grammars]” (sect. 6,
para. 3).
This meme is spreading, alarmingly: E&L even cite a paper
by a brain researcher (Friederici 2004) who is looking for
distinct neural systems for processing FSGs on the one hand
and PSGs (phrase-structure grammar) on the other. The truth
is that no one has shown monkeys to have any general ability
to learn finite-state (FS) languages. It is extremely unlikely
that anyone ever will. FS parsing is powerful; it would
suffice for pretty much all the linguistic processing that humans
ever do.
Reflect for a moment on the likelihood that tamarins could be
habituated to strings matching this regular expression:
a (cd cd c) aþ b (c d c d c) b
All such strings begin with either a or b; the middle is an inde-
finitely long stretch of c and d in random order, but always con-
taining an even number of d; and strings end with whatever they
began with (notice, an unbounded dependency!).
This language has a very simple FSG, but passively learning it
from being exposed to examples (acca, accdcccddcccccda;
bdccccdb; acdccddcccddda . . .) is surely not plausible. Figuring
out the grammar would surely be way beyond the abilities of
any mammal other than a skilled human puzzle-solver with
pencil and paper.
People have unfortunately been confusing FS languages with a
vastly smaller proper subset known as the strictly local (SL)
languages (Pullum & Rogers 2006; Pullum & Scholz 2007;
Rogers & Pullum 2007). Fitch and Hauser unwittingly encour-
aged the error by remarking that FSGs “can be fully specified
by transition probabilities between a finite number of ‘states’
(e.g., corresponding to words or calls)” (Fitch & Hauser 2004,
p. 377). The equation of states with words here is an error.
States in FSGs are much more abstract. Languages that can be
described purely in terms of transitions between particular term-
inal symbols (words or calls or whatever) are SL languages. (It is
not clear why Fitch and Hauser mentioned the orthogonal issue
of transition probability.)
The SL class is the infinite union of a hierarchy of SLk
languages (k . 1), the k setting the maximal distance over
which dependencies can be stated. The most basic SL languages
are the SL2 languages, describable by finite sets of bigrams. The
SL2 class is right at the bottom of several infinite hierarchies
within the FS languages (see Pullum & Rogers [2006] or
Rogers & Pullum [2007] for the mathematics).
Fitch and Hauser found that cotton-top tamarins could be habi-
tuated to an SL2 pattern, namely the one denoted by (ab)
. They
remark that perhaps tamarins fail to learn non-FS PSG languages
“because their ability to differentiate successive items is limited to
runs of two” (Fitch & Hauser 2004, p. 379), conceding the point
Commentary/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals
466 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5
that a limitation to recognizing bigrams might well be involved.
Their results do not in any way imply that monkeys can acquire
arbitrary FS languages from exposure to primary data. They may
not be much better at pattern learning than your cat. E&L have
unfortunately contributed to the spread of a myth.
As for the supposed myth of E&L’s title, that of language univer-
sals, we see little prospect of sensible debate at this stage. People
trying to set one up usually depict a clash between Chomsky,
who has purportedly “shown that there is really only one human
language” (Smith 1999 p. 1), and Joos, who is alleged to have
claimed that languages may “differ from each other without limit
and in unpredictable ways” (e.g., Smith 1999, p. 105).
But Chomsky (in Kasher 1991, p. 26) says merely that if all par-
ameters of syntactic variation are “reducible to lexical properties”
and if we ignore all parameters that are so reducible (hence we
ignore all parameters), there is no syntactic variation at all, so
the number of distinct syntactic systems is 1. This is not an empiri-
cal claim about human languages; it is a tautology. And Joos (1966,
p. 96), while setting a phonology paper in historical context, merely
alluded to an “American (Boas) tradition” that valued cataloguing
language features over explanatory speculation. The passage
quoted does not endorse that tradition or extend it to syntax.
It should be obvious that we must assume languages may differ
in unpredictable ways: we do not know the limits of variation, so
fieldwork often brings surprises. That was Boas’s point. But
equally obviously, not all conceivable differences between
languages will be attested. Logically there could be dekatransitive
verbs (taking ten obligatory object NPs), but there are not,
because using them would outstrip our cognitive resources.
In that sense there will be all sorts of limits.
This does not look like the seeds of an interesting debate, so it
is just as well that E&L do not really try to pursue one. Their con-
clusions are not about universally quantified linguistic generaliz-
ations being mythical, but about how “the diversity of language is,
from a biological point of view, its most remarkable property”
(sect. 8, para. 6, their thesis 1). That is an interesting thought,
and it deserves extended consideration by linguistic and cognitive
scientists.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We thank Rob Truswell for helpful critical comments on an earlier draft.
He bears no responsibility for the opinions expressed in this one, or for
any errors.
The discovery of language invariance




CISCL (Interdepartmental Centre for Cognitive Studies on Language),
University of Siena, 53100 Siena, Italy.
rizzil unisi.it
Abstract: Modern linguistics has highlighted the fundamental invariance
of human language: A rich invariant structure has emerged from
comparative studies nourished by sophisticated formal models;
languages also differ along important dimensions, but variation is
constrained in severe and systematic ways. I illustrate this research
direction in the domains of island constraints, word order restrictions,
and the expression of referential dependencies. Both language
invariance and language variability within systematic limits are highly
relevant for the cognitive sciences.
Evans & Levinson (E&L) claim that diversity, rather than uni-
formity, is the fundamental fact of language relevant for cognitive
scientists. This is not the conclusion that modern linguistics
arrived at over the last half century: careful testing of specific
universalist hypotheses permitted in many cases the discovery
of precise and stable patterns of invariance.
First, consider locality. In the late 1970s, the observation that
wh-phrases can be extracted from indirect questions in Italian
led to abandoning the hypothesis of a universal Wh Island Con-
straint (WhIC), and to the formulation of a parametrized version
of the relevant Universal Grammar (UG) principle, Subjacency
(Rizzi 1978). The attempt to systematically check the empirical
validity of the model led to the discovery of argument/adjunct
asymmetries. Wh-adjuncts (why, how, . . .) are strictly non-
extractable even in languages which are permissive with argu-
ment extraction:
(1) a. Quale problema non sai come risolvere?
“Which problem don’t you know how to solve?”
b. Come non sai quale problema risolvere?
“How don’t you know which problem to solve?”
The critical cross-linguistic observation came from the study of
wh-in-situ languages (with wh-elements remaining in clause-
internal position). Huang(1982) discovered that in Chinese, the
argument-adjunct asymmetry (1) holds at the interpretive level.
Sentence (2) can mean (3)a, with interpretive extraction of the
argument, but not (3)b, with interpretive extraction of the
adjunct:
(2) Akiu xiang.zhidao [women weishenme jiegu-le shei]
ne?
Akiu want.know [we why fire-Prf who] Qwh
(3) a. “Who is the person x such that Akiu wonders [why we
fired person x]?”
b. “What is the reason x such that Akiu wonders [whom
we fired for reason x]?”
Huang’s conclusion was that in wh-in-situ languages the wh-
elements move abstractly to the front, and the abstract
movement in (2) is sensitive to the same fundamental locality
constraint as the overt movement in (1) (see also, Tsai 1994).
A huge literature was then devoted to understanding the
nature of the asymmetry in (1) to (3) (see Cinque 1990; Pesetsky
2000; Starke 2001, among others), the generality of adjunct non-
extractability (Lasnik & Saito 1992), and the parametrization
involved in argument extraction. So, the refutation of an unqua-
lified WhIC gave rise to a deeper cross-linguistic generalization,
which was soon extended to a much larger class of Weak Islands
(Szabolcsi 2006), and deeply influenced the development of the
theory of locality (Chomsky 1995, 2000; Rizzi 1990).
Here and elsewhere, variation is not haphazard but gives rise
to precise cross-linguistic patterns, with some logical possibilities
systematically unattested: we don’t find the “mirror image” of
Italian or Chinese, that is, of a language allowing (overt or
covert) extraction of adjuncts and barring extraction of argu-
ments. If the non-universality of the WhIC had been interpreted
as showing that anything goes in extraction across languages, lin-
guists would have continued to collect catalogues of extraction
facts for individual languages, with little hope of ever uncovering
systematic generalizations in the patterns of variation.
In this case, the discovery of invariance required considerable
abstractness and theoretical sophistication. Much of the typologi-
cal tradition discussed by E&L has chosen to stick to an extre-
mely impoverished, non-abstract descriptive apparatus, a
legitimate methodological decision, but one which severely
restricts the possibility of capturing forms of invariance. In
spite of these limitations, it is far from true that the typological
literature globally supports an “anything goes” position. In fact,
the typological findings can be an important source of inspiration
for more structured and abstract approaches. Consider Cinque’s
(2005) discussion of Greenberg’s (1963a) Universal 20, a gener-
alization essentially confirmed by 40 years of typological
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investigations: in languages in which N appears at the end of the
NP, the order of certain modifiers is rigid (Demonstrative –
Numeral – Adjective – Noun); in languages in which N is
initial, significant ordering variation is observed. Cinque offers
an explanation of this pattern through the assumption that N
movement is the fundamental engine determining reordering.
If N moves, it can determine different orders on the basis of fam-
iliar parameters on movement. If N remains in the final position,
the order is invariably the basic one, plausibly determined by
compositional semantics. Again, only a small subset of the
logical possibilities is attested, and precise patterns of variation
hold, which are amenable to plausible computational principles.
Finally, consider the theory of binding, constraining referential
dependencies (E&L, sect. 3, para. 8). There is some limited vari-
ation in the locality conditions for the principles holding for ana-
phors and pronominals, expressible through restrictive and highly
falsifiable parametric models (Manzini & Wexler 1986). Clearly,
we are very far from a picture of indefinite variability. Moreover,
there is no variation at all in non-coreference effects: no language
seems to allow coreference between a pronoun and a NP when the
pronoun c-commands the NP (Hei said that Johni was sick: Lasnik
1989), a property which children are sensitive to as early as testing
is feasible (Crain 1991). Furthermore, referential dependencies are
systematically regulated by the hierarchical relation c-command
(Reinhart 1976), not by other imaginable relations. In sum, we
find highly restricted variation, or strict uniformity. The same
kinds of considerations would apply to many other domains dis-
cussed by E&L (constituent structure, the status of subjects, etc.).
I certainly agree that language variation is of great interest for
the cognitive sciences. Much promising research already focuses
on that. Brain-imaging studies try to determine how the brain
learns formal rules falling within or outside the range of attested
cross-linguistic variation (Moro 2008; Tettamanti et al. 2002);
acquisition studies uncover systematic “errors” in language devel-
opment which correspond to structures possible in other adult
languages, thus suggesting that children explore UG-constrained
grammatical options which are not supported by experience
(Rizzi 2006; Thornton 2008); and so on. The cognitive sciences
should not overlook the results of half a century of linguistic
research which has seriously attempted to identify the limits of
variation: it is simply not true that languages can vary indefinitely.
This fundamental fact is of critical importance for addressing
central questions of acquisition and processing, questions on
the expression of the linguistic capacities in the brain, and on
the domain specificity or generality of the relevant cognitive con-
straints. The astounding observational diversity of living organ-
isms has not deflected biologists from the search for the
fundamental common features of life. There is no reason why lin-
guists and cognitive scientists should give up the theory-guided
search for deep invariants and the ultimate factors of linguistic
variation.
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Abstract: Generative linguistics’ search for linguistic universals (1) is not
comparable to the vague explanatory suggestions of the article; (2)
clearly merits a more central place than linguistic typology in cognitive
science; (3) is fundamentally untouched by the article’s empirical
arguments; (4) best explains the important facts of linguistic diversity;
and (5) illuminates the dominant component of language’s “biocultural”
nature: biology.
1. A science of cognition needs falsifiable theories. Although
the target article’s final seven theses (sect. 8) include sugges-
tions we find promising, they are presented as vague specu-
lation, rather than as a formal theory that makes falsifiable
predictions. It is thus nonsensical to construe them as superior
to a falsifiable theory on the grounds that that theory has been
falsified. Every theory is certain to make some predictions that
are empirically inadequate, but the appropriate response within
a science of cognition is to improve the theory and not to take
refuge in the safety of unfalsifiable speculation. Insightful
speculation is vital – not because speculation can replace
formal theorizing, but because speculation can be sharpened
to become formal theory. Theory and speculation are simply
not empirically comparable.
2. In a theory of cognition, a universal principle is a property
true of all human minds – a cog-universal – not a superficial
descriptive property true of the expressions of all languages –
a des-universal. This is why generative grammar, with its explicit
goal of seeking cog-universals, has always been more central to
cognitive science than linguistic typology, which only speaks to
des-universals. Unlike descriptive linguistic typology, generative
grammar merits a central place in cognitive science because its
topic is cognition and its method is science – falsifiable theory
formulation.
3a. Counterexamples to des-universals are not counterexam-
ples to cog-universals.The des-universals of Evans & Levinson’s
(E&L’s) Box 1 must not be confused with the cog-universals
sought by generative grammar. This general point applies to all
cases addressed in their article, but we only illustrate with one
example. That Chinese questions do not locate wh-expressions
in a different superficial position than the corresponding declara-
tive sentence (Box 1) is a counterexample to a wh-movement
des-universal but, famously, generative syntax has revealed that
Chinese behaves like English with respect to syntactically deter-
mined restrictions on possible interpretations of questions; this
follows if questions in both languages involve the same depen-
dency between the same two syntactic positions, one of them
“fronted.” In English, the fronted position is occupied by the
wh-phrase and the other is empty, whereas in Chinese the
reverse holds (Huang 1982/1998; Legendre et al. 1998). It is
the syntactic relation between these positions, not the superficial
location of the wh-phrase, that restricts possible interpretations.
Such a hypothesized cog-universal can only be falsified by enga-
ging the full apparatus of the formal theory – it establishes
nothing to point to the superficial fact that wh-expressions in
Chinese are not fronted.
3b. There are two types of cog-universals: Architectural and
specific universals. The former specify the computational archi-
tecture of language: levels of representation (phonological, syn-
tactic, semantic, etc.) data structures (features, hierarchical
trees, indexes, etc.), operations (rule application, constraint satis-
faction, etc.). The authors correctly recognize these as “design
features” of human languages, but erroneously exclude them
from the set of relevant universals. These architectural universals
do not yield falsifiable predictions regarding typology, but they
yield falsifiable predictions regarding language learnability. For
instance, Peperkamp et al (2006) showed that without architec-
tural universals regarding phonological rules, general-purpose
unsupervised learning algorithms simply fail to acquire the pho-
nemes of a language. The latter, specific universals, are tied to
particular formal theories specifying in detail the architecture’s
levels, structures, and operations, thus yielding falsifiable predic-
tions regarding language typology.
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4a. Optimality Theory (OT), mentioned in the target article as a
promising direction, contains the strongest architectural and
specific universals currently available within generative
grammar. According to OT’s architectural universals (Prince &
Smolensky 1993/2004; 1997), grammatical computation is
optimization over a set of ranked constraints. This strong hypoth-
esis (more than the hypothesis of “parameters”) has contributed
insight into all levels of grammatical structure from phonology to
pragmatics, and has addressed acquisition, processing, and prob-
abilistic variation (the website http://roa.rutgers.edu hosts more
than 1,000 OT papers). In a particular OT theory, specific univer-
sals take the form of a set of constraints (e.g., C1 ¼ “a sentence
requires a subject”; C2 ¼ “each word must have an interpret-
ation,” etc.) A grammar for a particular language is then a priority
ranking of these constraints. For instance, C1 is ranked higher
than C2 in the English grammar, so we say “it is raining,”
although expletive “it” contributes nothing to the meaning; in
Italian, the reverse priority relation holds, making the subjectless
sentence “piove” optimal – grammatical (Grimshaw & Samek-
Lodovici 1998).
4b. OT’s cog-universals yield theories of cross-linguistic
typology that generally predict the absence of des-
universals. Each ranking of a constraint set mechanically pre-
dicts the possible existence of a human language. OT therefore
provides theories of linguistic typology that aim, as rightly
urged by the target article, to grapple with the full spectrum of
cross-linguistic variation. OT makes use of a large set of specific
universals (i.e., constraints), but because of the resolution of con-
straint conflict through optimization, these do not translate into
des-universals: In the preceding example, C1 is violated in
Italian, and C2 in English. Some des-universals can, however,
emerge as general properties of the entire typology, and can be
falsified by the data (as, perhaps, the existence of onsetless
languages). This does not entail abandoning the Generative Lin-
guistics program, nor the OT framework, but rather, revising the
theory with an improved set of specific universals.
5. Language is more a biological trait than a cultural
construct. The authors do not provide criteria to determine
where language is located on the continuum of bio-cultural
hybrids. Lenneberg, quoted in the target article, presented four
criteria for distinguishing biological traits from cultural phenom-
ena (universality across the species, across time, absence of learn-
ing of the trait, rigid developmental schedule) and concluded that
oral (but not written) language is a biological trait (Lenneberg
1964). The validity of this argument is ignored by the authors. Iro-
nically, OT is more readily connected to biology than to culture:
the archictural-universals of OT are emergent symbolic-level
effects of subsymbolic optimization over “soft” constraints in
neural networks (Smolensky & Legendre 2006); and Soderstrom
et al. (2006) have derived an explicit abstract genome that
encodes the growth of neural networks containing connections
implementing universal constraints.
If language is a jungle, why are we all
cultivating the same plot?
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Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) focus on differences between
languages at a superficial level, rather than examining common processes.
Their emphasis on trivial details conceals uniform design features and
universally shared strategies. Lexical category distinctions between nouns
and verbs are probably universal. Non-local dependencies are a general
property of languages, not merely non-configurational languages. Even
the latter class exhibits constituency.
Languages exhibit hugely more diverse phenomena than are
displayed in well-studied European families. However, citing a
collection of exotica does not prove Evans & Levinson’s
(E&L’s) claim that “it’s a jungle out there” (sect. 3, para. 17).
Examining languages more closely, or at a higher level of abstrac-
tion, often reveals critical similarities which superficial descrip-
tions can obscure. Moreover, languages frequently employ
distinct grammatical strategies to achieve parallel outcomes;
thus, the universal is the end result, not the means of achieving
it. Finally, unrelated languages often “choose” the same strategy,
despite the lack of a single universal solution, suggesting that
homogeneity is widespread.
Lexical category distinctions (sect. 2.2.4). Certainly, there is
no invariant set of lexical or functional categories. But it
remains to be demonstrated that a language may lack any distinc-
tions between lexical categories, or, more specifically, may lack a
noun/verb distinction. E&L note that languages of the Pacific
Northwest Coast are frequently claimed to have no noun/verb
distinction, illustrating with Straits Salish. Similar claims have
been made for a nearby, unrelated family, Southern Wakashan
(e.g., Makah, Nuuchahnulth). Here, nouns can function as pre-
dicates (i.e., not only arguments) and bear predicative inflections,
including tense, aspectual, and person/number marking, and
verbs can function as arguments (i.e., not only predicates) and
bear nominal inflections, including determiners; (1) and (2)
give Nuuchahnulth examples from Swadesh (1939):
1. mamuuk-maa quu as- i
work-3s:INDIC man-the
“The man is working.”
2. quu as-maa mamuuk- i
man-3s:INDIC work-the
“The working one is a man.”
Thus, nominal and verbal roots cannot be identified either by
distribution or morphology. Additionally, essentially any lexical
root in Nuuchahnulth, including (the equivalents of) nouns,
adjectives, and quantifiers, can take verbal inflectional mor-
phology, superficially suggesting that all words are predicative,
and thus that there is no noun/verb distinction. Immediate evi-
dence against this (Braithwaite 2008) is that verbs only function
as arguments when a determiner is present, whereas nouns func-
tion as arguments even without a determiner.
Close inspection reveals further behavioral differences
between noun and verb roots (Braithwaite 2008). For instance,
proper names can take nominal inflections, such as the definite
- i, shown on noun and verb stems in (1) and (2), but cannot




Names, a subclass of nouns, therefore cannot be predicates,
clearly distinguishing them from verb roots.
Moreover, although both nominal and verbal predicates can
bear possessive markers, nominal predicates with possessive
morphemes display a systematic ambiguity in terms of which
argument an accompanying person marker is understood to
refer to, whereas verbal predicates display no such ambiguity.
A similar ambiguity arises in tense marking. Verbal predicates
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This suffix also appears on nouns. Even nonpredicative nouns,
including names, can bear tense morphology, apparently sup-
porting the lack of a noun/verb distinction:
5. a aa a qasˇi – ’a mista-(m)it
and.then die-EVENTIVE Mista-PAST
“Then (the late) Mista died.”
The past-tense marker -(m)it on the name conveys the specific
meaning “former”; since names cannot be predicative in Nuu-
chahnulth, as (3) shows, this is evidently not a nominal predicate.
However, past-tense markers also attach to nominal predicates,
which are then interpreted in one of two ways: (6) shows a
past-tense nominal predicate, exactly parallel to (4), except with
a noun root; (7) displays a predicate nominal in which -(m)it
bears the alternative “former” meaning:
6. quu as-(m)it-(m)a
person-PAST-1s.INDIC
“I was a man.”
7. uunuu ani uumiik-(m)it-qa
because that whaler-PAST-SUBORDINATE
“because he was a former whaler”
Critically, -(m)it on a verbal predicate never exhibits the
“former” meaning but is always interpreted simply as past
tense. In sum, careful investigation such as that of Braithwaite
provides ample evidence for a noun/verb distinction in Waka-
shan languages, despite superficial appearances.
Constituent structure (sect. 5). As E&L note, “non-configura-
tional” languages display free word order and discontinuous con-
stituents: in (8), from the Australian language Kalkatungu, the
underscore shows the components of the ergative subject, and
italics show the (nominative) object:
E&L state that “the parsing system for English cannot be
remotely like the one for such a language” (sect. 2, para. 3),
because case-tagging indicates relationships between words,
rather than constituency and fixed word order. But, in fact, the
parsing system for English is well used to non-local dependen-
cies – that is, to relating items not contiguous in the string.
Note the discontinuous constituents in the following examples,
and that the dependency even occurs across a clause boundary
in the second instance: A student sauntered in wearing a large
fedora; Which girl did you say he gave the books to __?.
Parsing in Kalkatungu (or Latin) therefore utilizes a strategy
also found in languages which do have clear constituents.
Moreover, completely unrelated non-configurational languages
like Kalkatungu and Latin share the same method of signal-
ing relationships between words (case-marking). All this
is hardly indicative of the jungle E&L assume; rather, it is
evidence that very few solutions are available, and that
languages make differential use of options from a small pool of
possibilities.
Furthermore, certain non-configurational Australian
languages (e.g., Wambaya; Nordlinger 2006) actually have one
strict word order requirement, namely that the auxiliary is in
second position, thus either second word, (9), or second constitu-
ent, (10) (Hale 1973 outlines the parallel requirement in
Warlpiri):
9. Nganki ngiy-a lurrgbanyi wardangarringa-ni alaji
this.ERG 3SF-PAST grab moon-ERG boy
“The moon grabbed (her) child.”
Crucially, the auxiliary cannot appear as, say, third word within
a four-word noun phrase. Contra E&L, this demonstrates the
psychological reality of word order and of constituent structure
in such languages. Moreover, while by no means universal,
second-position phenomena occur widely (e.g., Sanskrit, Celtic,
Germanic), demonstrating remarkable formal homogeneity
cross-linguistically.
Finally, E&L claim linguistic diversity is not characterized by
“selection from a finite set of types” (sect. 8, para 9, their thesis
3). Case-encoding systems are few indeed, and familiar strategies
(such as ergativity) even occur in language isolates such as
Basque.
Universal grammar is dead
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Abstract: The idea of a biologically evolved, universal grammar with
linguistic content is a myth, perpetuated by three spurious explanatory
strategies of generative linguists. To make progress in understanding
human linguistic competence, cognitive scientists must abandon the
idea of an innate universal grammar and instead try to build theories
that explain both linguistic universals and diversity and how they emerge.
Universal grammar is, and has been for some time, a completely
empty concept. Ask yourself: what exactly is in universal
grammar? Oh, you don’t know – but you are sure that the
experts (generative linguists) do. Wrong; they don’t. And not
only that, they have no method for finding out. If there is a
method, it would be looking carefully at all the world’s thousands
of languages to discern universals. But that is what linguistic typol-
ogists have been doing for the past several decades, and, as Evans
& Levinson (E&L) report, they find no universal grammar.
I am told that a number of supporters of universal grammar
will be writing commentaries on this article. Though I have not
seen them, here is what is certain. You will not be seeing argu-
ments of the following type: I have systematically looked at a
well-chosen sample of the world’s languages, and I have dis-
cerned the following universals . . . And you will not even be
seeing specific hypotheses about what we might find in universal
grammar if we followed such a procedure. What you will be
seeing are in-principle arguments about why there have to be
constraints, how there is a poverty of the stimulus, and other
arguments that are basically continuations of Chomsky’s original
attack on behaviorism; to wit, that the mind is not a blank slate
and language learning is not rat-like conditioning. Granted, beha-
viorism cannot account for language. But modern cognitive
scientists do not assume that the mind is a blank slate, and they
work with much more powerful, cognitively based forms of learn-
ing such as categorization, analogy, statistical learning, and inten-
tion-reading. The in-principle arguments against the sufficiency
of “learning” to account for language acquisition (without a uni-
versal grammar) assume a long-gone theoretical adversary.
Given all of the data that E&L cite, how could anyone maintain
the notion of a universal grammar with linguistic content? Tra-
ditionally, there have been three basic strategies. First, just as we
may force English grammar into the Procrustean bed of Latin
grammar – that is how I was taught the structure of English in
grade school – the grammars of the world’s so-called exotic
8. Tjipa-yi tjaa kunka-(ng)ku pukutjurrka lhayi nguyi-nyin-tu.
this-ERG this branch-ERG mouse kill fall-PARTICIPLE-ERG
“The falling branch hit the mouse.” (Blake 2001, p. 419)
10. Naniyawulu nagawulu baraj-bulu wurlu-n duwa.
that.DUAL.NOM female.DUAL.NOM old.person-DUAL.(NOM) 3.DUAL-PROG get.up
“Those two old women are getting up.”
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languages may be forced into an abstract scheme based mainly on
European languages. For example, one can say that all the world’s
languages have “subject.” But actually there are about 30 different
grammatical features that have been used with this concept, and
any one language has only a subset – often with almost non-over-
lapping subsets between languages. Or take noun phrase. Yes, all
languages may be used to make reference to things in the world.
But some languages have a large repertoire of specially dedicated
words (nouns) that play the central role in this function, whereas
others do not: they mostly have a stock of all-purpose words
which can be used for this, as well as other, functions. So are sub-
jects and noun phrases universal? As you please.
Second, from the beginning a central role in universal
grammar has been played by the notion of transformations, or
“movement.” A paradigm phenomenon in English and many
European languages is so-called wh- movement, in which the
wh- word in questions always comes at the beginning no
matter which element is being questioned. Thus, we ask,
“What did John eat?”, which “moves” the thing eaten to the
beginning of the sentence (from the end of the sentence in
the statement “John ate X”). But in many of the world’s
languages, questions are formed by substituting the wh- word
for the element being questioned in situ, with no “movement”
at all, as in “John ate what?”. In classic generative grammar
analyses, it is posited that all languages have wh- movement,
it is just that one cannot always see it on the surface – there
is underlying movement. But the evidence for this is, to say
the least, indirect.
The third, more recent, strategy has been to say that not all
languages must have all features of universal grammar. Thus,
E&L note that some languages do not seem to have any recursive
structures, and recursion has also been posited as a central aspect
of universal grammar (in a very different way than such notions as
noun phrase). The response has been that, first of all, these
languages do have recursive structures, it is just that one
cannot see them on the surface. But even if they do not have
such structures, that is fine because the components of universal
grammar do not all apply universally. This strategy is the most
effective because it basically immunizes the Universal
Grammar (UG) hypothesis from falsification.
For sure, all of the world’s languages have things in common,
and E&L document a number of them. But these commonal-
ities come not from any universal grammar, but rather from uni-
versal aspects of human cognition, social interaction, and
information processing – most of which were in existence in
humans before anything like modern languages arose. Thus,
in one account (Tomasello 2003a; 2008), human linguistic uni-
versals derive from the fact that all humans everywhere: (1) con-
ceive nonlinguistically of agents of actions, patients of actions,
possessors, locations, and so forth; (2) read the intentions of
others, including communicative intentions; (3) follow into,
direct, and share attention with others; (4) imitatively learn
things from others, using categorization, analogy, and statistical
learning to extract hierarchically structured patterns of
language use; and (5) process vocal-auditory information in
specific ways. The evolution of human capacities for linguistic
communication draw on what was already there cognitively
and socially ahead of time, and this is what provides the many
and varied “constraints” on human languages; that is, this is
what constrains the way speech communities grammaticalize
linguistic constructions historically (what E&L call “stable
engineering solutions satisfying multiple design constraints”;
target article, Abstract, para. 2).
Why don’t we just call this universal grammar? The reason is
because historically, universal grammar referred to specific lin-
guistic content, not general cognitive principles, and so it would
be a misuse of the term. It is not the idea of universals of
language that is dead, but rather, it is the idea that there is a
biological adaptation with specific linguistic content that is
dead.
The neglected universals: Learnability
constraints and discourse cues
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Abstract: Converging findings from English, Mandarin, and other
languages suggest that observed “universals” may be algorithmic. First,
computational principles behind recently developed algorithms that
acquire productive constructions from raw texts or transcribed child-
directed speech impose family resemblance on learnable languages.
Second, child-directed speech is particularly rich in statistical (and
social) cues that facilitate learning of certain types of structures.
Having surveyed a wide range of posited universals and found
them wanting, Evans & Levinson (E&L) propose instead that
the “common patterns” observed in the organization of human
languages are due to cognitive constraints and cultural factors.
We offer empirical evidence in support of both these ideas.
(See Fig. 1.)
One kind of common pattern is readily apparent in the six
examples of child-directed speech in Figure 1, in each of which
partial matches between successive utterances serve to highlight
the structural regularities of the underlying language. Two uni-
versal principles facilitating the identification of such regularities
can be traced to the work of Zellig Harris (1946; 1991). First, the
discovery of language structure, from morphemes to phrases, can
proceed by cross-utterance alignment and comparison (Edelman
& Waterfall 2007; Harris 1946). Second, the fundamental task in
describing a language is to state the departures from equiprob-
ability in its sound- and word-sequences (Harris 1991, p. 32; cf.
Goldsmith 2007).
These principles are precisely those used by the only two unsu-
pervised algorithms currently capable of learning productive
construction grammars from large-scale raw corpus data,
ADIOS (Solan et al. 2005) and ConText (Waterfall et al., under
review). Both algorithms bootstrap from completely unsegmen-
ted text to words and to phrase structure by recursively identify-
ing candidate constructions in patterns of partial alignment
between utterances in the training corpus. Furthermore, in
both algorithms, candidate structures must pass a statistical sig-
nificance test before they join the growing grammar and the
learning resumes (the algorithms differ in the way they represent
corpus data and in the kinds of significance tests they impose).
These algorithms exhibited hitherto unrivaled – albeit still very
far from perfect – capacity for language learning, as measured
by (1) precision, or acceptability of novel generated utterances,
(2) recall, or coverage of withheld test corpus, (3) perplexity, or
average uncertainty about the next lexical element in test utter-
ances, and (4) performance in certain comprehension-related
tasks (Edelman & Solan, under review; Edelman et al. 2005;
2004; Solan et al. 2005). They have been tested, to varying
extents, in English, French, Hebrew, Mandarin, Spanish, and a
few other languages. The learning algorithms proved particularly
effective when applied to raw, transcribed, child-directed speech
(MacWhinney 2000), achieving precision of 54% and 63% in Man-
darin and English, respectively, and recall of about 30% in both
languages (Brodsky et al. 2007; Solan et al. 2003).
To the extent that human learners rely on the same principles
of aligning and comparing potentially relatable utterances, one
may put these principles forward as the source of part of
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speech, phrase structure, and other structural “universals.” In
other words, certain forms may be common across languages
because they are easier to learn, given the algorithmic constraints
on the learner.1
Language acquisition becomes easier not only when linguistic
forms match the algorithmic capabilities of the learner, but also
when the learner’s social environment is structured in various
helpful ways. One possibility here is for mature speakers to
embed structural cues in child-directed speech (CDS). Indeed,
a growing body of evidence suggests that language acquisition is
made easier than it would have been otherwise because of the
way CDS is shaped by caregivers during their interaction with chil-
dren.2 One seemingly universal property of CDS is the prevalence
of variation sets (Hoff-Ginsberg 1990; Ku¨ntay & Slobin 1996;
Waterfall 2006; under review) – partial alignment among
phrases uttered in temporal proximity, of the kind illustrated in
Figure 1. The proportion of CDS utterances contained in variation
sets is surprisingly constant across languages: 22% in Mandarin,
20% in Turkish, and 25% in English (when variation sets are
defined by requiring consecutive caregiver utterances to have in
common at least two lexical items in the same order; cf. Ku¨ntay
& Slobin 1996; this proportion grows to about 50% if a gap of
two utterances is allowed between the partially matching ones).
Furthermore, the lexical items (types) on which CDS utterances
are aligned constitute a significant proportion of the corpus voca-
bulary, ranging from 9% in Mandarin to 32% in English.
Crucially, the nouns and verbs in variation sets in CDS were
shown to be related to children’s verb and noun use at the
same observation, as well as to their production of verbs, pro-
nouns, and subcategorization frames four months later (Hoff-
Ginsberg, 1990; Waterfall 2006; under review). Moreover, exper-
iments involving artificial language learning highlighted the
causal role of variation sets: adults exposed to input which con-
tained variation sets performed better in word segmentation
and phrase boundary judgment tasks than a control group that
heard the same utterances in a scrambled order, which had no
variation sets (Onnis et al. 2008).
The convergence of the three lines of evidence mentioned –
the ubiquity of variation sets in child-directed speech in widely
different languages, their proven effectiveness in facilitating
acquisition, and the algorithmic revival of the principles of acqui-
sition intuited by Harris – supports E&L’s proposal of the origin
of observed universals. More research is needed to integrate the
computational framework outlined here with models of social
interaction during acquisition and with neurobiological
constraints on learning that undoubtedly contribute to the emer-
gence of cognitive/cultural language universals.
NOTES
1. Language may also be expected to evolve in the direction of a better
fit between its structure and the learners’ abilities (Christiansen & Chater
2008).
2. Social cues complement and reinforce structural ones in this
context (Goldstein & Schwade 2008).
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Abstract: Our response takes advantage of the wide-ranging
commentary to clarify some aspects of our original proposal
and augment others. We argue against the generative critics of
our coevolutionary program for the language sciences, defend
the use of close-to-surface models as minimizing cross-
linguistic data distortion, and stress the growing role of
stochastic simulations in making generalized historical accounts
testable. These methods lead the search for general principles
away from idealized representations and towards selective
processes. Putting cultural evolution central in understanding
language diversity makes learning fundamental in the cognition
of language: increasingly powerful models of general learning,
paired with channelled caregiver input, seem set to manage
language acquisition without recourse to any innate “universal
grammar.” Understanding why human language has no clear
parallels in the animal world requires a cross-species
perspective: crucial ingredients are vocal learning (for which
there are clear non-primate parallels) and an intention-
attributing cognitive infrastructure that provides a universal
base for language evolution. We conclude by situating linguistic
diversity within a broader trend towards understanding human
Figure 1 (Waterfall & Edelman). Examples of child-directed
speech in six languages. It is not necessary to be able to read,
let alone understand, any of these languages to identify the most
prominent structural characteristics common to these examples
(see text for a hint). These characteristics should, therefore, be
readily apparent to a prelinguistic infant, which is indeed the
case, as the evidence we mention suggests. All the examples
are from CHILDES corpora (MacWhinney 2000).
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cognition through the study of variation in, for example, human
genetics, neurocognition, and psycholinguistic processing.
R1. Introduction
The purpose of our target article was to draw attention to
linguistic diversity and its implications for theories of
human cognition: Structural diversity at every level is not
consonant with a theory of fixed innate language structure,
but instead suggests remarkable cognitive plasticity and
powerful learning mechanisms. We pointed out that
human communication is the only animal communication
system that varies in myriad ways in both form and
meaning across the species, and this must be a central
fact that should never be lost sight of.
The responses in the commentaries show that opinion in
the language sciences, and especially in linguistics, is still
sharply divided on “the myth of language universals,” or
at least our telling of it. The comments of the typological
and functional linguists (Croft, Goldberg, Haspelmath)
show that much of our argument is already widely
accepted there: “evolutionary linguistics is already here”
(Croft). Positive responses from many commentators in
experimental and cross-species comparative psychology
suggest that researchers in experimental psychology and
cross-species studies of communication are ready for the
kind of coevolutionary, variability-centred approach we
outlined (Bavin, Catania, McMurray & Wasserman,
Merker, Tomasello, and Waterfall & Edelman). Gen-
erative linguists, by contrast, disagreed sharply with our
presentation, laying bare some fundamental differences
in how linguistics is conceived as a science.1
We have organized the response as follows.
Section R2 responds to the critical comments from the
generative camp, suggesting that the assumptions
behind many of these responses are misplaced.
Section R3 looks at the question of whether we have over-
stated the range of diversity by ignoring unpopulated
regions of the design space.
Section R4 takes the commentaries from the non-genera-
tive linguists and the psychological, animal behavior,
and computational learning research communities,
which were overwhelmingly positive, and indicates
how these might be used to round out, or in places
correct, our position.
Section R5 sketches where we think these new develop-
ments are heading, and their relationship to what else
is happening in the cognitive sciences.
We set aside the specific data questions till an appendix
at the end, where we concede two factual mistakes, clarify
disputed facts and generalizations, and examine more
specific linguistic points that would bog down the main
argument – on nearly all of them, we think the criticisms
from our generativist colleagues do not stand up to
scrutiny.
R2. Incompatible evaluation metrics reflect
different paradigms
It was never our intention to engage in mud-slinging with
our generative colleagues, but as Tomasello has predicted
there was a certain inevitability that familiar sibling quar-
rels would be rerun. Most of the criticisms from the gen-
erative camp reflect deep differences between generative
and typological/functionalist approaches in their overall
assumptions about many issues. Where do we locate
causal explanations? Where do we seek the general unify-
ing laws behind surface diversity – in structure or in
process? Do we use only discrete mathematical models
(favoring regularized representations), or do we bring in
continuous and stochastic models as well (favoring rep-
resentations sticking closer to surface variety)? Should
generalizations purport to directly represent mental
reality, or are they modelling the summed information of
thousands of different coevolutionary products shaped
by multiple selective factors? Should we adopt essentiali-
zing categorizations (as “formal universals”), or abandon
these as misleading and adopt a strategy that measures
surface diversity directly so as not to lose data that is
useful for evaluating the fit of models?
Generative and typological/functionalist accounts will
give different answers to each of these questions, and it
is this difference in overall scientific paradigm that
accounts for the seemingly irreconcilable conflict
between generativist commentators like Freidin and
Pesetsky, who see our proposals as so imprecise as to be
unfalsifiable, and psychologists like Tomasello and Mar-
goliash & Nusbaum, for whom it is the generative
approach that has moved away from falsifiability.
To clarify these differences, we try here to give a brief
and constructive account of where the real differences
lie (as Pullum & Scholz opine, more could be fruitless).
The generativist critique includes the following interlinked
charges:
1. Lack of theory, precise representation, or falsifiabil-
ity (Smolensky & Dupoux, Freidin)
2. Mistaken ontology, mistaking behavior for cognition
and (a point we hold off till sect. R4.1) history for
science (Smolensky & Dupoux)
3. Lack of abstractness – that we are misled by surface
variation into ignoring underlying structural regularities
(Baker, Harbour)
4. That taking surface diversity at face value leads away
from the quest for general principles (Smolensky &
Dupoux, Nevins)
5. That we have neglected the presence of “formal uni-
versals” (Nevins)
6. That the typologists’ preference for using a non-
abstract descriptive apparatus is the wrong methodological
choice (Rizzi)
7. That we have merely presented an under-analyzed
Wunderkammer of variation that can be shown to reduce
to well-known phenomena (Pesetsky).
We now take up these issues one at a time. A further cri-
ticism, that we may have overstated the range of diversity
by ignoring the fact that languages all lie within a bounded
corner of the possibility space (Pinker & Jackendoff,
Tallerman) is dealt with separately in section R3.
R.2.1. What kind of theory?
Smolensky &Dupoux and Freidin complain that we did
not offer a fully articulated theory with precise predictions
about sentential structure. But that was not what we set
out to do. Our goal was to survey our current understand-
ing of language variation, explain its import for the cogni-
tive sciences, and outline a fertile area for future research.
We sketched the kind of biological models into which this
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variation neatly seems to fit and the ones that invite future
development in a number of directions. A lot of these
materials and ideas have not been sufficiently taken into
account, we felt, by researchers in the cognitive sciences.
We were gently suggesting that the time has come for a
paradigm change, and at the end of this response we will
say a little more.
Nevertheless, at the end of the target article we did
sketch directions for future research (see also sect. R5 in
this response). Commentators outside the generative
camp (e.g., Waterfall & Edelman, Christiansen &
Chater) in many cases saw no difficulty in deriving a
range of predictions or consequences, and indeed saw
the target article as “mov[ing] the study of language in
the direction of the research methods of the experimental
sciences and away from enclosed personal belief systems”
(Margoliash & Nusbaum).
The radically different assessments of empirical ground-
ing here reflect (we think) a narrow view of theory and
evidence on the part of some of our critics. Within
the language sciences there is a wide variety of theory – the-
ories about language change (historical linguistics), language
usage (pragmatics), microvariation within individual
languages (sociolinguistics), language production, acqui-
sition and comprehension (psycholinguistics), language vari-
ation (typology), and language structure (the traditional
heart of linguistics), to name just a few. Generative theory
is just one version of a theory of linguistic structure and rep-
resentation, and it is marked by a lack of external explana-
tory variables, making no reference to function, use, or
psychological or neural implementation. It has delivered
important insights into linguistic complexity, but has now
run into severely diminishing returns. It is time to look at
the larger context and develop theories that are more
responsive to “external” constraints, be they anatomical
and neural, cognitive, functional, cultural, or historical.
Here we think an evolutionary framework has a great deal
to offer in the multiple directions we sketched.
We pointed out the central fact that the human com-
munication system is characterized by a diversity in form
and meaning that has no parallel in the animal kingdom.
Generative theory has never come fully to terms with
this, and a theory of universal grammar that isn’t answer-
able to linguistic variation consequently has distinctly
limited appeal.
R.2.2. Cognition, behavior, and representation
Various Chomskyan dichotomies (competence vs. per-
formance, i-language vs. e-language, Smolensky &
Dupoux’s cog-universals vs. des-universals) have been
used to drive a wedge between cognition and behavior.
There are distinct dangers in this.
First, most cognitive scientists will agree that cognition
exists to service perception and behavior. Second, the evi-
dence for cognition remains behavioral and perceptual
(even when we can look at the functioning brain in vivo,
we look at its response to an event), and most cognitive
scientists will want all theories measured ultimately in
terms of predictions over brain events and behavior or
response (as the very title of this journal suggests; cf. Mar-
goliash & Nusbaum). Third, many cognitive scientists
view favorably the new “embodiment” perspectives
which blur the line between representation and process.
Chomsky, in his initial work on formal grammars,
suggested that the descriptive apparatus chosen to model
language should be just sufficient and not more powerful
than is required – in that way, some match to cognition
may be achieved. From then on, in the generative tradition
there has been a systematic conflation between the
language of description and what is attributed to the
language learner and user: “the brains of all speakers rep-
resent a shared set of grammatical categories” (Berent),
and “formal universals in phonology are constituted by
the analytic elements that human minds employ in con-
structing representations of sound structure” (Nevins).
Many generativist approaches – particularly parametric
formulations – consequently attribute cognitive reality to
conditionals of the form “if structural decision X, then
also structural decision Y” or “learning X is universally
easier than learning Y” (essentially Nevins’ Example
[1]). No language typologist would maintain that con-
ditional regularities of this type would be found in speak-
ers’ heads. Yet this is precisely what is advocated in the OT
(Optimality Theory) framework advocated by Smolensky
& Dupoux:
OT . . . is inherently typological: the grammar of one language
inevitably incorporates claims about the grammars of all
languages. This joining of the individual and the universal,
which OT accomplishes through ranking permutation, is prob-
ably the most important insight of the theory. (McCarthy 2002,
p. 1)
To make this work, an infinite set of possible sentences
are first generated then filtered by (among other things)
comparisons of this type. Instead of putting the filtering
where it belongs, in cultural system evolution across gen-
erations, OT effectively burdens each individual mind
with a pre´cis of the functional history of all known
human languages, and loads the entire optimization
process onto on-line grammatical computation. This is
not just cognitively unrealistic – it is computationally
intractable (Idsardi 2006).
This conflation of the metalanguage with the object of
description is a peculiar trick of the generative tradition.
By going down this path, it has opened up a huge gap
between theory and the behavioral data that would
verify it. The complex representational structures look
undermotivated, and covert processes proliferate where
alternative models deftly avoid them (see the discussion
of Subjacency and covert movement in sect. R6.8).
A biologist does not assume that a snail maintains an
internalized representation of the mathematical equations
that describe the helical growth of its shell. Even for the
internal characterization of a mental faculty, the strategy
is odd: computer scientists interested in characterizing
the properties of programming languages use a more
general auxiliary language to describe them, as in Scott-
Strachey denotational semantics. Once explanatory
theories hook external factors (e.g., psycholinguistic or
evolutionary factors) into the account, this conflation of
cognition and metalanguage must be dropped.
Smolensky & Dupoux’s aphorism “Generative
grammar merits a central place in cognitive science
because its topic is cognition and its method is science,”
then, will not find universal approval: other branches of
linguistics are much more in tune with psychological
reality as reflected in language acquisition, production,
and comprehension. Nor has generative grammar of the
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Chomskyan variety been particularly successful as an
explicit theory of linguistic representation. Many other
representational formats, such as HPSG and LFG, have
had greater uptake in computational circles (see, e.g.,
Butt et al. 2006, Reuer 2004). LFG, for example, adopts
a parallel constraint-based architecture that includes
dependency as well as constituency relations. This allows
for the direct representation of crucial types of variability
discussed in sect. 5 of our target article, while avoiding the
need for movement rules or large numbers of empty nodes
(see sect. R6.8 for further discussion of how this works for
subjacency). These formats, which represent different out-
growths from the same generative roots, show that precise,
testable, computationally tractable models of language can
be developed that reflect cross-linguistic diversity much
more directly in their architecture.
R2.3. Abstractness and universal generalizations
A number of commentators (Baker, Harbour, Nevins,
Pesetsky) felt that we were unwilling to entertain the
sorts of abstract analyses which allow us to find unity in
diversity. But we are simply pointing out that the proposals
on the table haven’t worked. Abstractness has a cost: the
more unverifiable unobservables, the greater the explana-
tory payoff we expect. Judging the point where explanatory
superstructure becomes epicyclic and unproductive may
be tough, and generative and non-generative camps
clearly have different thresholds here. But the increasingly
abstruse theoretical apparatus is like a spiralling loan that
risks never being paid by the theory’s meagre empirical
income (cf. Edelman & Christiansen 2003). Even attempts
to deal with the growing evidence of variability through
the theory of parameters – projecting out diversity by a
limited number of “switches” pre-provided in Universal
Grammar (UG) – has empirically collapsed (Newmeyer
2004, p. 545), a point largely undisputed by our commen-
tators (although Rizzi continues to use the notion – see
the discussion of Subjacency in sect. R6.8).
All sciences search for underlying regularities – that’s
the game, and there is no branch of linguistics (least of
all historical linguistics, with its laws of sound change)
that is not a player. For this reason Harbour’s commen-
tary misses the target – of course some middle level gen-
eralizations about the semantics of grammatical number
are valid in any framework (although his account of the
plural seems to not generalize beyond three participants,
and there are additional problems that we discuss in
sect. R6.4). The art is to find the highest level generaliz-
ation that still has empirical “bite.”
R2.4. Recognizing structural diversity is not
incompatible with seeking general laws
The criticisms by Nevins, Pesetsky, and Smolensky &
Dupoux – that we are not interested in seeking deeper
laws behind the surface variation in linguistic structure –
reveal a failure to understand the typological/functional
approach. In a coevolutionary model the underlying regu-
larities in the cross-linguistic landscape are sought in the
vocal-auditory, cognitive, sociolinguistic, functional, and
acquisitional selectors which favor the development of
some structures over others. The goal is to seek a con-
strained set of motivated selectors (each testable) that
filter what structures can be learned, processed, and trans-
mitted. The stochastic nature of the selection process, and
the interaction and competition between multiple selec-
tors, accounts for the characteristic balance we find, of
recurrent but not universal patterns with marked diversity
in the outliers.
Phonological structures, for example, will be favored to
the extent that they can be easily said, easily heard, and
easily learned.2 But these targets regularly conflict, as
when streamlined articulation weakens perceptual con-
trasts or creates formal alternations that are harder to
learn. In fact it has been a key insight of optimality
theory (OT) that many competing factors need to be
juggled, but that not all are equally potent and most can
be “non-fatally violated.” The different weightings of
these “constraints” generate a kaleidoscope of language-
specific configurations, and modelling their interaction
has been a strong appeal of the OT program. But the con-
straints identified by OT are more fruitfully treated as the
sorts of scalar processing effects sketched in Haspel-
math’s commentary. The typological sweep, like OT pho-
nology, aims at a comprehensive documentation of all such
constraints and their interactions, finding languages in
which individual effects can best be isolated or recom-
bined, with laboratory phonology studying why each
effect occurs.
The line of attack that “languages share structural simi-
larities often masked by one of their differences”
(Pesetsky) thus misses the point of why it is useful to con-
front diversity head on. Like generative theory, the
program we have outlined seeks to discover the general
behind the particular. But it differs in where we seek the
general laws. For our generativist critics, generality is to
be found at the level of structural representation; for us,
at the level of process. Our claim, in Darwinian mode, is
that the unity of evolutionary mechanisms can best be dis-
cerned by reckoning with the full diversity of evolutionary
products and processes.
R2.5. Non-abstract representations preserve
information
Rizzi suggests that the typologist’s strategy of using an
“extremely impoverished, non-abstract descriptive appar-
atus” that takes diversity at face value in representing
phenomena will have less success than the generative
program in establishing universal patterns. Yet, as the
burden of explanation for cross-linguistic patterning is
moved out of the prewired mind and into the evolution
of individual language systems under selection from the
sorts of factors outlined earlier, the most appropriate
mathematical models employ stochastical and continuous
methods rather than the discrete methods that have
characterized the generative tradition (Pierrehumbert
et al. 2000). And once we employ these methods, there
are positive benefits in “directly measuring the variation,
instead of reducing it” (Bickel 2009): any other strategy
risks degrading the information on which the methods
are based.
Take the question of how perceptual discriminability
and articulatory ease interact in the domain of vowel dis-
persion over the formant space to favor the emergence
of some vowel systems over others. The classic study by
Liljencrants and Lindblom (1972) simulated the evolution
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of vowel systems over time under these twin selectional
pressures and compared the results to the distribution of
attested vowel inventories. The insights yielded by their
model would not have been possible if the descriptions
of vowel systems had been in terms of discrete binary fea-
tures such as [front] and [round] rather than in terms of
position in a continuous three-dimensional space based
on formant frequencies.
Staying close to the surface thus avoids the essentializ-
ing fallacy critiqued by Goldberg and Croft, while retain-
ing the maximum information for matching against
stochastic models of how general evolutionary processes
interact to produce a scatter of different structural out-
comes across the language sample.
R2.6. Neglect of “formal universals”
We are criticized by Nevins for neglecting “formal univer-
sals” – “the analytic elements that human minds employ in
constructing representations of sound structure . . . the
available data structures (e.g., binary features, metrical
grids, autosegmental tiers) and the possible operations
on them that can be used in constructing a grammar of a
language.” (See also our discussion in sect. R6.8 of Subja-
cency, as raised by Smolensky & Dupoux, Freidin, and
Rizzi.)
Data structures like these have undoubted value in con-
structing formal representations of phonological phenom-
ena. But, first, it does not follow that they are the actual
representations that humans learn and use. As Tomasello
and Bavin argue, increasingly powerful general pattern
learning mechanisms suggest that many of the relevant
phenomena can be managed without needing the rep-
resentations that Nevins advocates. Second, even if such
structures prove to have psychological reality, it does not
follow that we are natively endowed with them. Take the
general issue of discrete combinatoriality – the fact that
languages recombine discrete units like consonants and
vowels – which is relevant both to binary features (like+
consonantal) and, in many models, the separation of con-
sonantal and vocalic elements onto distinct autosegmental
tiers.3 Zuidema and De Boer (2009) have used evolution-
ary game theory simulations to investigate the hypothesis
that combinatorial phonology results from optimizing
signal systems for perceptual distinctiveness. Selection
for acoustic distinctiveness, defined in terms of the prob-
ability of confusion, leads along a path of increasing
fitness from unstructured, holistic signals to structured
signals that can be analyzed as combinatorial. Some very
general assumptions – temporal structuring of signals
and selection for acoustic distinctiveness – lead over
time to the emergence of combinatorial signals from holis-
tic origins.
Should linguists use binary features and autosegmental
tiers in the grammars and phonological descriptions they
write? Sure, whenever they are useful and elegant. Do
we need them to draw on a single, universal feature set
to account for the mental representations that speakers
have? Probably not, judging by the direction in which
the psycholinguistic learning literature is headed. Do we
need them to account for why languages all exhibit dis-
crete combinatoriality? No – this can emerge through
the sorts of processes that Zuidema and De Boer have
modelled. Intriguingly, an empirical parallel has been
identified in one new sign language: Meir et al. (in
press) and Sandler et al. (2009) show that duality of pat-
terning has only been gradually emerging over three gen-
erations of one Bedouin sign language variety.
R2.7. An underanalyzed Wunderkammer of variation
A number of commentators charge us with producing a
Wunderkammer of exotica (Pesetsky), intended more to
dazzle rather than illuminate. Pesetsky and Tallerman
suggest that if properly analyzed these exotica will turn
out just to be ordinary, universal-conforming languages.
Both take up the issue of constituency, and argue that
recent research finds it subtly present in languages pre-
viously claimed to lack it. A clarification is in order.
There are two potential issues:
a. Is constituency universal in the sense that all
languages exhibit it somewhere in their systems, if even
marginally?
b. Is constituency universal in the sense that all
languages use it as the main organizational principle of
sentence structure and the main way of signalling gramma-
tical relations?
Our target was (b) – different languages use different
mixes, as has been well-modelled by approaches like
LFG; but our commentators tend to target (a).
Pesetsky points out that Tlingit may after all have an
initial slot into which constituents can be systematically
shifted (we would need to know actually what can go
there, and if that is actually predicted by a constituency
analysis). But he is wrong in presenting Warlpiri as the
“free word order language par excellence.” It is well
known that Warlpiri places its auxiliary after the first con-
stituent, and that when words are grouped together into a
contiguous NP only the last word needs to carry case,
instead of the usual patterning of inflecting every word.
Neither of these properties, however, are found in
Jiwarli (Austin & Bresnan 1996), which is why we chose
it as our example.
The point about free word order languages, whether or
not they have small islands of constituency, is that they
cannot be parsed by a constituency-based algorithm as in
most NLP (natural language programming) today,
because they do not use constituency as the systematic
organizing principle of sentence structure. If constituency
is not the universal architecture for sentence structure,
then the entire generative apparatus of c-command,
bounding nodes, subjacency, and so forth collapses,
since all are defined in terms of constituency. In this way
Tallerman is wrong in thinking that parsing free word
order is just like parsing English discontinuous construc-
tions – the latter are allowed by rule, which sets up
precise expectations of what comes next in what order.
Incidentally, the reader should note the argumentation
of these rejoinders: that we, Evans & Levinson (E&L),
have cherry-picked exotic facts about language A, but
look, language B yields to the normal universal analysis,
so there’s no reason to take A seriously. Since absolute uni-
versals can be falsified by a single counterexample, it is a
logical fallacy to defend a universal by adducing facts
from some other language which happens not to violate it.
The seven general charges we have discussed capture,
we think, most of the sources of disagreement. Freidin’s
commentary in particular indicates the deep rift in
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contemporary linguistics between Chomskyans and the
rest, which ultimately rests on different judgements
about the interlocking of theory and evidence. This is
regrettable, as generative grammar has served to open
up the “deep unconscious” of language as it were,
showing how languages are organized with far greater
complexity than had hitherto been imagined. While
Chomskyans have presumed that these complexities
must be innate, we have argued that there are two blind
watchmakers: cultural evolution acting over deep time,
and genetic infrastructure, which for the most part, of
course, will not be specific to language.
Finally, let us note that Chomsky’s own position makes
it clear that the generative enterprise simply has a different
target than the program we are trying to promote, namely,
(in our case) working out the implications of language
diversity for theories of cognition and human evolution.
The following recent quote makes this clear:
Complexity, variety, effects of historical accident, and so on,
are overwhelmingly restricted to morphology and phonology,
the mapping to the sensorimotor interface. That’s why these
are virtually the only topics investigated in traditional linguis-
tics, or that enter into language teaching. They are idiosyncra-
sies, so are noticed, and have to be learned. If so, then it
appears that language evolved, and is designed, primarily as
an instrument of thought. Emergence of unbounded Merge
in human evolutionary history provides what has been called
a “language of thought,” an internal generative system that
constructs thoughts of arbitrary richness and complexity,
exploiting conceptual resources that are already available or
may develop with the availability of structured expressions.
(Chomsky 2007, p. 22; our emphasis)
On this view, UG primarily constrains the “language of
thought,” not the details of its external expression. The
same conclusion was stoically reached by Newmeyer
(2004, p. 545): “Typological generalizations are therefore
phenomena whose explanation is not the task of gramma-
tical theory. If such a conclusion is correct, then the expla-
natory domain of Universal Grammar is considerably
smaller than has been assumed in much work in the Prin-
ciples-and-Parameters approach” and Chomsky (2007,
p. 18) seems in part to concur: “Diversity of language
provides an upper bound on what may be attributed
to UG.”
These then are simply different enterprises – Chomsky
is concerned with the nature of recursive thought
capacities, whereas linguistic typology and the non-gen-
erative linguists are concerned with what external
language behavior indicates about the nature of cognition
and its evolution. We have argued that the latter program
has more to offer cognitive science at this juncture in intel-
lectual history. Perhaps a mark of this is that our cross-
linguistic enterprise is actually close to Chomsky’s new
position in some respects, locating recursion not as a uni-
versal property of (linguistic) syntax, but as a universal
property of language use (pragmatics, or mind) – a fact,
though, that emerges from empirical cross-linguistic work.
R3. How much of the design space is populated?
Pinker & Jackendoff point out no doubt correctly that
the possible design space for human languages is much
greater than the space actually explored by existing
languages. Two basic questions arise: (1) What exactly
are the dimensions of the possible design space, of
which just one corner is actually occupied? (2) What
exactly does this sequestration in a small corner imply?
Before we get too excited by (1), we should consider (2).
Pinker & Jackendoff imply that languages are locked into
the corner by intrinsic, innate constraints, and that’s why we
don’t find languages with really outlandish properties. But
there is a fundamental fact they have overlooked. The ear-
liest modern human remains date back to about 200,000
BP, and outside Africa date from only 100,000 years or so
ago. If that is the date of the great diaspora, there has
been relatively little time for diversification. Let us explain.
We have to presume that most likely all the languages
we have now are descended by cultural evolution from a
single ancestral tongue (it would take an event of total
spoken language loss to be otherwise – not impossible,
but requiring a highly unlikely scenario, such as an isolated
lineage descended from a deaf couple). Now consider the
following surprising fact. The structural properties of
language change on a near-glacial time scale. In an
ongoing study using Bayesian phylogenetics, Dunn et al.
(in preparation) have found that taken individually, a
structural feature within a single large language-family
like Austronesian changes on average just once about
every 50,000 years.4 What that implies is that all the
languages we now sample from are within structural spit-
ting distance of the ancestral tongue! It is quite surprising
in this light that typologists have been able to catalogue so
much linguistic variation. Once again, a coevolutionary
perspective is an essential corrective to the enterprise.
So whether we need a lot of further explanation for the
fact that languages seem to be cultivating the same garden
(Tallerman), to the degree that this can be shown,
depends crucially on the extent to which you think the
languages of the world are independent experiments.
Francis Galton, who stressed the need for genealogical
independence in statistical sampling, would urge caution!
Let us turn now to the properties of the design space.
Pinker & Jackendoff point out that we set aside a rich
set of functional universals on the grounds that they are
definitional of language (a move we borrowed directly
from Greenberg). Of course it is not trivial that these
seem shared by all human groups (although very little
empirical work has actually been done to establish this –
but see, e.g., Stivers et al. 2009). We think that there is a
clear biological infrastructure for language, which is
distinct from the structural properties of language. This
consists of two key elements: the vocal apparatus and the
capacity for vocal learning, on the one hand (both biologi-
cal properties unique in our immediate biological family,
the Hominidae), and a rich set of pragmatic universals
(communicative intention recognition prime among
them), on the other. This is the platform from which
languages arise by cultural evolution, and yes, it limits
the design space, like our general cognitive and learning
capacities (Christiansen & Chater). We emphasized
that those interested in the evolution of the biological pre-
conditions for language have been looking in the wrong
place: Instead of looking at the input-output system (as
Philip Lieberman has been urging for years; see, e.g., Lie-
berman 2006), or the pragmatics of communicative
exchange, they’ve been focussed on the syntax and combi-
natorics, the least determined part of the system, as
demonstrated by linguistic typology.
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A functional perspective has been a long running under-
current in typological and descriptive linguistics, as Croft
and Goldberg remind us. Goldberg suggests that the
design space is highly constrained by systems motivations;
for example, pressures to keep forms distinct while staying
within the normal sound patterns of a language. These
pressures provide explanations for the internal coherence
of language structure, a perspective that is indeed necess-
ary to explain how languages are not for the most part a
heap of flotsam and jetsam accumulated during cultural
evolution, but rather, beautifully machined systems, with
innovations constantly being adjusted to their functions.
Returning to the question of how saturated or otherwise
the design space is, Pinker & Jackendoff maintain it is
easy to think of highly improbable but possible language
types, and they suggest a few. Quite a few of these
simply fail on the functional front – they are unproductive
like their Cadda, or limited in expressiveness like their
Bacca, and groups confined to speaking such languages
would rapidly lose out to groups with more expressive
systems. Daffa, the quantificational-logic language, lacks
any form of deictics like “I,” “‘you,” “this,” “now,” or
“here”: The presence of some deictics is certainly a func-
tional universal of human language and follows from the
emergence of human language from interactional, socially
situated transactions.
Interestingly, though, some natural languages do have
properties that partake of Pinker & Jackendoff’s
thought experiments. For example, their imaginary
Cadda, a language of one word holophrases, lacks
double articulation. The three-generation sign language
of Al Sayyid is also said to lack double articulation (Meir
et al., in press; Sandler et al. 2009), showing that this has
to arise by cultural evolution: it is not given by instinct.
The musical language Gahha, likewise, isn’t too far off
attested reality. The West Papuan language Iau (Bateman
1986a; 1986b; 1990a; 1990b) has eight phonemic tones
(including melodic contours), close to the number of pho-
nemic segments, and uses them both for lexical distinctions
and for grammatical distinctions including aspect, mood,
and speech-act distinctions; other tone languages use
pitch to indicate modality or case (e.g., Maasai).
Nor is the “rational” Fagga too far “outside the envelope.”
Sure, it would require a level of semantic factorization down
to a number of combinable semantic components not larger
than the number of phonemes, but some semantic theories
posit a few score “semantic primitives” in terms of which all
meanings can be stated (e.g., Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002),
and Demiin, the Lardil initiation language, maps the entire
lexicon down to around 150 elements (Hale 1982).
Combine Demiin semantics with !Xo´o˜ phonology (159 con-
sonant phonemes on some analyses), pair one semantic
element to each phoneme, and Fagga might just squeak
in.5 Whether or not it then actually existed would depend
on whether a possibly evolutionary route past the “historical
filters” could be found – in other words whether an evol-
utionary pathway could exist to reach this highly economical
mapping of meaning elements onto phonological segments.
Finally, it is salutary to recollect that it is only relatively
recently that we have come to recognize sign languages as
fully developed languages with equal expressive power to
spoken languages. These languages with their easy access
to iconicity and analog spatial coding break out of the
design space restricted by the strictly linear coding of the
vocal-auditory channel. The typology of these languages is
still in development, and there are plenty of surprises yet
to come (see Meir et al., in press; Zeshan 2006a; 2006b).
R4. Language variation and the future directions
of cognitive science
R4.1. Is history bunk? Linguistics as a science of
change
History is more or less bunk. It’s tradition. We don’t want tradition. We
want to live in the present and the only history that is worth a tinker’s
dam is the history we make today.
— Henry Ford (Interview in Chicago Tribune, May 25, 1916)
Nevins’ dismissal of the coevolutionary approach we are
advocating as “hand-waving at diachronic contingencies”
hints at another kind of dissatisfaction with the general
program we outlined in the target article: the suspicion
that we advocate an old-fashioned historical and cultural
approach, which will return linguistics wholly to the huma-
nities. The antipathy to history is based on the view that (a)
it is the study of particularities, whereas we should be in
the business of generalizing, (b) it cannot be predictive,
while any empirical science should make falsifiable
predictions.
But the study of evolution is centrally about history, the
study of the match between organisms and environment
over time, and few would doubt its scientific credentials.
And modern linguistics began as a historical discipline,
that rapidly felt able to announce laws of historical
change, while recent sociolinguistics has been able to
catch language change in the making.
A fundamental shift is that modern computational
methods have revolutionized the possibility of studying
change in systems using more and more complex and rea-
listic simulations. Within the study of evolution, compu-
tational cladistics exploits this to the full, using, for
example, Bayesian inference to run millions of simulations
and Monte Carlo Markov chains to search for the optimum
model that predicts back the data with the greatest like-
lihood. We can make history today, as Henry Ford
thought we should.
In the coda of the target article (sect. 8) we sketched a
set of future directions for the language sciences based
on evolutionary ideas, and these new methods put
those directions within our grasp right now. Take the
idea stated in thesis (3), that recurrent clustering of sol-
utions will occur in grammars of non-closely related
languages – such a claim can be tested by simulations.
Equally tractable is the idea that changes cascade
(thesis [4]), so that a few crucial ones may land a
language in a gully of future developments. Thesis (5)
about coevolution between brain, vocal organs, and
language has already begun being intensively explored
by simulation (Christiansen & Chater 2008; Christian
et al. 2009). Thesis (7) suggests that we should investi-
gate how the full range of attested language systems
could have arisen – pie in the sky without computational
simulation, but now thinkable. For example, we could
follow Bickerton (1981) and start with a simple Creole-
like language, described by a set of formal features or
characters, and use the rates and parameters of charac-
ter change derived from recent work on the Bayesian
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phylogenetics of language families to simulate cultural
evolution over more than 100,000 years. Do we derive
patterns of diversity like we now see, or would we
need to model special historical circumstances such as
massive hybridization?
Smolensky & Dupoux ignore the recent synthesis of
biological and cultural evolution. Thus they assert
“language is more a biological than a cultural construct.”
We would go further: “language is one hundred percent
a biological phenomenon.” It is absurd to imagine that
humans by means of culture have escaped the biosphere –
we are just a species with a very highly developed
“extended phenotype” or “niche construction” (Laland
et al. 1999), using culture to create conditions favorable
to our survival. The twin-track approach to human evol-
ution that we sketched (derivatively from, e.g., Boyd &
Richerson 1985; Durham 1991) tries to explicate this, uni-
fying perspectives on history and phylogeny as the science
of likely state changes in a population. There is immense
room for future theoretical and modelling work here:
without it we are not going to understand how we as a
species evolved with the particular cognitive capacities
we have.
R4.2. Learning and development
A number of commentators stress how two further
avenues of research will help to situate our understanding
of human cognition in a biological context: human devel-
opment, and comparative psychology across species. For
reasons of space, and reflecting the limits of our own
expertise, we underplayed the crucial role of learning
and cognitive development that is presupposed by the
linguistic variation we outlined. These commentators
offer a valuable corrective, summarizing the human and
cross-species literature. They show how much more
powerful are the learning mechanisms we can now draw
on than the basic associationist models available in the
1950s when Chomsky argued that their lack of power
forced us to postulate rich innate endowments for
language learning. Indeed, the combined arguments put
forth by the commentators go some way towards providing
a solution to a problem we left unanswered at the end of
section 7 of the target article: accounting for how language
learning is possible in the face of the levels of diversity we
describe.
Bavin does a good job of reminding readers what the
basic issues are here, and especially the central debate
over the domain-specificity of language learning.
Tomasello observes that the Chomskyan argument
about the unlearnability of language structure crucially
relies on the assumption of a simple association learning:
once we take into account the rich context of communi-
cation, with shared attention and intention interpretation,
not to mention capacities for analogy and statistical learn-
ing, the argument fails. Catania also refers to work on
other species showing that category discrimination can
be triggered right across the board by a single new stimu-
lus. Catania, Christiansen & Chater, and Merker all
stress the funnelling effects of the learner bottleneck via
“C-induction”: In Merker’s words. “cultural transmission
delivers the restricted search space needed to enable
language learning, not by constraining the form language
takes on an innate basis, but by ensuring that the form
in which language is presented to the learner is learnable.”
Catania suggests we explicitly incorporate a “third track” –
acquisition – into our coevolutionary model, but we would
prefer to maintain it as one (albeit powerful) set of selec-
tors on linguistic structure alongside the others we
outline in our article.
A number of commentators dwelt on Chomsky’s
“poverty of the stimulus” argument for rich innate
language capacities. Bavin points out that the complex
sentential syntax that motivates the argument is learnt so
late that the child has wide experience of language on
which to build. Perhaps the neatest refutation is provided
by Waterfall & Edelman, who note a crucial property of
the linguistic input to children: namely, repetition with
minor variation, which draws attention to the structural
properties of strings, exhibiting for the infant the “trans-
formations” of Zellig Harris. They show how learning
algorithms can effectively use this information to bootstrap
from unsegmented text to grammatical analysis.
McMurray & Wasserman correctly point out that our
position radically moves the goal posts for language learn-
ing, suggesting that not only are a slew of specialized learn-
ing strategies employed to learn a language (and these
commentators provide very useful bibliographic leads
here), but which of these strategies is deployed may
depend on the language being learnt. We don’t necessarily
learn Ye´lıˆ Dnye with its 90 phonemes, flexible phrase
order, and widespread verb suppletion using the same
strategies we use for English: As McMurray & Wasserman
write, “humans . . . assemble language with a variety of
learning mechanisms and sources of information, this
assembly being guided by the particularities of the
language they are learning.” Instead of talking about the
passive acquisition of language, we should be talking
about the active construction of many different skills.
This perspective buries the idea of a single language acqui-
sition device (LAD).
Christiansen &Chater, as well as Catania, emphasize
that learning in development is the crucial filter through
which languages have to pass. Languages have to be
good to think with (to modify an adage of Levi-Strauss),
otherwise they won’t make it. Christiansen & Chater
have described (both in their 2008 BBS article [see BBS
31(5)] and in Christiansen et al. 2009) interesting model-
ling that shows that the learning filter must be largely
language-independent, and thus that properties of learn-
ing are unlikely to have evolved specifically for language.
This is a new kind of evidence against the position
taken by Pinker & Jackendoff that language-specific
learning principles must be involved in the acquisition of
language.
Finally, we would like to draw attention to one other
crucial aspect of development, namely, the way in which
the environment is known to modulate developmental
timing in the underlying biology of organisms, so that phe-
notypic variation can be achieved from the same genotype
(“phenotypic plasticity”), and conversely, phenotypic iden-
tity can be obtained from variant genotypes (“developmen-
tal buffering”). In the conclusion to our target article we
drew attention to the extraordinary achievement that is
culture – generating phenotypic difference where there
is no genetic difference, and phenotypic identity where
there is genetic difference. These issues have been much
explored in the biological literature on epigenesis and
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development (see West-Eberhard [2003] for a fascinating
overview).
R4.3. The comparative perspective across species
Our other major omission, as some commentators noticed,
is the lack of reference to the comparative psychology of
other species. Margoliash & Nusbaum appeal to linguists
and others interested in the evolution of language to “cast
off the remaining intellectual shackles of linguistic specie-
sism” and take the findings of animal research more into
account. They usefully remind us of the importance of the
relationship between perceptual and motor skills. Merker
notes how findings about complex learned birdsong can
explain how a prelinguistic human adaptation for emanci-
pated song could provide a mechanism for sustaining and
elaborating string transmission, even if this was timed
before the full emergence of social cognition: it can be
driven by the need to impress by elaborate vocal display
even when not yet used to communicate meaning.
Darwin (1871) had, of course, imagined that language
evolved from song (see Fisher & Scharff 2009; Fitch
2006, for an update).
Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli (Penn et al.) point out that
our demonstration of the variability in language, and the
implication that there is no simple innate basis for it, has inter-
esting implications for a central issue in comparative psychol-
ogy: what exactly is the Rubicon which divides us from apes?
If the crucial ingredient was a chance language gene or the
genetic substrate for UG, it might be possible to argue that
language alone is responsible for the sea-change in our cogni-
tion. But if there is no such magic bullet, then languages must
be learnt by principles of general cognition, and the Rubicon
must be constituted by more fundamental and more general
differences in cognition.
Penn et al. err, though, when they try to extend the
argument to downplay Tomasello’s (2008) thesis that the
crucial divide is the special assemblage of abilities that
make up the pragmatic infrastructure for human language.
Tomasello’s assemblage of specialized social cognition is
precisely what we need to explain the genesis of language
diversity – it provides a general platform both for
language learning and for the elaboration of distinct
systems. Still, bringing their point together with those by
Margoliash & Nusbaum and Merker is a useful remin-
der that we need to account both for the emergence of pat-
terned form (where cross-species studies of sophisticated
vocalizers must take on greater importance) and of
productive meaning (where social cognition is likely to
remain the main driver).
Penn et al. see in our display of language variation
more evidence for their identification of a major disconti-
nuity between apes and humans in the capacity for
relational thought. If this capacity is not introduced by a
single new evolved trait, human language, then the gulf
is a feature of general cognition. But we note two
caveats here: First, in our very nearest cousins (chimps
and bonobos), there are pale shadows of relational think-
ing (Haun & Call 2009). Second, no one doubts the impor-
tance of language in delivering ready-made relational
concepts (Gentner 2003). Beyond that, we probably
agree about the facts, but might value them differently:
Is 10% continuity with chimps a telling bit of continuity,
or is 90% discontinuity a hopeless Rubicon?
R5. Situating language and cognition in the
biology of variation
Science moves in new directions blown by winds of differ-
ent kinds – Kuhnian collapses, new technologies, new
integrative insights, newly developing fields, funding
biases, even boredom with old paradigms. We think it is
pretty clear that for a mix of these reasons, the cognitive
sciences are about to undergo a major upheaval. Classical
cognitive science was based on a mechanistic analogy with
a serial computational device, where serial algebraic algor-
ithms could represent models of the mind. A simplifying
assumption was made at the outset: we need only charac-
terize one invariant system. That is, the human mind is
essentially an invariant processing device, processing
different content to be sure, but running the same basic
algorithms regardless of its instantiations in different indi-
viduals with different experiences, different environments,
and different languages (cf. Smolensky & Dupoux’s “a
universal principle is a property true of all minds”).
This view has taken a number of knocks in the last
twenty years; for example, from the success of parallel
computational models and the rise of the brain sciences.
The brain sciences were at first harnessed to the classical
enterprise, with invariance sought beneath individual vari-
ation in brain structure and function through selecting
only right-handed or male subjects, pooling data, and nor-
malizing brains. But cognitive neuroscience has increas-
ingly broken free, and now the range of individual
biological variation is a subject of interest in its own right.
Pushing this development is genetics. It is now feasible to
correlate brain structure and function with scans across half a
million single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) or genetic
markers. We already know detailed facts about, for
example, the alleles that favor better long-term memory
(Papassotiropoulos et al. 2006), and we are well on the way
to knowing something about the genetic bases of language
(Fisher & Marcus 2006, Vernes et al. 2008). On the proces-
sing side, we know that about 8% of individuals have right-
lateralized language, that individuals differ markedly in the
degree of language lateralization, and that on specific tasks
about 10% of individuals may not show activation of the
classic language areas at all (Mu¨ller 2009). (True, most indi-
viduals will have circuitry special to language, as Pinker &
Jackendoff remark, but that may be only because using
language bundles specific mental tasks, and because adults
have built the circuitry in extended development.) We
even have preliminary evidence that gene pools with
certain biases in allele distribution are more likely to
harbour languages of specific sorts (Dediu & Ladd 2007).
We are not dealing, then, with an invariant machine at all,
but with a biological system whose evolution has relied on
keeping variance in the gene pool.
This research is going to revolutionize what we know
about the mind and brain and how it works. By putting vari-
ation central, as the fuel of evolution, it will recast the
language sciences. Some aspects of the language sciences
are pre-adapted to the sea-change –sociolinguistics, dialec-
tology, historical linguistics, and typology – provided they
can take the new mathematical methods on board. But
we can look forward to the new psycholinguistics, centrally
concerned with variation in human performance in the
language domain both within and across language groups,
and the new neurocognition of language which will
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explore both the varying demands that different languages
put on the neural circuitry and the way in which superficial
phenotypic standardization is achieved by distinct under-
lying processing strategies in different individuals.
In this context, renewed interest in the variation in
human experience and expertise, in the cultural contexts
of learning, and the diversity in our highest learned skill –
language – is inevitable. For the cognitive and language
sciences to engage with these developments, a first step is
to take on board the lessons of those linguistic approaches
that place variation and process at centre stage. Then the
very diversity of languages becomes no longer an embar-
rassment but a serious scientific resource. That is the
message we have been trying to convey.
R6. Appendix: Disputed data and generalizations
R6.1. Kayardild nominal tense
The occurrence of tense on Kayardild nominals was cited
by us as a counterexample to Pinker and Bloom’s (1990)
claim that languages will not code tense on nominals.
Baker’s commentary does not dispute this, but then
tries to use it to establish an orthogonal issue, namely,
his verb-object constraint (see sect. R.6.10). While it is
true that in Kayardild, tense appears on objects rather
than subjects, it is not hard to find other languages, such
as Pitta-Pitta (Blake 1979), where it is the subject rather
than the object that codes for tense – so the general
phenomenon gives no succor to Baker’s hoped-for univer-
sal. Needless to say, all this only reinforces the fact that
tense can occur on nominals.
R6.2. Positionals and ideophones
We noted in the target article that not only are the “big
four” word classes (noun, verb, adjective, adverb) not
wholly universal, but there were plenty of other word
classes out there, including positionals and ideophones.
We used the example of Mayan positionals. Pesetsky is
right that Mayan positionals are classically defined as a
root class, not a stem class, but the facts are actually
more complex (see, e.g., Haviland 1994). Positionals
have their own unique distribution at the stem level too,
occurring, for example, in a special class of mensural clas-
sifiers (de Le´on 1988), body-part constructions (Haviland
1988, p. 92) and color-plus-position constructions
(Haviland, submitted). In any case, many languages from
around the world (such as Ye´lıˆ Dnye; Levinson 2000)
have positionals as a special word class with their own
distinctive distributions. (See Ameka and Levinson
[2007] for detailed examples and a typology.)
Pesetsky similarly tries to undermine the status of ideo-
phones/expressives as a word class (the terms are more or
less synonymous, but come from different linguistic
descriptive traditions). He correctly notes that Osada
(1992) does not discuss their syntax in Mundari, and this
reflects a general neglect of their syntactic characteristics
in linguistic descriptions, apart from simplistic characteriz-
ations of them as “syntactically unintegrated.” However, a
careful discussion of the syntax of the functionally similar
class of expressives in another Austroasiatic language,
Semelai, can be found in Kruspe (2004): their syntactic
distribution closely parallels that of direct speech
complements. Likewise in Southern Sotho (Molotsi
1993), ideophones pattern like complements of “say,”
with the further property that they can be passivized, so
that “John snatched the woman’s purse” is literally “John
said snatch woman’s purse,” which can be passivized as
“snatch was said woman’s purse.” In short, ideophones
and expressives have a syntax, if sometimes limited.
R6.3. Straits Salish noun versus verb distinction
We pointed out that it was still unclear whether in fact
there is a universal noun/verb distinction. We mentioned
the Wakashan language Straits Salish as an example of a
language plausibly claimed to lack a noun/verb distinc-
tion. Instead of presenting counteranalyses of the Straits
Salish data, Tallerman cites data from Nuuchahnulth
(Nootka), from another language family, with no demon-
stration that the arguments can be transferred to Straits
Salish. A crucial difference between the languages is that
names can be predicative in Straits Salish but not in
Nootka. Tallerman’s major arguments for the existence
of a noun/verb distinction in Nuuchahnulth were
already given in Jacobsen (1979) and Schachter (1985),
and Jelinek (1995) takes care to show that they don’t
apply to Straits Salish, which is why we used Salish
rather than Nootka as an example. We agree with her,
though, that further investigation of the Salish case is
needed (a point also articulated in Evans & Osada 2005);
hence our statement that no definitive consensus has
been reached.
R6.4. Jemez/Kiowa number
Harbour reproaches us for attributing the “unexpected
number” facts to Jemez rather than Kiowa; in fact, the
languages are related and both exhibit similar phenomena
(Mithun 1999, p. 81, and personal communication). We
thank Harbour for picking up the factual errors he
points out, but for our part would like to correct his
mischaracterization of this case as our “prime example”
of “something we would never think of” – it was one of
many, and the rest still stand. More importantly, further
cross-linguistic data disputes his claim that “singular ‘we’
arises because Winnebago uses only [+ augmented].”
The use of “because” here illustrates the fallacy of infer-
ring cause from single cases. Harbour’s formulation
predicts that if a language uses a more elaborated gramma-
tical number system than just [+ augmented] it should not
treat “1 þ 2” as singular. Yet there are many languages
which have a three-way number system and which none-
theless treat 1þ2 in the same series as the singulars, like
Bininj Gun-wok (Evans 2003a).
R6.5. Arrernte syllable structure
Nevins, and (briefly) Berent, take issue with our citing
Arrernte as an example of a language that defies the “Uni-
versal CV preference” by taking VC as the underlying
syllable type. To contextualize their riposte, it is worth
quoting Hyman (2008, p. 13):
In each of the above cases, there is no “knock-out argument.”
Anyone determined to maintain [these] universals can con-
tinue to do so, the worst consequence being an indeterminate
or more awkward analysis. . . . Architectural universals have
Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language universals
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5 481
this property: it all depends on your model and on what com-
plications you are willing to live with.
Nevins’ purported counter-analysis is of this type. To
make it work is not just a matter of allowing onset-sensitive
morae, not a problem in itself, but also of leaving the coda
out of weight considerations, which is more problematic.
Moreover, he only considers some of the phenomena
that Breen and Pensalfini (1999) cite – such as the fact
that the language game known as “Rabbit Talk” picks out
exactly the VC syllable to move to the end of the word –
and ignores the arguments they give for postulating an
initial vowel in words which start with a C when pro-
nounced in isolation; namely, that this vowel appears
when the word is not pronounced breath-group initially,
and that postulating it simplifies other morphonological
processes. A further argument in favor of the VC analysis
(see Evans 1995b) is that although there is considerable
variation in how words are pronounced in isolation (e.g.,
“sits” can be pronounced [an m ], [an m], [n m ], or
[n m]), the number of syllables remains constant under
the VC syllable analysis (at 2 in this instance), whereas
the number of syllables under other analyses remains
inconstant, even with the moraic adjustments that Nevins
proposes. In short, proposing VC syllables lines up beauti-
fully with a whole range of rules, whereas adopting the
alternative, while workable, is crabbed by inelegancies.
A deeper problem than mere inelegance in forcing a
language like Arrernte into a procrustean CV bed is that
it draws attention away from explaining what forces have
shaped the unusual Arrernte structure. There is growing
evidence from phonetic work by Butcher (2006) that the
Arrernte VC syllable represents the phonologization of a
whole syndrome of phonetic and phonological effects at
work in Australian languages, linking a number of
phenomena like: (a) the unusual proliferation of distinctive
heterorganic clusters intervocalically (e.g., nk vs. ˛k vs. k
vs. k); (b) the large set of place contrasts for oral and
nasal stops, including contrasts like alveolar versus postal-
veolar, that are most effectively cued by the leading rather
than following vowel; (c) the neutralization of the apico-
alveolar versus apico-postalveolar contrast word-initially;
and (d) the widespread pre-stopping of intervocalic
nasals and laterals.
The joint effect of all these features is to concentrate the
maximum amount of contrasting information in intervoca-
lic position, and make the leading vowel crucial for signal-
ling the place of following consonants through F2 and F3
formant transitions. In other words, it is VC rather than
CV units (or, more accurately, the continuous phonetic
signals that correspond to them) which are the most infor-
mative, in terms of cueing the greater number of contrasts.
This now allows us to give an insightful account of why VC
syllables emerge as phonological units in some Australian
languages. We would not be led to this explanation if we
use too much abstract representational machinery to
conjure away the existence of an aberrant pattern.
R6.6. Finite state grammars and cotton-top tamarins
Pullum & Scholz pull us up for propagating a misinter-
pretation of the findings in Fitch and Hauser (2004), by
stating that cotton-top tamarins have a general ability to
learn finite state languages. We stand corrected, and urge
the reader to heed Pullum & Scholz’s clarification that
Fitch and Hauser’s findings are restricted to the much
smaller subset known as SL (strictly local) languages.
The investigation of recursive and augmentative struc-
tures in animal cognition is a current minor industry in
cognitive science. If this is meant to shed light on the
human language capacity, it is arguably quite misguided.
Indefinite recursion, or discrete infinity as Chomsky
prefers, is not an actual property of human language –
no human is capable of indefinite centre-embedding, for
example. Only in the light of a radical distinction
between competence and performance does this minor
industry make any sense at all, and that little sense is
undermined by the impossibility of testing animals directly
for indefinite recursion.
R6.7. Cinque’s generalization about Greenberg’s
Universal #20
Specifying strict ordering in noun phrases where the noun
comes last, is raised by Rizzi as an example of how impli-
cational universals can be made to follow from parameter-
ized rules. However, Dryer (2009), drawing on a larger
cross-linguistic sample, shows that you get better fit with
the data if Cinque’s formal categories (like Adjective) are
replaced by semantic categories (like “modifier denoting
size, color, etc.”). Cinque’s parameterization just gives a
discrete and approximate characterization of statistical
trends reflecting the interaction of many functional
selectors.
R6.8. Subjacency and “invisible Wh-movement”
A number of commentators (Smolensky & Dupoux,
Freidin, Rizzi) appealed to the Chomskyan notion of
“Subjacency” as a convincing example of a highly abstract
principle or rule-constraint which is manifested directly in
languages like English. The idea in a nutshell is that move-
ment of constituents is constrained so that they may not
cross more than one “bounding node” in the syntactic
tree (in English, bounding nodes are a NP, i.e., noun
phrase, or a complementizer phrase headed by that).
Hence you can say “What does John believe that Mary
saw __?” but not “What does John believe the rumor
that Mary saw _?”.
Now consider Rizzi’s point that many languages,
including Chinese, do not move their Wh-words (so
called in situ Wh) – they would stay in the corresponding
slots indicated in the just provided sentences – but appear
to exhibit semantic interpretations that might constitute a
parallel phenomenon. The apparent lack of Wh-move-
ment in Chinese, which at first seems an embarrassment
to the theory, is claimed however to mask covert movement
at an underlying level, close to semantic interpretation:
consequently the range of construals of a Chinese Wh-
question is argued to be limited by the very same abstract
constraint postulated for languages with overt movement
(see examples in Rizzi’s commentary). For generativists,
this may seem like a double scoop: Not only is the con-
straint of an abstract enough kind that children would
find it hard to learn in English, but it even holds in
Chinese where it is, in effect, invisible, so could not poss-
ibly be learnt! Moreover, it is a completely arbitrary and
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unmotivated constraint, so there is no apparent way for the
child to infer its existence. Therefore, it must be part of
UG, a quirk of our innate language organ.
But this in fact is not at all a convincing example to the
other camp. First, to make it work in languages with and
without overt “movement,” it has to be so particularized
(“parameterized”) for each language so that, as we noted
in the target article, the child might as well learn the
whole thing (Newmeyer 2005). Second, there are perfectly
good alternative models that do not use movement: Wh-
words are simply generated in the right place from the
start, using other methods than movement to get the
correct logical interpretations. Within LFG, a combination
of the FOCUS discourse function and prosodic structure
can get in situ Wh interpretation with no covert movement
required (Mycock 2006). Through methods like these,
LFG, HPSG, and Role and Reference Grammar have all
developed ways of modelling both the English syntactic
constraints and the Chinese interpretation constraints
without any covert operations or unlearnable constraints.
Van Valin (1998) offers one of these rival explanations.6
He notes that for entirely general purposes one needs to
have a notion of “focus domain” – roughly the unit that
can be focussed on as new information in a sentence. A
chunk like Mary did X is such a unit, but the rumor that
Mary did X is not, because it marks the information as
already presumed. So it makes no sense to question part
of it. Focus domains have a precise structural characteriz-
ation, and the informational structure of this kind explains
both the English and the Chinese facts without positing
covert entities or unmotivated rule constraints. Van Valin
shows that the focus domains are easily learned by children
from the range of possible yes/no question elliptical
answers. This explanation needs the minimum equipment
(a definition of focus domain) and no magic or UG.
Take your pick between the two explanations – an
unmotivated, unlearnable, hidden constraint implying
innate complex architecture, or a general design for com-
munication requiring nothing you wouldn’t need for other
explanatory purposes. As C.-R. Huang (1993) notes after
discussing the Mandarin data, “there is no concrete evi-
dence for an abstract movement account . . . invoking
Ockham’s razor would exclude movements at an abstract
level.”
R6.9. C-command
Rizzi claims that “no language allows coreference between
a pronoun and a NP when the pronoun c-commands the
NP” (He said that John was sick; each other saw the
men). We pointed out that in languages (like Jiwarli)
which lack constituency as the main organizing principle
of sentence structure, notions like c-command cannot be
defined (c-command is defined in terms of a particular
kind of position higher in a syntactic constituency tree).
But let us interpret this relation loosely and charitably,
in terms of some general notion of domination or
control. Then the observation would have very wide val-
idity, but it would still be only a strong tendency. Counter-
examples include Abaza reciprocals (Hewitt 1979) where
the verbal affix corresponding to “each other” occupies
the subject rather than the object slot, and Guugu Yimid-
hirr pronominalization, where it is possible to have a
pronoun in the higher clause coreferential with a full NP
in the lower clause (Levinson 1987).
Once again, then, we are dealing with a widespread
but not universal pattern. The typological/functional para-
digm explains it as emerging from a more general ten-
dency in discourse (not just syntax): reference to entities
proceeds with increasing generality, which is why “She
came in. Barbara sat down” is not a way of expressing
“Barbara came in. She sat down.” (see Levinson [2000]
for a detailed Gricean account). Many languages have
grammaticalized the results of this more general tendency,
producing grammatical rules which can then be described
by c-command (if you want to use that formalism) but also
by other formalisms. Seeking the most general explanation
for cross-linguistic patterning here directs us to more
general pragmatic principles (“use the least informative
form compatible with ensuring successful reference
given the current state of common ground”), rather than
in terms of a specific syntactic constraint which only
applies in a subset (even if a majority) of the world’s
languages. Many strong tendencies across languages
appear to have a pragmatic or functional base, undermin-
ing a presumption of innate syntax.
R6.10. The “Verb-Object Constraint”
Baker offers his “Verb-Object Constraint (VOC)” as a
proposal for a “true linguistic universal” of this high level
kind – the generalization that the verb “combines” with
the theme/patient before a nominal that expresses the
agent/cause (“combines” is not defined, so we take it
loosely). But this, too, rapidly runs afoul of the cross-linguis-
tic facts. Note that his formulation equivocates between
whether the constraint is formulated in terms of semantic
roles such as agent and patient, or grammatical relations
such as subject and object; some of the problems below
pertain to one of these, some to the other, some to both:
1. Many languages don’t have a clear notion of subject
and object (see remarks in our target article). If we avoid
this problem by stating the universal in terms of thematic
roles (theme, patient, agent, experiencer), then we’ll find
such anomalies as languages which effectively idiomatize
the subject-verb combination, only combining secondarily
with the patient, employing idioms like “headache strikes
me/the girl” or “fever burns him” (Evans 2004; Pawley
et al. 2000).
2. Although polysynthetic languages like Mohawk
usually incorporate objects rather than subjects into the
verb, there are some that do incorporate transitive sub-
jects/agents (not just objects as Baker’s generalization
would predict), most famously the Munda language Sora
(Ramamurti 1931; cf. Anderson 2007).
3. There are twice as many VSO languages as VOS
languages, 14% versus 7%, respectively, in a worldwide
sample by Dryer (2009), but only VOS languages seem
likely to facilitate a “combination” of verb and object.
4. Languages with ergative syntax group the object of
transitives and the subject of intransitives as one type of
entity, around which the syntax is organized (Baker
notes this as a potential problem, but doesn’t offer the
solution).
Taken together, these problems make the VOC just one
more observation that is certainly a statistical tendency,
but which it is misleading to elevate to “universal” status.
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NOTES
1. We use the term generative linguists to refer to linguists working
specifically within frameworks deriving from the various theories of
Chomsky. The term also has a wider sense, referring to a larger body of
researchers working in fully explicit formal models of language such as
LFG, HPSG, and their derivatives. These alternative theoretical develop-
ments have been much less wedded to the Chomskyan notion of Universal
Grammar. LFG, in particular, has explicitly developed a much more flex-
ible multidimensional architecture allowing for both constituency and
dependency relations as well as the direct representation of prosodic units.
2. Of course these need to be relativized to modality: facts about the
position of the larynx or the stability of some vowel formants across
varying vocal tract configurations are only relevant to sound, whereas con-
straints on the production of hand or arm gestures are only relevant to
manual sign. There will be some parallels, but the degree to which “sonor-
ity” is the same phenomenon in both, as Berent suggests, is still contro-
versial (Sandler 2009; Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006, p. 245).
3. Hockett (1960) correctly identified this as part of the “duality of pat-
terning” (together with combinatorial semantics) necessary if language is
to be unlimited in its productivity.
4. Lest this finding invite incredulity, given that the language family is
assumed to be less than 6,000 years old, this figure is worked out by
summing independent path-lengths in many branches of the family
tree and looking for the total numbers of changes from an ancestral
language. The number should be taken with a pinch of salt but is probably
in the right general ballpark.
5. Abui, on Frantisˇek Kratochvil’s (2007) analysis, comes rather close.
6. For other kinds of explanation in terms of processing costs, see
Kluender (1992; 1998), Hawkins (1999), and Sag et al. (2007).
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